

**AN EVALUATION OF KUBWA RESETTLEMENT SCHEME (1989-2010), FEDERAL
CAPITAL TERRITORY, NIGERIA**

BY

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M.TECH/SSSE/2007/1711

DEPARTMENT OF GEOGRAPHY
FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, MINNA

DECEMBER, 2010.

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**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, FEDERAL UNIVERSITY
OF TECHNOLOGY MINNA, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF TECH. (M.TECH) IN GEOGRAPHY
(ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT)**


DECEMBER, 2010

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis was wholly and solely written by me under the supervision of **Dr. A.S Abubakar**. No part of this work has either been wholly or partially presented before for any degree elsewhere. Information hereby obtained from published works and unpublished works of others have been referred and acknowledged accordingly.

NWACHUKWU, Ikenna Ikechukwu

Sign



Date

03/5/11

DEDICATION

This inspiring work is dedicated to the families of **A. C. NWACHUKWU, MRS. IFECHI** and

F. J. OKECHUKWU.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The strategic conception of a resettlement policy is to provide a holistic and sustainable framework and operational guidelines for all the stages of a resettlement process from identifying settlement requiring resettlement, enumeration, site selection through to the stage of occupying the resulting resettlement scheme. Wherever and whenever there exists a missing link, the resettlement process becomes defective and unsustainable.

However, where resettlement policy implementing agency are inconsistent, where government priority are inconsistent, where political fiat exist, where institutions lack man power, integrity, and the requisite effective mechanisms to implement the resettlement policy, the resettlement process collapses and we thus, see a defective and unsustainable resettlement process.

Events have shown that there have been resettlement projects across Nigeria necessitated by various reasons (e.g. Dam construction, road construction etc) These have been be devilled with their respective challenges.

However, the creation of the FCT necessitated resettlement in the FCT resulting from large scale urban development; in line with this the FCT Act and the Master Plan indicated the approach (es) to resettlement of indigenous population affected by the development of the Federal Capital City. The resettlement policies have changed severally since its inception from total resettlement, partial resettlement, integration, and now total resettlement. Similarly, the task of implementing the resettlement policy has also jostled between the purviews of resettlement committees, resettlement task force before culminating into a fully fledged department in 2005.

All of these have given the FCT resettlement policy a character and outlook of inconsistencies whose consequences find expression in all resettlement schemes, of interest to this study is the Kubwa resettlement scheme which is not exclusive. This dismal expression has seen in the lack of schedule and phasing of the resettlement of indigenous settlement, loss of farm land and sources of

livelihood of resettlers, loss of cultural values of resettlers, dilapidation of infrastructure in the resettlement scheme.

This study intends to assess the implication of all these problems facing the Kubwa resettlement scheme as a result of the weak and inconsistent resettlement policy on the indigenous resettlers with a view to making appropriate recommendations. The study intends to achieve this by carrying out surveys and collecting and analyzing data on resettlers perception of the resettlement policy and the problems observed, obtain data from implementing agency about limitations and challenges, and make physical observations of the spatial expressions of the problems identified in order to make analytical deductions / inferences.

The study concludes by making recommendations that will make the indigenous resettlers derive optimum benefit from the FCT Resettlement Policy and make the Kubwa Resettlement Schemes as models for sustainable resettlement and compensation of indigenous population.

Upon the fact that after about thirty years since inception, the Abuja Master Plan is still being implemented with Phase I and part of Phase II of the FCC fully developed. Thus, in the development of the remaining part of Phase II and the whole of Phases III and IV, resettlement and compensation is of continual relevance to the development of the Federal Capital City, hence, the need to make it a sustainable tool in the resettlement and compensation of indigenous population in the Federal Capital Territory.

1.2 Research Problems

Inconsistencies in Resettlement Policy:

This has resulted from the frequency in the change of Government from time to time which has resulted to changes in government priorities, changes in government policies, lack of operational schedule for resettlement of indigenous settlement and has consequently led to development of unplanned land development around areas occupied by indigenous villages yet to be resettled from

the FCC. On the aggregate, resettlement cost has become heightened and similarly indigenous settlement have become so pressured and stressed.

Loss of Cultural Values:

As a result of the proximity of the Kubwa resettlement scheme to the FCC, there has been continuous infiltration of the Kubwa resettlement scheme by non-resettlers who are in pursuit of cheaper accommodation away from the FCC. This influx has resulted to the loss of cultural identity of the resettlers and the transfer of cultural values and customs to future generations of the resettlers cannot be guaranteed.

Loss of Farmland and Source of Livelihood:

This has resulted from a continuous spread of unplanned land development within and around the Kubwa resettlement scheme to accommodate non-resettlers who work within the FCC but reside outside the FCC, in such places of close proximities, like the Kubwa resettlement scheme. This phenomenal spread of unplanned land development has resulted to the loss of livelihood of the resettlers, as majority of the resettlers are farmers by this the settlers have become poor and disadvantaged with a diminishing standard of living condition.

Infrastructure Stress:

The Kubwa resettlement scheme was planned for a targeted population in line with the provided infrastructure to cater for the planned population. Over time, with the influx of non-resettler to the Kubwa resettlement scheme, facilities, utilities and services have become so pressured that their adequate and functional supply has gradually become a mirage. The result of this influx is also seen in the increased occupancy ratio and population density of this scheme, similarly, loss of recreational land making children play on the street, access roads in bad condition, electricity and water supply epileptic.

Ineffective Development Control Mechanism:

The sophistication and efficiency of any development control mechanism holds the key to a sustainable spatial development, however, the Kubwa resettlement scheme, the control of

development is seemingly ineffective as haphazard and unplanned development are prevalent, this inefficiency is further exacerbated by the involvement of the area council office in the management of the Kubwa resettlement scheme. All of this has resulted to the continual spread of unplanned land development leading to haphazard landuse development and setting a premise for unsustainable development, by this, making the Kubwa resettlement scheme lose the integrity of a sustainable resettlement scheme.

These problems as highlighted above have variously characterized the Kubwa resettlement schemes. The scheme thus leaves so much to be desired, and they do not meet the hope and aspirations of the resettlers.

1.3 Research Aim and Objectives

Aim

The aim of the study is to assess the impacts and problems of the FCT resettlement policy on the Kubwa Resettlement Scheme as a sustainable tool in the resettlement and compensation of indigenous population in the Federal Capital Territory.

In order to achieve the aim of this study, the specific Objectives are to:

To examine all previous and existing resettlement policies of the FCT.

To identify the impact of the influx of non-resettlers on the cultural values of the indigenous resettlers.

To assess the status of farmland areas for resettlers vis-a-vis the spread of unplanned land development within and around the Kubwa resettlement scheme.

To examine the present status and quality of infrastructural facilities, utilities and services within Kubwa resettlement scheme.

To identify the existing development control framework and mechanism for the Kubwa resettlement scheme vis-a-vis the present level of unplanned land development.

To make appropriate recommendations to ameliorate the identified problems.

1.4 Research Scope

The scope of the study is limited to the geographic extent of Kubwa resettlement scheme as outlined in resettlement policy stipulations and the resettlement plan, all physical development that has emerged within and around its confines, to include issues of assessment of conditions of physical development, conditions of facilities, utilities and services, community perception, level of community participation in evolving and implementing the resettlement plan, nature and extent of deviations from the provisions of the policy and plan, reasons for the deviations, socio-economic well-being of the resettlers and the nature and extent of un-planned residential development.

1.5 Research Justification

The justification of the study is borne out of the dire need to make an evaluation of the FCT resettlement policy in line with the Kubwa resettlement schemes not only to measure policy implications on it but also to ascertain its compliance with the provisions of the resettlement plan but to make it relevant to the needs of the people. There is also the need to impose order in the spreading unplanned residential development within and around the site of the Kubwa resettlement schemes, make the facilities, utilities and services functional and engender community spirit in the resettlers to give them a sense of ownership and responsibility by ensuring their participation in the review and monitoring process.

The study will also evolve improved methods and methodologies to all issues pertinent to sustainable implementation of resettlement schemes, starting from the conception stage through to monitoring and review stages. Importantly, resettlement and compensation using resettlement scheme is a continual effort of immense relevance in the FCT, until the remaining phases II, III and IV of the FCC are developed. The sustainability of this scheme will be a model for up-coming schemes in the FCT and as a viable to for resettlement and compensation.

1.6 Limitations of Research

The development of the original sites of Old Maitama, New Maitama, Katampe and Kukwaba in the FCT prevented an on-the-spot assessment of pre-resettlement situation, or comparative analysis, hence, data collection relied on oral / documented evidences. Also the unavailability of the layout plan(s) of the illegal residential development within and around the resettlement scheme site posed hindrances to the evaluation / assessment of these indiscriminate developments.

1.7 Background to Study Area

1.7.1 The Genesis and Concept of The Federal Capital Territory

By the early 1970s, the problems, which were being experienced in Lagos as a Federal Capital, were enormous and beginning to make it impossible for effective functioning. These problems included the following:

- a. The role of Lagos as Federal and State Capital meant that the city was over subscribed and occasionally conflicts in the dual roles played by the same city were manifesting.
- b. Limited space was available in the territory of Lagos for physical expansion.
- c. Rapid population growth.
- d. Non-commensurate infrastructure development.
- e. Traffic jams were becoming a permanent feature.
- f. Ineffective waste disposal and sanitation.


By 1971, well-researched arguments on the deteriorating infrastructure were already pointing to the abandoning of Lagos as Federal Capital in preference for a site that would serve as a symbol of National Unity. The Aguda Committee was appointed in 1975, and it recommended, “a centrally located Federal Capital in a spacious area with easy access to all parts of the federation would be an asset to the nation and would help in generating a new sense of national unity”.

1.7.2 Location

Abuja is located in the center of Nigeria, in the Guinea Savanna region of the middle belt. It is situated between Latitude $8^{\circ} 25'$ and $9^{\circ} 25'$ north of the Equator and Longitude $6^{\circ} 45'W$ and $7^{\circ} 45'E$ of the Greenwich Meridian.

Abuja is bounded by Kaduna in the North, in the East by Nassarawa, in the Southwest by Kogi and in the West by Niger States respectively (See Fig. 1.1). It covers an area of about 8,000 kilometers. Until recently (i.e starting from the early 1980s) in the whole 8,000 square kilometers of the territory, there was no settlement with a population of 10,000 inhabitants. Also, none of the four roads leading to it, namely Koton-Karfe-Abuja (150 km), Bida-Abuja (156 km), Minna-Abuja (112 km) and Keffi-Abuja (94 km) was tarred. Every one of these roads is trunk A, and hence, the responsibility of Federal Government. (Mabogunje 1977).

Between 1985 to date however, the situation has considerably changed for good as the entire four trunks A roads linking the territory with all part of the country are now tarred. The Kaduna - Abuja, and Keffi - Abuja roads have been dualized.



Source: AGIS, 2007.

Scale: 1:5,000,000

Fig. 1.1 FCT-Abuja in the National Context.

1.7.3 Climate


The general determinant of climate over Federal Capital Territory is the movement of the Discontinuity zone, which represents the meeting point of the dry Tropical Continental Air mass, and the coastal moist, Tropical Maritime Air mass. The movement of the zone determines the incidence of wet & dry season over the Federal Capital Territory. The wet season lasts from May-October and the dry season, from November to April. The cloud cover during most of the wet season is responsible for the cool weather of that season. The second determinant of climate is the local relief. The valleys tend to be considerably hotter than the higher elevations.

The weather is of two major seasons, the dry season and the rainy season. The dry season begins in November and ends in February with warm sunshine and harmattan in December and January. The rainy season starts in March and ends in November.

1.7.3.1 Temperature

Temperature during the dry season (Nov-April) can be as high as 27.5°C and 37°C (80°F-98°F), divinely range could rise up to 17°C (32°F) thereby greatly affecting comfort levels.

March is a critical month during which temperatures are usually highest. The maximum temperature ranges from 23.5°C -36°C (72°F-96°F) and is registered in the wet season (May-October), (See Figure 1.2). Divinely range is reduced to about 7°C (13°F) illustrating the moderating influence of cloud cover. These patterns however vary with elevation.



Source: AGIS, 2007.

Fig. 1.2 Maximum and Minimum Temperatures of the FCT (1987-2007)


1.7.3.2 Relative Humidity

Relative humidity during the dry season at higher elevation is about 20% while at lower elevation it is 30%. In the rainy season, it could be as high as 90% in the morning and 50% in the afternoon. At the valleys and plains the combination of relative humidity and temperature could be oppressive in terms of reduction of comfort level.

1.7.3.3 Rainfall

The start of rainy season in northeastern Federal Capital Territory is around the 10th of April. The rain tapers off, very rapidly after the 20th of October. Thus, the duration of the rainy season is between 180 days to 240 days in the year and total rainfall received during this period is between 1,145.55mm-1, 631.7mm. In the Abuja area 60 percent of the annual rainfall is in the months, July, August and September. (See Figure 1.3). This concentration of rainfall shows the need for drainage system that can handle large volumes of water very quickly.

Another weather phenomenon is associated with the presence of inselbergs, these features exert an influence on local weather greater than their size. These inselbergs induce convectional activity and cause intense relief rain in their immediate surroundings.



Source: AGIS, 2007.

Fig. 1.3 Mean Monthly Rainfall of Abuja (1987-2007)

1.7.3.4 Relief/Bedrock Geology

The relief of the FCT consists of a number of distinct physiographic regions which are basically of two types; hills and plains. The hills occur in clusters or in ranges (form of ridges) and are found mainly along the eastern boundary region, the north-east and north-central part of the territory, where an extension from Suleja (Niger State) protrude into the Territory. Relief within these hills is above 100m and it increases to 300m in the more rugged areas.

Slope gradient are generally over 10^0 , although much steeper in areas of solid rock hills and escarpment. Within these areas of rough topography however, some extensive areas of gently sloping terrain occur (especially within the Bwari-Aso hills and Zuba hills). The drainage texture of the hills is generally fine, and valley densities of $4 / \text{km}^2$ are common.

The major hills include gawu, Zuba, Bwari-Aso and Agwai-Karu hills. The extensive plains include, Iku-Gurara plains, Kau plains, Gwagwa plains, Bada plains, Bobo plains and Rubochi plains. (See Figure 1.4).

The bedrock geology is basically basement complex of Precambrian igneous rocks, made up largely of schist, gneiss and maluetities. Much of the plains and terraces are covered by sedimentary rocks of cretaceous age. A combination of geology and relief reveals topographic constraints value or hazard rating which is a useful index for building development and for identifying developable areas.



Source: Dawam P. D. (2000).


Fig. 1.4 Physiographic regions of the FCT (1987-2007)

3.5 Hydrology & Drainage

In terms of hydrology and drainage, the FCT is considered to have potential ground water sources, because of the extent of faulting within the underlying metamorphic geologic structure. Most of the streams exhibit flash floods during rainy period because of torrential rains and high run-off characteristics of the plains. The territory has a run-off co-efficient of between 40% and 60%.

However, some of these streams remain dry throughout the dry season.

In the valley bottom, the water table may be very close to the surface and water logging occurs e.g in Kwali and West of Abaji e.g around Pandagi and Yewuni. (See Figure 1.5).



Source: Dawam P. D. (2000).

Fig. 1.5 Rivers and Drainage pattern of the FCT

1.7.3.6 Vegetation and Soil

The surrounding plains and especially river courses are covered by rainforest. This is manifested especially along the stream courses. The vegetation types can be described as Forest and Savannah

type, the Forest vegetation can be seen as a situation where the vegetation consists predominantly of woody plants and from which grasses are virtually absent. While the Savannah is a vegetation type in which perennial mesophytic grasses are at least 80cm high, with flat basal and cauline leaves play an important part.

Elsewhere, cultivation has disturbed and reduced vegetation to grass tufts and shrubs. The soil type is sandy clay. A soil engineering constraint value indicates area of FCT as suitable for physical development.

1.7.4 History of Resettlement Schemes in the FCT

Resettlement in the Federal Capital Territory FCT is part of the blue print of planned implementation needed to achieve the laudable dream of the new Federal Capital City plan. It dates back 1976 when a policy was engineered regarding the inhabitants of the proposed Federal Capital territory. The initial plan and intention of the Federal Government was that everybody in the Territory would be resettled outside the geographical boundary of the territory and be paid compensation.

It however, became apparent that to have every village and local inhabitants moved will involve a lot of money. Therefore due to the enormous financial expenditure envisaged in the total resettlement of the entire existing local population outside the territory and the planning implication of leaving the vast habitable land unoccupied, an option of either to stay within in the FCT or to be resettled in the respective state of Niger, Kwara and Plateau, from where the FCT was carved out, was given to the local inhabitants. This was during the Civilian administration of the second republic, (1979 – 1983), when a review of resettlement policy was called for. Consequently a Presidential Ad-hoc committee

was then set up to look at the entire gamut of the resettlement exercise in the FCT.

The resettlement committee recommendations which were accepted by the Federal Government comprise the following:

i) That all household living in the area for city development will have to be compulsorily moved out, paid compensation and resettled in area of their choice, whether inside or outside the Abuja Federal Capital Territory. Resettlement should involve not just compensation for what the households have lost but should entail some degree of improvement in the people's standard of living through provision of basic amenities in their new area of domicile.

ii) That new compensation rates recommended in the report be used for all compensation items.

The presidential Ad-hoc committee report revealed that out of 26,000 household heads in the territory about 5,412 people opted to leave while the rest opted to remain from both priority and non priority areas. The priority areas according to FCDA required for immediate capital city development while the non-priority areas outside the zone needed for city construction. The capital city alone has been estimated to cover an area of 256 km² out of the 8000 km² of the entire capital territory.

The City therefore occupies 250 km² (3%) of the entire Territory with a projected population of 3.2 million people when completed. The rest of the Territory outside the city periphery constituting about 7,744 km² (97%) is designed as area for Regional Growth and Satellite Towns Development to accommodate resettlement towns.

The people that opted to leave the territory were duly compensated in accordance with the Presidential Ad-hoc Committees report while those that preferred to stay behind (both whose area

of habitation falls, within area of immediate physical development) are to be resettled else where in the Territory and compensated in accordance with the dictates of Land Use Decree (LUD) 1978. Resettlement unit was consequently inaugurated in November 1983 and was given the task to plan the resettlement of the people so far affected. Though this unit has changed names at various times its functions and activities have basically remained the same. The unit has been made a full Department in FCDA recently by Honourable Minister FCT Abuja.

The resettlement Task Force's scope of progress revealed that the unit through the progress made in the implementation of the Master Plan and details site development plans, has the following resettlement projects as priority projects after Ushafa Resettlement Scheme:

(i) Kubwa Resettlement Scheme:

This is prepared to resettle the inhabitants of New and old Maitama, Katampe, and Kukwaba villages, because of the development of the Federal capital City.

(ii) Karu Resettlement Scheme:

This is meant to take care of few hamlets located within the Federal Housing Authority Estate at Karu village.

iii) Jibi Resettlement Scheme:

This is meant to take care of Jabi (Yakubu and Samuel), Mabushi, Kpadna, Utako, Jahi and Zhilu-maje villages, because of the development of the Capital City. Upon completion and shortly before the handing over to the beneficiaries officers of the Nigeria Police went into occupation and with the

intervention of the Federal Government the project was handed over to the Nigeria Police with promise refund to the FCDA via deduction from source of the police allocation, the cost of the project.

(iv) Apo / Garki Resettlement Scheme:

This is designed to accommodate the indigenes of Garki village \ Apo who are affected by the new resettlement policy that seeks to phase out the integration policy, this scheme however is currently on-going.

1.7.5 Pre-Resettlement Situations

Villages to be resettled at Kubwa Resettlement Scheme are Maitama Sabo (New), Maitama Tsoho (Old) Kukwaba, Katampe in order to allow for the construction of the FCC. *See Fig. 1.6.* Also, the Kubwa Resettlement Scheme is located in the Bwari Area Council of the FCT. *See Fig. 1.7*





Fig. 1.6 Villages to be resettled from the FCC to within the Territory




Source: AGIS (2004)

Fig. 1.7 Area Councils in the FCT – Abuja. Villages to be resettled from the FCC to within the Territory


1.7.5.1 Morphology

The cluster type arrangement (Fig. 1.8-1.9) is a predominant characteristic of the affected settlements. Many groups of clusters aggregate to form a typical village with each area interconnected by footpaths.



Source: *Kubwa Resettlement Area Master Plan (1989)*

Fig. 1.8 Typical compound cluster in old settlements before resettlement to Kubwa Resettlement Schemes.



Source: Greater Usuma Town (Tourist Resort) (1985)


Fig. 1.9 Typical compound cluster in old settlements before resettlement to Kubwa Resettlement Schemes

1.7.5.2 Housing Types

The basic house type is the round hut with its conical type of roof measuring about 3.0 metres in diameter and 2.5 metres in height. (Plate i). The huts are in clusters of between three and five which make up the compound. Each compound contains a household.



Source: Kubwa Resettlement Area Master Plan (1989)



Source: Greater Usuma Town (Tourist Resort) (1985)

Plate i Typical House types in old settlements before resettlement to Kubwa Resettlement Schemes.


About 90% of the huts were made of mud and thatched roofs with one entrance and a little window usually facing the inner compound to maximize privacy. Closely located to the huts were mud barns or "rumbus" standing on stakes about half a metre above the ground. (*Plate 1.2*).



Source: *Kubsswa Resettlement Area Master Plan (1989)*

Plate 1.2 Traditional Rumbus (Storage Barn)

The huts were arranged in circular patterns joining each other by mud walls which make up the inner portion (courtyard). (*Fig. 1.10*).



Source: Kubwa Resettlement Area Master Plan (1989)

Fig 1.10 Cluster type arrangement of settlements and hierarchy of Open space

This courtyard serves as cooking area, meeting place recreational ground and for drying household items. Toilet and bathrooms are essential facilities that are conspicuously absent. The surrounding bushes are often used for such purposes.

1.7.5.3 Circulation

There were visibly no roads within the villages, the main modes of transportation are foot and animal. The foot paths though unplanned, help in connecting the residential areas with commercial facilities such as the market, village centre and the palace. Most of such footpaths are about one metre wide.

1.7.5.4 Open Space


Although there appeared to be no organized open spaces in these villages, yet a critical look will reveal a definite pattern of inner courtyard which leads to the buffers between compounds and the

market square that are usually located close to the palace and the mosque. A cluster of three or more compounds provides a larger order of open space system.

1.7.5.5 Other Social Infrastructure

Electricity and pipe borne water are conspicuously absent throughout the villages.

The bigger villages such as Garki and Kukwaba have both the conventional primary and Quranic type of school. The one - tutor Quranic schools are in some cases attached to mosques. The conventional primary schools are built of aluminum sheets. The absence of a motor park in most of the villages could be explained by the fact that the foot forms the dominant mode of transportation. Weekly markets are common features of the commercial life which are avenues of social and cultural interactions. They have no permanent structures and are predominantly built of thatches on wooden trunks. (Plate iii-iv).



Source: Kubwa Resettlement Area Master Plan (1989)

Plates iii Typical Market and Motor park in old settlements before resettlement to Kubwa Resettlement Schemes.



Source: Greater Usama Town (Tourist Resort) (1985)

Plates iv Typical Market and Motor park in old settlements before resettlement to Kubwa Resettlement Schemes.

Besides being centres for sale of commodities, each market unconsciously specializes in the sale of particular goods.

The people mostly Gwaris are known to be energetic and hard working farmers. They produce a wide variety of food crops ranging from yams, cow pea, rice, cereal, vegetables to fruits.

THE STUDY AREA

1.7.8 Kubwa Resettlement Scheme

1.7.8.1 Locational Setting

Kubwa resettlement area falls within Bwari Area Council along the northern borders of the Federal Capital Territory, and covers an approximate area of 860 hectares. It is bounded to the north by Bwari - Aso hill range and to the south by the outer northern express way.

1.7.8.2 Topography

The area is generally low, undulating and dotted with rock out crops. The heights range between 406 metres along the river valleys and 448.8m at the highest point. The slopes range from one to ten percent, except in rocky out crops and valley sides where the slopes range from 20 -30%). Generally the entire area slopes in a south ward direction.

1.7.8.3 Drainage

The area is traversed from the north east to south west by the Usuma River. The numerous tributaries of Usuma River are notably Sudna and Garudna, and they provide natural drainage channels from north to south throughout the area.

1.7.8.4 Soil and Vegetation

This soil in the area is found to contain large amount of humus which makes it considerably fertile and hence suitable for farming. The soil remains a great potential to the area in respect of agriculture. The vegetation can best be described as parkland savannah with scattered trees. There exist galleries of forest along the river valleys and the landscape is heavily covered by tall elephant grasses especially during the rains.

1.7.8.5 Climate

The climate of this area is not significantly different from that of the entire territory with its annual temperature range between 21°C and 32°C. The annual rainfall is about 117 millimetres with the highest recorded in the months of July, August and September.

1.7.9 The Scheme

The land use provision was based largely on the existing characteristics of the displaced villages with the planning objective of providing necessary facilities for their basic self-sufficiency and healthy integration into the new environment. The estimated total land area in the old plan is about 1,359.79 hectares. (*See Figure 1.13*).

In that plan, the villages were treated ultimately as neighborhood units inter-relating within a District at a higher order for the distribution of goods, services and facilities.

Since farming was the dominant occupation of the expected settlers, the fringe and most of the underdeveloped area totaling about 512 hectares or representing about 60% of the resettlement area was earmarked for agriculture to provide nearby farms for the villages. *See Table 1.2 below*.

Table 1.2: Landuse Budget of Kubwa Resettlement Area Master Plan. (1989)

S/No.	LAND USE	AREA IN HECTARES	% COVERED
1	Residential	176.61	20.54
2	Commercial	11.18	1.30
3	Industrial	4.06	0.47
4	Public/Semi-Public	48.83	5.68
5	Open Spaces/Green Area	64.99	7.56
6	Road Network	42.30	4.92
7	Agriculture	511.90	59.53
TOTAL		859.85	100.00

Source: Kubwa Resettlement Area Master Plan (1989)

The provisions of the plan as highlighted above reflected the initial intention, which was to resettle villagers affected by development within the Federal Capital City. As a matter of priority villages displaced from Phases I & II including Garki, Jabi I & II, Durumi I & II, Kukuwaba, Maitama, Sabo, Maitama Tsoho and Katampe were to be resettled at Kubwa. This therefore took up a total land area of 177 hectares, which is about 21 % of the settlement's land area. (According to the original plan)

1.7.9.1 Residential Development

The residential development was based on the compound system type of layout, which was intended to retain the individual communal life of the resettled population. The plots provided were for each household with expandable core houses of a minimum of 2-bedrooms and maximum 4-bedrooms to also take care of natural growth and other incidental needs within the family units.

1.7.9.2 Education

Five number Primary Schools and One Secondary School were provided within the Plan.

The Secondary School was located in the central area to service all the resettled villages.

1.7.9.3 Agriculture

About 60% of the total land area was earmarked for agriculture as farming was the primary occupation of the settlers. The plan envisaged that this chunk of land be held in trust by the District Heads through the village heads who are expected to share the land amongst their respective subjects.

1.7.9.4 Transportation

Different hierarchy of roads was provided to take care of vehicular traffic and pedestrian movements. The plan provided 42 hectares of roadway amounting to 4.9% indicate the settlement is highly pedestrianised.

1.7.9.5 Central Area

The central area as planned is strategically located to allow for maximum accessibility from all parts of the area. Apart from being fairly central, it is accessed through a primary road, which traverses the entire planned area.

The Centre is made up of communal/municipal facilities, public facilities and private commercial ventures. It is to serve as the main focus of the planned area, culturally divergent and a unifying factor for all the elements within the settlement.

1.7.9.6 Infrastructure Facilities

The infrastructural facilities, utilities and services planned for Kubwa, include electricity supply, water supply, storm water and waste water drainage channels, sanitary landfill, sewerage treatment plant, postal and telecommunication services.

However, some of these facilities are yet to be developed. The plan was aborted midway due to change in the Partial Resettlement Policy by FCDA to Integration Resettlement Policy (i.e. integrating villages within the city). Hence, Kukwaba, Old Maitama, New Maitama and Katampe Villages were the only villages resettled in Kubwa. By this, the holistic conception of the plan was altered. Therefore, vast developable lands that are left un-committed or earmarked for agriculture were later converted for illegal development.

However, Table 1.3 below shows the landuse distribution of the extent of implementation of the Kubwa Resettlement Scheme covering an area of 190.59 hectares.

Table 1.3: Landuse Budget of Kubwa Resettlement Area (Study Area)

S/No.	LAND USE	AREA IN HECTARES	% COVERED
1	Residential	73.22	38.42
2	Commercial	1.00	0.52
3	Public/Semi-Public	2.13	1.12
4	Open Spaces/Recreation	18.11	9.50
5	Roads / Circulation	14.69	7.71
6	Agriculture	81.44	42.73
TOTAL		190.59	100.00

Source: Kubwa Resettlement Area Master Plan (1989)

By and large, the Kubwa Resettlement Scheme is a planned development, where the provisions of the detailed site development plan is meant not only to resettle these displaced indigenous populace and give them a new lease of life but also to make provisions that would guarantee a better life that would have been achieved if resettlement / displacement had not occurred. The following chapter examines the implementation of the scheme with a view to observing the achievements and the failures.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Literature Review

This review of literatures considers such related issues as population relocation and rehabilitation, reasons for relocation, guidelines and good practice in resettlement, implementation procedures as they have been conceived and used by several authors. It further gives a brief account of resettlement scheme practices in some parts of the world and considers some known cases of resettlement schemes. It concludes with some known cases of resettlement schemes as well as some empirical effects of such exercise.

2.1.1 Concept and Meaning of Resettlement

Resettlement has been viewed variously by different authors from different perspectives. Some described it as a process, a situation, others as a phenomenon. From the aggregation of these perspectives resettlement implies the displacement of people (usually in large numbers) and their activities from their original place of habitation to a new location. However, for the purpose of this study which seeks to focus on Resettlement Schemes, it views resettlement as a holistic process involving the relocation and rehabilitation of people from their original places of habitation to a planned area intended to cater for their habitation and occupational needs.

Involuntary resettlement is often a consequence of planned change generated by major development projects or programmes. While such relocation of people is generally regarded as a consequence of building dams for irrigation or hydropower, in fact it also occurs with considerable frequency as a result of projects in many other sectors (e.g. projects for urban renewal, highway construction, mine development, etc.).

The types of development projects that most often cause involuntary resettlement are those that are predicated on a major change in land and water use. This commonly occurs in urban development projects, water resource projects, in highway construction, mine development or in industry, where financing is provided for:

- (a) construction of dams for Irrigation, hydro-energy and water supply which create man-made lakes on previously Inhabited areas;
- (b) construction of transportation corridors -- railways, highways, airports, transmission lines, irrigation canal networks and others that require right of way;
- (c) construction of new ports and towns;
- (d) construction or Improvement of urban Infrastructure (e.g. sewerage systems, subways, Intra-city roads, etc.) and more generally, urban systematization;
- (e) Inception of mining operations, particularly strip mining; and
- (f) the protection of grazing areas and of transhumance routes.

Such projects are often of crucial importance for national or regional development. They are but one of a variety of situations in which national long term interests may conflict with the interests of groups and individuals who are immediately and adversely affected. The former usually prevail. However, in as much as these projects, in addition to their positive contribution to national interests, have also an unavoidable negative impact, means of reconciling the two sets of conflicting interests need to be found. Firm measures must be taken to protect the lives, welfare, culture and human

rights of those displaced, as well as to reduce/redress the loss of economic potential incurred by the local or regional economy.

In Belshow's (1978) view, resettlement "involves the planned and controlled transfer of population from one area to another". In the same vein, Bridger (1962) definition indicates that resettlement can be viewed as "the transfer of population from one area to another on a planned basis with the objectives of raising their' standard of living" However, Scudder (1973:2) defined resettlement as involuntary movement resulting from government decision which the people have to obey and from that reason the Government being the initiating agency assume degree of responsibility". Also Palmer (1974) conceptualized resettlement schemes to be "those designed to relocate people affected by war, national hazards, development of projects e.g dam construction, road construction development of new towns etc.

The construction of dams necessitated the setting-up of various resettlement projects across the world both in the tropical and sub-tropical countries. Such projects are government sponsored in which people affected are involuntarily moved out to a new area of abode but in an organized manner.

2.1.2 Compensation

It would be difficult to talk about resettlement adequately, without mentioning a major aspect of it, which is compensation. Compensation as described by advanced learners dictionary is something especially money that is given to a person for hurt, damage or injury. Compensation is to provide something good to balance or reduce the bad effect of damage or loss. Compensation describes the

arrangement for valuing and disbursing benefits as result of the involuntary movement (Abumere, 1999).

Population resettlement scheme consume colossal amount of capital. The financial resources committed to the project must be adequate to cover the expenses from the stages of feasibility study through stages of social surveys and last stages of final execution of the project. Compensation could also be seen as money or payment in kind to which the people affected are entitled, in order to replace the lost of asset, resources or income. The provision for compensation which is affair replacement value for basic losses within a reasonable period of time is to minimize impoverishing effects of displacement. Compensation is usually of two kinds; monetary compensation and compensation in kind. Compensation aims at providing alternative land, buildings, houses etc for the displaced persons to ameliorate the pains of relocation. It facilities implementation procedures when properly conceived and managed. The three important elements of involuntary resettlement policy by Asian Development Bank Report 2006 are that;

- Compensation to replace lost assets.
- Assistance for relocation, including provision of relocation sites with appropriate facilities and services.
- Assistance for rehabilitation to achieve at least the same level of well being, rehabilitation measures include restoration of access to public facilities, infrastructures and services and cultural property and common property resources.

The Nigerian Urban and Regional Planning Decree 88 of 1992 Section 76 and 77 makes provision on compensation. The Provision include that, compensation is to be in accordance with the Land Use Act of 1979.

The Problem of payment of Compensation to displaced people for their immovable assets are numerous and complex, primary because of the inability of the re-settlers to adjust to their new ways of life. Experience from the past scheme have shown that those re-settlers who receive monetary compensation do not actually spend the money in ways that would help them get resettled effectively, but on luxury items and entertainment (Mabogunje, 1975). Several evidences are available on the misuse of compensation money to displaced farmers in Kabanni Basin during the University dam project. The overall consequences of such actions are economic stagnation of the regions affected and the resultant social problems of migration in an attempt to adjust to economic needs.

Compensation according to (Abumere, 1999), must be made for any Compulsory acquisition of land by public authorities. However, there is no consensus in regards to the form of method to be adopted. From the various resettlement schemes in Nigeria, the following five practices may be discerned.

- Cash payment for houses, economic tress, farmlands, community facilities etc, with the displaced persons, resettling themselves as best as they can in surrounding districts. This option was adopted in the Tiga Dam Resettlement Scheme in Kano, Northern.
- Cash payment only in respect of household immovable items (houses, economic tress, farmland) with the public authority installing basic infrastructures (roads, mosque, churches etc.)

and community structures (schools, mosque, churches etc,) whilst the displaced population build their own houses.

- Cash payment for irreplaceable items(mainly economic tress) with the public authority constructing houses similar to those vacated by the displaced persons and providing farmlands in laid out areas for people to move into;

- Cash payment for irreplaceable items with the public authority constructing relatively modern housing and providing other facilities for the re-settlers. This option was adopted in the Kainji Dam Resettlement scheme in the middle in the belt of Nigeria. A similar version has been adopted on the Ajoda New Town Resettlement Scheme in Ibadan, South Western Nigeria; and

- Cash payment for irreplaceable items (economic tress mainly) with the public authority providing farmlands of sixes equipment to those lost and building materials for re-settlers to build houses of their choice. This option was adopted in the Bakolori Dam Resettlement Scheme.

Nigerian Urban and Regional Planning Decree Section 76 Subsection (1) states that all matters connected with the paymet of compensation for the revocation of a right of occupancy under that part (i.e. part 4 – acquisition of land and compensation shall be governed in accordance with the relevant provisions of land use of 1978. Section 29 Subsection (1) of the land be entitled to compensation for the value at the date of revocation of their unexhaustive improvement subsection (4) of section 29 further state that compensation shall be as respects:

- The land for an amount equal to the rent if any, paid by the occupier during the year in which the right of occupancy was revoked.

- Building installation or improvement, thereon, for the amount of the replacement cost of the building, that is to say, such cost as may be assessed on the basis of the prescribed method of assessments as determined by the appropriate officers less any depreciation, together with the interest at the bank rate for delayed payment of compensation and in respect of any improvement in the nature of reclamation works being such cost thereof as may be substantiated by documentary evidence and proof to the satisfaction of the appropriate officer.

- Crops on land apart from any building, installation or improvement thereon, for an amount equal to the value as prescribed and determined by the appropriate officer.

Compensation as stated in the Land Use Act connotes that;

i. land should be considered for amount equal to rent that year.

ii Buildings and improvements at the replacement value connotes fairness and being substantial.

iii. Crops on land should also be considered.

Payment for basic losses and replacement value compensation connotes fairness and being substantial. Payment within reasonable period connotes minimizing delays in payment. This removes frustration and reduction in value from the compensation. Payment of reasonable compensation means substantial amount and value should be paid to favour recipients. The provision for reasonable compensation which is fair replacement value for basic losses within a reasonable period of time minimizes impoverishing effects of displacement.

Subsection (5) where the land in respect of which a Right of Occupancy has been revoked forms part of the larger area, the compensation payable shall be computed as in subsection (4) (a) above less a proportional amount calculated in relation to that part of the area not affected by the revocation but of which the portion revoked forms apart and any interest payable shall be assessed and computed in the like manner.

Subsection (6) where there is any building installation or improvement or crops on the land to which subsection (5) applies, then compensation shall be computed as specified therein, that is as respects:

- Such land, on the basis specified in that subsection.
- Any building, installation or improvement or crops thereon any combination of the two or all of improvement or crops thereon or any combination of the two or all of those things on the basis specified in that subsection and subsection (4) above, or so much of those provisions as are applicable and on interest under those provisions shall be computed in like manner.

Section (7) for the purpose of this section "installation" means any mechanical apparatus set up or put in a position for use or materials set up in or on land or other equipment, but excluded any fixture in or on any building.

Section (30) where there arises any dispute as to the amount of compensation calculated in accordance with the provisions of Allocation Committee.

Section (31) the provision of the Public Land Acquisition (Miscellaneous Provisions). Act 1976 shall not apply in respect of any land vested in or taken over by the Governor or any local government, as the case may be, may in his or its discretion offer in lieu of compensation payable in accordance with the provisions of this Act resettlement in any other place or area by way of a reasonable alternative accommodation (if appropriate in the circumstances).

2.1.3 Legal Aspects of Resettlement and Compensation

2.1.3.1 Land Use Act of 1978

The Land Use Act of 1978 is different from the land tenure system that was practiced in the various parts of the country and as modified in 1990. The purpose of the Land Use Act was in liberalizing the tenure system, enhance orderly growth and development of our country and minimize hoarding and speculation. Section 33 Sub Section 1-3 talks about resettlement:

- “Where a right of occupancy is respect of any developed land on which a residential building has been erected is revoked, the Governor or Local Government may in his or its discretion offer in lieu of compensation payable in accordance with the provision of the act, resettlement in any other place or area by ay of reasonable alternative accommodation if appropriate in the circumstance”
- “Where the value of alternative accommodation is higher than compensation payable, the parties concerned may by agreement require that refund or repay to government”.
- “Where a person accepts a “resettlement” his right to compensation shall be deemed to have been duly satisfied and no further compensation shall be payable to such a person”.

2.1.3.2 Acquisition of Land

Nigerian Urban and Regional Planning law (NURP Decree 88 of 1992, amended 1999) Section 75 Sub-Section (1) gives power to revoke and acquire any right of occupancy in connection with planned rural development in accordance with the policies and proposals of any approved plan on

the recommendation of the appropriate authority (i.e. the commission, the board of authority). Section 75 Subsection (2) states that any right of occupancy held in pursuance of Subsection (1) above shall be revoked in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Land Use Act.

Land Use Act section 28 subsection 1 states that it shall be lawful for the governor to revoke a Right of Occupancy for overriding interest. This also is covered by subsection 2b of section 28 which says that the land may be acquired for public purpose.

2.1.3.3 Environmental Impact Assessment Act 1992

It is recorded in the Environmental Impact Assessment Act 1992 that, due lawful process must be followed to resettle the affected communities that will be displaced.

Section 4 and (g) of the Environmental Impact Assessment Act 1992 provides that EIA shall include at least a description of the proposed activities. This is an indication whether the environment of any State or Local Government Areas outside Nigeria is likely to be affected by the proposed activity or its alternatives, also the affected people, interest group and the public should be given opportunity to comment on the EIA. Development projects should be for the upliftment and social well-being of the people including the host communities.

2.1.4 Abuja Master Plan Guidelines Regarding Resettlement Within The FCT

Settlement proposed to be relocated within the Federal Capital Territory fall into 5 categories as per the 1979 Master Plan. They are:

- i. Settlements within 5 kilometer of Capital city site.
- ii. Settlements within the area proposed for game reserved i.e. within Bobo plains.
- iii. Settlements within I kilometer of the watershed and all settlements within the watershed of the proposed reservoirs in the Bwari-Aso Hills (i.e. both the upper and the lower Usama Dams of which only the lower Usman has so far been built).

- iv. Settlements in the FCT within 5 kilometer of the intersection of the two major road corridors (routes A-2) entering the northern part of FCT at Zuba.
- v. Settlements of old Nyanya and old Karu along route A-234 exits from the FCT at the eastern flank.

2.1.5 Scale and Nature of Resettlement

The size of the population displaced may vary from only several hundred people in one project to tens of thousands of people in others. The Aswan Dam project in Egypt, for instance, had to resettle over 100,000 people, and the Narmada Sardar Sarovar Dam being built now in Gujarat will displace some 70,000 people. The Yacyreta reservoir at the border area between Argentina and Paraguay will submerge towns and villages inhabited by some 45,000 people and about 60,000 urban and rural people were displaced by the Sobradinho Dam in Brazil. The recently completed Nangbeto hydropower dam in Togo has displaced some 10,000 rural people, many of whom are shifting cultivators, while the Shuikou dam on the Min river in China, whose construction started in 1987, will cause the relocation of about 62,500 people living in villages and townships. The largest involuntary relocation in dam projects known so far was caused by the Danjlangkou dam, completed in China in mid '70s, where some 383,000 people were resettled; and a drinking water reservoir and supply system under construction now in Dhaka, Bangladesh will cause the relocation of some 20,000 people, etc.

In each and every case, the task of involuntarily relocating people is a daunting one and it would be a mistake to underestimate the disruptive effects of dislocation even in projects where the size of the population affected is relatively small. In Guatemala, for instance, the mishandling of the relatively

limited relocation entailed by the Chlxoy dam caused such discontent that a national emergency was declared.

Warning about the difficulties involved in resettlement, the World Bank's (1988) guidelines emphasize that the complexity of dislocation results not from numbers alone, but from the severity of the consequences to the people affected and to project success. The way involuntary resettlement is handled can substantially affect the overall economic and social results of projects.

2.1.6 Resettlement as Development Programme

The only response adequate to the complex and disruptive nature of involuntary resettlement, when such resettlement is unavoidable, is careful and systematic advance planning for viable alternatives in each Individual project.

Because involuntary resettlement dismantles a previous production system and way of life, all resettlement programs must be development programs as well. It is not acceptable to leave unexplored or unimplemented reasonable measures to prevent those dislocated from becoming permanently impoverished. When resettlement is unavoidable, the World Bank's (1988) policy is to help the borrower ensure that the productive base and income-earning ability of those involuntarily resettled are improved – so that they share the benefits of the new development and are compensated for transitional hardships or at least helped to attain the standards they would have achieved without relocation.

2.1.7 Resettlement Losses

Huge development projects that change patterns of use of land, water, and other natural resources can cause a range of resettlement effects. Resettlement losses most often arise because of land acquisition, through expropriation and the use of eminent domain or other regulatory measures, to obtain land. Housing, community structures and systems, social networks, and social services can be disrupted. Productive assets, including land, income sources, and livelihoods can be lost. Cultural identity and potential for mutual help may be diminished.

Loss of resources for subsistence and income may lead to exploitation of fragile ecosystems, hardship, social tensions, and impoverishment. In urban areas, displaced people might swell a growing squatter population.

2.1.8 The Imperatives of Resettlement and Relocation

2.1.8.1 Consulting with the people

The people affected are ultimately the best placed to select the strategies which will, often, bring dramatic change to their lives. They may well have a much better sense than an outsider of what will work for them, and their participation is likely to lead to a greater sense of ownership and more sustainable solutions. According to Asian Development Bank (ADB) (1998), Social preparation is an important process for reducing tension and obtaining cooperation when resettlement is likely to cause social resistance, or when vulnerable people are displaced.

2.1.8.2 Good Practice

According to ADB (1998), Good practice in resettlement planning and implementation contained the following key elements:

- Take all steps to minimize or eliminate involuntary resettlement where feasible by exploring viable alternative design options.
- Define the parameters of likely resettlement at the **ISA** stage, and include appropriate **TORs** in the **PPTA** Feasibility Study.
- Conceptualize and implement resettlement measures as development programs, to be part of all projects, including sector, private sector and co-financed projects, and loans to development finance institutions.
- Complete socioeconomic surveys and census of people affected early in the project preparation to identify all losses from land acquisition and all affected persons, and to avoid an influx of outsiders or speculators.
- Involve all stakeholders in a consultative process, especially all affected persons, including vulnerable groups.
- Compensate all affected persons, including those without title to land, for all their losses at replacement rates.
- Where relocation of housing is required, develop relocation options in consultation with affected persons and host communities, in order to restore living standards.
- Where people will lose income and livelihoods, establish appropriate income restoration programs with objectives to improve, or at least restore, their productive base.
- Provide a social preparation process for people affected when they are vulnerable, or when there is social tension associated with displacement.

- Prepare a time-bound Resettlement Plan with appropriate provisions and sources of funding before appraisal, with a summary Resettlement Plan before **MRM**. Include a summary resettlement plan in the draft RRP to the Board.
- Involve specialists in resettlement and social sciences, and people affected, in the planning, implementation, and monitoring of the Resettlement Plan.

2.1.8.3 Concept of Significance and Resettlement Planning

According to the ADB (1998), “Significant” is defined as meaning:

The population of 200 persons or more will experience resettlement effects. Similarly, the population of 100 persons or more who are experiencing resettlement effects and are indigenous people or vulnerable as defined in the policy (for example, female-headed households, the poorest, isolated communities, including those without legal title to assets, and pastoralists). Also, the population of persons more than 50 people experiencing resettlement effects that are particularly vulnerable, for example, hunter-gatherers. The Projects Department concerned would decide, in consultation with the Social Development Division (SOCD), if a full Resettlement Plan is required.

A full Resettlement Plan is required when resettlement effects are significant. When resettlement is significant, Asian Development Bank staff should assist the government and other project sponsors to:

- adopt and implement the policy objectives and principles within their own legal, policy, administrative, and institutional frameworks;
- build the capacity of the government and other project sponsors effectively to plan and implement involuntary resettlement;
- strengthen the DMC’s capacity and macro frameworks for involuntary resettlement;

- assist the government and other project sponsors in preparing and submitting to the Bank, before loan appraisal, a satisfactory Resettlement Plan with time-bound actions and budgets; and
- inform the government of the Asian Development Bank's policy.

The full Resettlement Plan would include the following:

- (i) objectives, policies, and strategies;
- (ii) organizational responsibilities;
- (iii) community participation and integration with host populations;
- (iv) socio-economic survey;
- (v) the legal framework including mechanisms for resolution of conflicts and appeals procedures;
- (vi) identification of alternative sites and selection;
- (vii) valuation of and compensation for lost assets;
- (viii) landownership, tenure, acquisition, and transfer;
- (ix) access to training, employment, and credit;
- (x) shelter, infrastructure, and social services;
- (xi) environmental protection and management; and
- (xii) implementation schedule, budget, and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E).

It would also specify measures taken to minimize or avoid resettlement effects. It may include a social preparation phase. The time and effort required to prepare a Resettlement Plan will be commensurate with the scale and magnitude of the resettlement problem. The Asian Development Bank's policy states that: "the preparation of a resettlement plan may require 2-4 weeks of local consultant inputs for a simple project involving resettlement of a small number of people, whereas a plan involving larger number of people to be resettled in a complex project may require about 15 months of staff and consultant inputs in addition to the inputs of the executing agencies, and may take up to 2 years".

2.1.9 Resettlement Experience in the Developed World

According to the Encyclopedia of Urban Planning (ed Whittick), resettlement became associated with new towns programme initiated since 1903 as an alternative response to over-congestion in Urban Centers . Ebenezer Howard, put forward a courageous and brilliant proposal for Garden cities outside London and the primary aim was to provide an alternative to overgrowth, congestion and sub-urban development of cities. This was done by creating new modernized towns in which people could have good houses in healthy and pleasant surroundings near their places of work with urban services and cultural facilities and access open to country side. The practicality of achieving these lofty objectives did not come to fruition immediately as people did not rapidly occupy the newly built towns at Letchworth in 1903 and Welwyn Garden City in 1919.

It was not until after the Second World War that came a policy limiting metropolitan overgrowth. Thus under the New Towns Act of 1946, about 25 new towns, essentially conforming to Howard's Garden City definition were founded in great Britain, each town being initially planned for a population ranging from 25,000 to 60,000 people and beyond. Many of these towns have proved remarkably successful as place to live and efficient centers of modern industry.

Between 1760 and 1920, there was the British Enclosure Movement which involved a survey of scattered strips of land, evaluation and re-distribution of same. There from, new roads were set, drainage channels were constructed etc. rather than fragmented and scattered land holdings, land was considered holistically. New Layouts were prepared with roads, trees and farm houses relocated harmoniously in villages. (Hall, 1975, 22).

The result was a series of transportation sector that was brought about by the industrial revolution. This paved the way for Britain to achieve its present stage of development in the rural sector.

The United States of America having learnt lesson from the British Enclosure Movement, surveyed its nation and drew up 'grids' which popularly known as 'geographical lines'. Based on the system of grids, rectangular systems of land subdivisions was involved with farm houses and home steads located on various rectangles. (Abin, 1987).

But the above does not mean that resettlement in the developed world has only been occasioned by new towns. Instead, development projects such as dams, construction of roads, bridges, states farms and industrial complexes have 'forced' people to leave their old settlements. Government order relocations by stating that their actions as being motivated by the wider and more-embracing public interest.

Perhaps the best known international experience of resettlement is the one associated with the Tennessee Valley Authority in America. In 1933, Tennessee Valley Authority was established to control the flood waters of the Tennessee river, build dams for electric power, and conserve the soil.

Many lakes have been formed by these dams on the three important river systems comprising of Cumberland, Mississippi and Tennessee rivers. Massive planning and technical assist compensations were involved in this project.

2.1.10 Resettlement Experience in the Developing World

Many resettlement schemes have been carried out in the developing countries. This study examined some of the schemes with a view to noting their areas of successes and failures. Chambers (1969, p4) in his study, provides a list of resettlement schemes that were imposed on the people by governments with the vowed aim of improving living standards through agricultural development and social transformation. These include the million-acre settlement scheme and others in Kenya. The Gezira Scheme in the Sudan, the Volta river settlement in Tanzania, Western Nigeria farm settlements and Eastern Nigeria resettlement schemes; resettlement under the land apportionment act in S. Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and the Kariba resettlement in Zambia.

2.1.10.1 Kenya

In Kenya, 35,000 families had by 1974 been settled on 470,000 hectares of land at a total cost of UK 30 million pounds under the million - Acre settlement, 400 families on 6500 hectares of land under the Harambee settlement scheme, 14,000 families on 105,000 hectares of land under the Haraka settlement scheme and 2000 families at Kalou where 86 large scale farms covering a total of 56,000 hectares were taken over. Beginning in 1976, the shiriki programme was started which involved the take over of expatriate owned large scale farms, but these were not subdivided into small plots. Instead each farmer was allocated a small plot of land of about one hectare for food production while the majority of the farm was to be run as a large scale unit with a manager provided by the department of settlement (Republic of Kenya, 1974) by 1973, 5,300 families had been established on 53,000 hectares at a cost of 3.1 million pounds. A second phase was expected to settle 14,000 families on 139,000 hectares of land at a cost of 7.8 million pounds, but 41,000 hectares of this had to be based on sub divisional settlement. (Republic of Kenya, 1974).

These Kenyan's programmes have had substantial problems, part of which relate to the inadequate knowledge of suitable farming systems or realistic targets for settlement farms when the major programmes were commenced. However, whilst at one stage it seemed likely that the subdivision of the large farms would ease with the completion of the million acre scheme, the current sentiment is that:

The evidence available suggests that most farm products can be produced very successfully on small-scale farms. In the long run, therefore a considerable amount of land currently used by large scale farm will be retained intact only to the extent necessary to ensure sufficient supplies of those products which can be best produced on a large scale basis where private farmland is retained as large scale units, the Government will encourage the occupation of these farms by groups of people or cooperative societies rather than a few privilege individuals (Republic of Kenya, 1974 pp. 199).

2.1.10.2 The Volta Resettlement Scheme

The Volta resettlement scheme was meant to resettle those that were to be displaced as a result of the construction of the Akosombo dam reservoir. The resettlement was designed so as to enhance the physical, economic and social condition of the relocated communities. The life of the host communities were also to be enhanced.

The organization of the scheme did not start until nine months after the construction of the dam had commenced. The operative officers consisted of planners, architects, soil scientists, soil workers and

agricultural extension workers. The working party members were however responsible to their respective ministries and establishments and not to the resettlement officers were settled by the resettlement authority. The responsibility of the resettlement officers was limited to chairing of meetings. Hence it was difficult to achieve coordination.

Housing policy was adopted and aimed at transforming the communities. The villagers were re-grouped to enable the provision of amenities and services cheaper. The initial one-room houses provided were simple and relatively inexpensive. There was public participation at the planning and the construction stages. By involving them during the construction of the houses, they acquired necessary skills to enable them expand their core houses when the need arises.

The agricultural policy was such that each family had its own farm plot and can hire farm machinery from the cooperative by the government and then subtract the cost of hiring the farm machinery. The scheme was not a successful one because, it was in a hurry to relocate people before inundation, and the farmlands were left un-cleared. All efforts were diverted towards the provision of shelter to the neglect of providing agricultural land.

In this scheme, public participation at the planning and construction stage is commendable, but however due to haphazard implementation which gave less cognizance to provision of farmland at the expense of provision of shelter led to the failure of the scheme.

2.1.10.3 Aswan High Dam Resettlement Scheme

In the case of the Aswan High dam two ethnic groups in two countries (Egypt and Sudan) were to be resettled. The life of the people was to be transformed by provision of better condition of living

through better housing and other facilities. In Sudan, housing compensation policy was adopted. The type of houses that were provided was diametrical, which is different from what the people consider acceptable. The people started to change the houses to suit their purpose; some abandoned the houses and build new ones for themselves. In this scheme, the lack of community participation at design stage necessitated the expressions of resentment in the abandoning of the resettlement houses. In Egypt, resettlement committee was constituted and the committee engaged in enlightenment campaigns geared towards involving the people in the resettlement programme. This indeed helped to alley the fears of the people. In these cases we see the positive utter implications of public participation as a positive and indispensable tool of any resettlement scheme.

2.1.11 An Overview of Some Selected Resettlement Schemes in Nigeria

2.1.11.1 Kainji Dam Resettlement Scheme

The Kainji Dam project was borne out of the realization of the Kainji region as a great potential for Nigeria's economic development. It was envisaged in the hydro-electricity potentials of the River Niger, the development of which would lead to the overall progress and development of the country. The Dam construction was commissioned on 15th February, 1969, but the conception and other preliminaries of the project started much earlier.

According to Oyedipe (1983), the reservoir created by the dam construction covers area of about 1,250 square kilometer and cut across the emirates of Borgu, Kontagora and Yauri in the former Ilorin, Niger, and Sokoto provinces. Following the inundation of the 1,250 square kilometer of land, 44,003 farmers, 200 professional fishermen, and some 100,000 animals were dislodged. There were subsequently resettled in 139 new villages and two towns. Six indigenous ethnic groups were

affected by the resettlement. These were Gungawa, Kambari, Labarawa, Hausawa, Shangawa, Bussawa, and some non-indigenous ethnic groups. See table 2.1.

Table 2.1 The number of affected settlements and ethnic groups

Ethnic Group	No. of Settlement	Percentage (%)
Gungawa	111	46.4
Kambari	35	14.6
Larawa	23	9.6
Mixed	43	18.0
Housawa	16	6.7
Sangawa	7	2.9
Bussawa	4	1.7
Total	239	100.00

Source: Oyedipe (1983), p.27

To effect the resettlement of the dislodged persons, a recommendation was put forward that a resettlement area be carved out of the Native Authorities to be affected. A resettlement officer to administer the scheme was also appointed at the establishment of the Niger Dam resettlement Authority (NDRA in October, 1962. (Oyedipe, 1983).

Cash compensation and building compensation policies were adopted in the resettlement programme. First was the cash compensation policy since there was an urgent need to evacuate the villages at the immediate vicinity of the construction site before any work could be done at all. The people part took in the selection of new sites. Criteria for the selection of the sites were sufficient farmland and water, and the site to be within the territorial boundaries of the concerned, native authority. Official assistance were given in evacuating the concerned people in question to the new sites.

It was later observed that the farmers who were compensated in cash for their farms jettisoned the search for new farmlands. This, and the fact that any disruption of the farming schedule of the people was bound to be disastrous and thus, led to the adoption of a new policy (building compensation) for the remaining settlements. This policy required the services of consulting architects to design the resettlement houses. Studies of the scheme by Atkinson (1982) showed that there was 97% acceptance of the resettlement scheme. The reason why about 3% rejected the resettlement provided was unconnected with the housing, although general criticism superficially is that they did not like their housing without researching further the reason for this belief. According to him, the expressions of dislike about the scheme are identified below.

The communities had been merged together contrary to their traditional space relationships causing chickens of one family to fight with the chickens of another family. Largely, majority of the resettlers remained and the few urban dwellers who complained, their complaint centered on such issues as that:-

- i. They couldn't carry sheaf of corn on their shoulder through their zaures.
- ii. They were not provided with doors to every opening
- iii. They were not given locks to their doors
- iv. They did not have individual rooms
- v. The housing was complained of as being too hot at night for those who were rural dwellers complained; that they didn't want opening or vents in many cases, vents and windows were blocked up.

Despite these minor problems, Kainji resettlement exercise is rated by Atkinson (1982) as one of the most successful of its kind not only in Nigeria, but also in Africa.

In this scheme we thus see that public participation was envisaged to be crux of this resettlement scheme, but the scheme was however plagued by such problems of design of house type having foreign outlook as against resettlers' preferences and the hurried evacuation of some resettlers without having built houses for them.

2.1.11.2 Bakolori Dam Resettlement Scheme

According to Rimi (1989), like other project-motivated schemes, this resettlement scheme was consequent upon the construction of a dam over the Sokoto River at Talata Mafara in 1979. The dam construction inundated a total area of about 25,000 hectares thereby displacing 14,000 farmers at Talata Mafara. Nine affected villages were regrouped and resettled in three near sites through mainly Cash Compensation Policy and Site and Services. In addition, resettlers were to be given building materials instead of government's direct involvement in housing construction as it was thought to be more expensive.

Varying rates of labour allowance were paid to the people. As Rimi (1989) reported "this allowance was paid in three installments on the basis of a certificate dully signed by Engineer of Authority confirming that work has reached certain specific levels".

As expected of resettlements involving large population of scattered villages, the regrouping strategy was used in the resettlement. The general frame-work of the resettlement was first the selection of sites with the people participating initially, followed by clearance of sites, layout

designs and allocation. Building materials were in the form of mud, water supply, roofing sheets and nails.

Like other project motivated resettlement schemes, the problems that confronted this scheme and the subsequent events such as the revolts and sub-sequent killings made it the worst in terms of its planning and implementation. For example, farmland compensation was later cancelled by the Authority, sites earlier selected with the people's participation were changed to those that did not participate; complaints of too small plot sizes compared to their previous large houses; slow payment of the agreed labour allowances, general lack of public facilities such as markets, dispensaries, roads, water, supply and places of worship. In other areas there exist inequitable re-allocation of farm lands and in fact allocations to non-genuine resettlers (Rimi 1986).

All these problems led to desertion, mounted dissatisfactions which culminated into revolts and subsequent killing of people in April, 1980. This was tagged the 'Bakolori crisis, 1980'.

It however, suffices to say that the enormity and complexity of the problems militating against the successful planning and implementation of this scheme is quite apparent and owes largely to lack of proper design, planning and implementation of the adopted approach to compensation and resettlement of affected persons. As beautiful and flexible as the approach seem and the opportunity it offer for resettlers to build houses of their choices (with building materials and labour supplied to resettlers).

2.1.11.3 Tiga Dam

According to Piet de Veide (1978), the Tiga resettlement scheme in Kano State was successfully carried out, since there was 'Free land available in abundance'. However, problems arose at Gari and

Jakara Dams when it became clear that insufficient 'Free land was available in the vicinity of the lake. This has resulted in farmers refusing the land allocated to them, due to the long distance between their new residence and their remaining farms. Some farmlands like that of Maikawa were also infertile. De Veide (1978) further noted that for most of the affected farmlands; because of the high demand prices rose accordingly. According to Voh & Atala (1987), most of the resettlers also have problems in land clearing, building of new houses, poverty and shortage of food and money to buy necessary farm inputs and health related problems.

Colson (1971), has noted that the first year of resettlement are often marked by many small experiments as people test the potential of the new environment. Expansion becomes possible only when a clear advantage exists and no large scale social innovation would be tried during this period. The first few years are often period of intensive labour demand, since clearing of land, gathering of building materials, houses and other homestead structures and field shelter have to be constructed mostly by men with the assistance of bay and the young ones.

The inhibitions in this scheme is the location of new farmland area in relation to places of residence, and the inconveniences and resentments that comes with lack of proximity of houses to farmland area in relation to farmland areas, this is an issue intricate to the design and planning of the resettlement scheme.

One can clearly understand now that resettlement involves movement of people from one place to another. It is often an involuntary movement resulting from government decisions which the people had to obey and for that reason the government as the initiating agency assumes a degree of responsibility quite different from the case of voluntary movement (Scudder, 1973). Changes are

therefore bound to occur in the process, and as these changes occur (both positive and negative) naturally, some affected people would oppose to changes, while others would welcome it. Only those who come up better after relocation tend to welcome it, while those who oppose it perceive negative changes as in the case of Bakolori (Sokoto State) Bechaman, 1984.

Udo (1977) in his study in Abuja area, considers resettlement as phenomenon essentially belonging to post colonial times, the dominant characteristics of which the people affected are compensated and resettled with a view to improving their economic situation. However, with the possible exception of Jiwa, which was relocated on a planned site in 1951 (Northern Nigeria, provincial Annual Reports, Kaduna, (1951) no example appear to exist in this area under study, until the establishment of the Federal capital Territory.

2.1.12 Nigeria's Experience in the Creation of The Federal Capital Territory

The thought of new capital was conceived when Lagos the former capital was plagued by urbanization problems because of its dual role as both the State and Federal Capital seat. On August 9th, 1975 Government of General Murtala Muhammed appointed a panel under the distinguished chairmanship of Justice Akinola Aguda. (Nigeria, 1975). The panel was empowered among other things to examine the dual role of Lagos as both a Federal and state capital and recommend a suitable site if it determines that the Federal Capital be moved. A site which will possess such wholesome characteristics as,

“with easy accessibility from all parts of the country by road, rail and air which would facilitate the administration of the country,... serve as a symbol of our unity and greatness and from the view point of national security, be less vulnerable to external aggression as it would be practically immune to sea-borne attack...” (Gen. Murtala, 1976).

The committee in its report recommended among other things that:-

- (i) That the city of Lagos is incapable of functioning as both a Federal and state capital due to the problem of inadequate land space for development commensurate with its status as the capital of Nigeria.
- (ii) Lagos is predominantly identified with ethnic group. A new capital in a more central location would provide equal access to Nigeria's great diversity of cultural groups.
- (iii) A new capital desirable that would be secure, ethnically natural, accessible, comfortable and adequate land and natural resources to provide a promising base for urban development
- (iv) A new capital is needed as a symbol Nigeria aspirations for unity and greatness.

The committee's report was accepted and Decree No 6 of 1976 was promulgated giving birth to the Federal Capital Development Authority. Thus in 1976 the Federal Government set in motion bold plans to build one of Africa's great capitals and one of the world's great new cities (Nigeria, 1976).

The site selected for the new capital and defined in the 1976 Federal Capital Territory Decree is and 8,000 sq km and bounded by the then states of Niger, Plateau, Kaduna, and Kwara.

Along with the establishment of the Federal Capital, the government decided that

“... The few local inhabitants in the area, who needed to be moved out of the territory for planning purposes, will be resettled outside the area in places of their choice at Government expense...” (Gen. Murtala, 1976).

2.1.12.1 FCT Resettlement Policy

The above quotation was the first major policy statement in respect of the establishment of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) and above all

the first major policy statement on resettlement issues within the FCT. Subsequently the FCT Act was enacted in 1976. The Act vests the entire 8,000 square kilometres of the FCT land area in the Federal Government of Nigeria. It was stated that,

"...the ownership of the lands comprised in the Federal Capital Territory shall likewise vest absolutely in the Government of the Federation." (FCT Act, 1976).

The Government wanted a principle of "equal citizenship" within the territory where no one can "claim any special privilege of "indigeneity" as was the case with Lagos. It wanted all the existing population to be moved out of the territory. That was the reason why it authorized not only a census of economic assets of all the inhabitants of the territory but also undertook to pay compensation for all their owners outside of the territory. (*Mabogunje, 1977 cited in Ayileka et al, 2001*). The extremely high cost of doing this led to a change of policy.

Resettlement as it affects the FCT was categorized into two. These are those who opted to be moved out of the FCT, and those that had remained but could be resettled within the FCT, should their places of abode be affected by development projects of the FCC.

The main focus of this study is on the second category. For this category, the Master Plan of Abuja listed 40 villages that would be relocated in the initial stage of the City growth. These settlements are within the areas earmarked for the City development as well as the 5 kilometres of the Capital City Site designed to protect the periphery of the City from development encroachments or unplanned expansion of existing settlements. According to the Master Plan, additional 85 villages would also have to be relocated as the City expands to the 3.1 million ultimate populations.

On the whole, the Master Plan estimated that about 264 settlements involving approximately 50,000 people then, could be relocated, if all the elements of the Regional Plan contained in the Abuja Master Plan were to be implemented. Although this represents a very high percentage of the total numbers of existing settlements, (42 – 46 percent), it must be recognized that this represents a total relocation programme, which would be executed over many years. It should also be noted that the Master Plan favoured the option of relocation within the FCT to existing villages / settlements in the regional areas which already have some basic community facilities. (See figure 2.1).




Fig 2.1 Recommended Resettlement and Relocation areas(Abuja Master plan 1979)

2.1.12.2 Resettlement Policy Changes in the FCT

Between 1976 and 2003, (a period of 27 years) there has been about four major policy changes affecting resettlement within the FCT. This is an indication that resettlement issues in the FCT have been characterized variously by policy inconsistencies. This shows the lack of continuity in the resettlement programme and the apparent prolonged resettlement of indigenous settlements in the FCT.

2.1.12.3 The First Policy Change (1978)

As earlier mentioned an ecological survey was conducted in 1977 and the report indicated that a large part of the territory was still infested with tsetse-fly whilst the river courses still provided breeding grounds for the simulium fly, the carrier of the disease vector giving rise to river blindness. To evacuate all the human population whose farming activities had helped to keep down and destroy much of the habitat favourable to the tsetse-fly was to compromise the future health status of the population of the new capital. In the circumstance, the decision to evacuate all the inhabitants had to be revised and compensation and resettlement undertaken only in respect of those occupying the site chosen for building the city (Mobagunje, 1977).

In addition to the above, a detailed study of the area in question had made it clear that the local inhabitants within the Territory were far from being 'few'. In fact well over 316,000 people were enumerated and not the 25,000-50,000 earlier thought. It was then estimated that the funds required for their compensation entitlement and resettlement outside the FCT were put at over 1.8 Billion


Nigerian Naira. In these circumstances, resettlement costs would have been astronomical, and would have delayed the development of the new capital (Mobagunje, 1977).

The above two reasons necessitated a major shift in resettlement policy which was announced by government in July 13, 1978. The policy states in parts thus:

"...those not affected by the first phase of resettlement, but wish to move out of the territory may do so, but such people will have no claims on the FCDA, as they have not been forced to leave. This in effect means that inhabitants (indigenes) not moved out during the present exercise who decide to stay will now be deemed to be citizens of the FCT and FCDA will soon appoint an administrator to administer them and look after their welfare. The present land area gazetted as FCT will remain. The site cleared for the building of the capital itself will be evacuated and resettlement of the people so evacuated can take place within or outside the territory. The meagre funds available now should be spent more on development of infrastructure rather than on payment of compensation..." (Gen. Obasanjo, 1978).

2.1.12.4 The Second Policy Change (1992)

On December 2, 1992 the Government made a complete U- Turn and opted for "Integration Policy" for those who have chosen to remain in the FCT as against complete resettlement. Accordingly Garki Village within Garki II District of the City in Phase I was allowed to remain within the FCC, except for the people to be affected by the construction of access roads and other infrastructures (*See figure 2.2*).




Source: AGIS, 2006

Figure 2.2: Garki Village integration scheme quickbird satellite image 2003

2.1.12.5 The Third Policy Change (1999)

In 1999 the “Integration Policy” was reversed to give room for complete resettlement. Settlements of Jabi, Kado, Gwarinpa among others within Phase II of the Federal Capital City were slated for resettlement outside the FCC. Actual construction work started at the end of 1999 on the new site in Jibi resettlement town outside the FCC to the north. Most of the houses were completed and ready for occupation by end of 2002. While the people affected were fully prepared for movement to the new location, there was another turn around. In preparation for the 2003 general election the additional security personnel brought into the Federal Capital Territory occupied the buildings under

the resettlement scheme. The Government looked the other way - perhaps out of political expediency. (See Plate v).



Source: Author; Fieldwork, 2007

Plate v: Jibi resselement village taken over by the Nigerian Police Force

2.1.12.6 The Fourth Policy Change (2003)

In 2003 there was another turn around in the FCT's resettlement programme, the then administration decided to adopt the policy of 'total resettlement', after the failure of the Garki village Integration resettlement policy and having realized that it would be practically impossible to implement the provisions of the Abuja Master Plan without a well articulated lasting and sustainable Resettlement policy in place. One of the cardinal principles of this policy was the complete resettlement of all areas hitherto earmarked for resettlement by the Master Plan.

Thus, we see varying inconsistencies in the policies on resettlement in the FCT, and this can be said to account for the slow pace of resettlement in the FCT.

2.1.13 Squatter Settlements Within The FCT

So many reasons could be adduced for squatting as a solution to solve housing needs, farming needs etc., the world over. The focus of this research is however on squatting solutions to 'housing needs' and to a little extent 'work-place needs' within the FCT. For this reason the following points are peculiar to the FCT in Nigeria. The initial policy change on resettlement as a result of health and other cost considerations might look good and plausible reasons on the face of it. It however set the trend and contributed greatly to the development of unplanned/squatter settlements within the FCT. It gave people the impetus and made them believe that Government was not very serious with the issue of resettlement (Jibril, 2006).

The initial Government Policy of housing development through the FCDA made people to expect too much from Government. Even though it wanted to set the pace and encourage people to move into an area that was hitherto least developed in the country and lacking in the most basics of all social amenities. People were at first reluctant. They lack confidence to provide housing at the initial stage. In short there was general apathy to invest in the development of the new capital city at the beginning. So the FCDA took the initiative to provide houses. After sufficient confidence was built, Government did not see the need to continue with that type of development again and so pulled out in 1991 from large scale housing provisions. It did this at a time when the private sector was yet to produce enough

housing stock at affordable rate for the ever growing population of the Territory. The consequences were of course acute shortages of housing stock within the city and its immediate environs. The only solution was recourse to squatting solution by people mostly not engaged in the formal sector and therefore not entitled to any form of Government housing provisions (Jibril, 2006).

To further compound the problems, the few private developers did not build for low income earners – people mostly engaged in the informal sector. They were more interested in developing big mansions that yields higher returns. The law governing land administration in Nigeria does not

ascribe any value to bare land. It only recognized compensation for unexhausted improvement on land. Over the years these compensation rates for crops, economic trees and houses have been on the low side. People therefore find it more expedient to sell their customary holdings at a much higher rate to individuals and other private concerns, than to wait for government acquisition and compensation which at any rate is far below the expectations of the customary title holders (Ibrahim, 2006).

At the initial stage of the City's development, quite a number of the local inhabitants do not seem to realize that the entire FCT landmass is vested in the Government of the Federation. Though they hold customary titles, they are not supposed to alienate (after 1976, the year the FCT Act gained legal force), without the consent of the Authority. This provision of the law was observed mostly in breach thereby leading to the flourishing of a vibrant illegal land market. This 'market' became the easiest way of land acquisition by squatters.

Due to the above given reasons, the local Traditional Rulers got seriously involved in the operations of the illegal land 'markets' and subsequent outright alienation of their ancestral land. Rather than wait and get 'meager' amount from government as compensation, they found it more expedient and lucrative to sell out rightly, outside government regulatory bodies. Squatters found out that instant fortune can be made out of the illegal operations of land market. They exploited the weakness of the Government apparatus. The result was the flourishing of squatter settlements. The general believe was that one can obtain a parcel of land develop, rent out and almost immediately recoup his/her initial investments. Two years rent are payable at the first instance in most cases and no any form of taxes are ever paid to government. So, before the government could acquire the land for any developmental project, they ('developers') would have recouped their initial investments and even made some profits. They were therefore ever ready to build regardless of the risk involved (Ibrahim, 2006).

In most developing nations government departments are known for their slow and inefficient way of doing business. Government officials in charge of land acquisition tend to create serious huddle for development purposes over the years. In a lot of cases, it takes years after obtaining formal governments grant to complete the processes of obtaining title with stringent conditions. It equally

takes another couple of years to obtain building plan approval from the relevant approving authority. This has made some serious developers resort to quacks and illegal land markets, leading to the development of unplanned and squatter settlements (Jibril, 2006).

People moved to Abuja because of the relative peace enjoyed by the inhabitants. This massive influx of people into the territory coupled with weak development control apparatus, contributed also to shortages of houses, and subsequent growth of squatter settlements. Lack of a well developed Mortgage Institutions did not give much room for private developers to provide enough housing scheme for low income earners hence squatter development in Abuja (Jibril, 2006).

The existence of these settlements within the City area and its environs is a serious distortion of the provisions of the Master Plan of the City as well as that of the Regional Development Plan of the FCT. Until something drastic is done, there can be no meaningful implementation of the provisions of the Master Plan. These areas are also increasingly becoming breeding ground for unscrupulous elements leading to increasing crime rate within the city and it's environ, a situation that was quite unthinkable at the onset of the development of the Territory. Nobody seems to be in charge in these areas because of the cosmopolitan nature of these settlements the traditional leadership has broken down. Since nobody seems to be actually in charge, government has been loosing a lot of revenue (AGIS, 2006).

Neither the FCT administration no the Municipal Council has fared well in revenue generation and collection in these squatter settlements. The existence of these squatter settlements is posing a serious health hazards not only to the people leaving within the settlements, but to other inhabitants of the FCT because of their squalid conditions. The "integration policy" has also created an urban slum within what could have been a beautiful city. There are a lot of unregulated activities such as substandard educational and health institutions and facilities within these areas. It was becoming increasingly obvious that if the Government wants to be taken seriously, it had to act fast and arrest the dangerous slide, which was fast turning the dream of 'a beautiful city' a mirage (AGIS, 2006).

By the year 2003, the FCT administration concluded that the only way out was a return to the original provisions of the Master Plan of Abuja which has suffered a lot of distortions. It is of

interest to note that since the beginning of the implementation of the Plan in 1980 there has not been any form of review. Ideally a plan should be review every five years. This was not the case with that of Abuja even though development has been going on at a fast rate for over 25 years. In 1999 a workshop on the “Review of the Master Plan” was held and the proceedings published in 2001. Nothing else happened. Meanwhile these settlements continued developing at alarming rate. People at first received the new initiative with mixed feelings. Going by past records many people did not give it any chance of success. Government however made it clear that it was not going to be ‘business as usual’ again. It started with the general restructuring and reorganization of the FCT administration. It scrapped the entire Ministry structure and the Minister took over the full control of the FCDA as the Chair of its Board of Directors. This singular act effectively removed the bureaucratic bottle necks normally associated with Government Ministry which hinders speedy implementation of laudable government programs. Development Control apparatus and structures were strengthen. A Taskforce was set up for the relocation of all squatter settlements with particular emphasis on those sitting on the main bowl of the city. A pilot scheme was initiated and it targeted one of the biggest squatter settlements of Idu-Karmo within phase III and Industrial Area of the City. It covers an area of 524 hectares; (more than the size of one residential district) within Phase III as well as part of the Industrial District. It was to relocate more than 5000 household heads most of whom are either ‘land lords’ or ‘tenants’. The date line for the relocation was fixed for November 2005.

It was a private-public-partnership affair. The affected people, NGOs, Community leaders, Banks and Financial Institutions, Private Developers, Industries etc were all involved in the planning. After series of meetings it was decided that Government would provide plots of land for the affected people to build and move away from the squatter zones. ‘Letters of intent’ were issued instead of formal letters of grants. However the ‘letters of intent’ were enough to guarantee some form of financial assistance from banks, NGOs and other International donor agencies. The idea is to issue formal titles with compatible conditions to the allottees. That way it could reduce the situation of out right sell and encourage the development of the scheme. A new government agency – Satellite Towns Development Agency (STDA) – is in charge of the provision of roads, light, water and other forms of amenities at the new location.

Table 2.2: List of Squatter Settlements within the Federal Capital Territory

ID	NAME	TYPE	AREA ha	DISTRICT
1.	Bakasi Market	Market	20.7	Central Area
2.	Zone 3	Mechanics	5.9	Wuse I
3.	Garki	Village/Market	19.0	Garki II
4.	Guzape	Village	225.8	Guzape
5.	Garki Village	Market	14.7	Gudu
6.	Apo	Village/Market	46.8	Duruni, Gudu
7.	Durumi	Squatter	32.3	Durumi
8.	Mabushi	Squatter/Market	15.5	Mabushi
9.	Katampe	Village	13.9	Katampe
10.	Gaduwa	Village	9.4	Gaduwa
11.	Dutse	Squatter	189.0	Dutse
12.	Dutse	Village	21.1	Dutse
13.	Wumba	Village	5.3	Wumba
14.	Mada	Squatter	165.4	Outside FCC
15.	Kurbo	Squatter/Market	54.5	Outside FCC
16.	Kuchigoro	Old Village	3.7	Kukwaba
17.	Kuchigoro Ext	Squatter	59.9	Kukwaba
18.	Karmajiji	Squatter	37.9	Kukwaba
19.	Wuye	Squatter	2.4	Wuye
20.	Jabi	Squatter	14.0	Jabi
21.	Jabi	Squatter	4.3	Jabi
22.	Jabi/Dakibiyu	Squatter	51.6	Jabi, Dakibiyu
23.	Utako	Squatter	11.9	Utako
24.	Karmo	Squatter	524.0	Karmo
25.	Gwarimpa	Squatter	408.0	Gwarimpa I
26.	Dape	Squatter	455.0	Dape
		TOTAL	2,412	

Source: Final Report Stage 1, AGIS, 2004

2.1.14 Determinants of a Successful Resettlement Scheme

Sequel upon empirical findings and review of models available on resettlement, the following factors are known to determine a successful resettlement scheme:

1. Minimal disruption in the settlers' normal way of life:

Scudder (1973) posited that without exception, population involved in resettlement projects resist removal. People feel impotent and defeated when they are eventually forcefully ejected from their preferred natural habitat. This he says is a traumatic experience, which causes stress and crisis of cultural identity. This makes them unable to innovate and stick only to their old ideas through a process called 'cultural involution'. This situation reverts only when the resettlers feel sufficiently at home in their new environment. He notes that the greater the stress, the more the tendency of cultural involution.

It will also be successful if the settlers are provided with houses, which they have the technological skills or financial resources to maintain. The design of houses should be simple, improvement upon the existing ones. They will also prefer layouts, which should conform to that they were used to before evacuation or resettlement.

Resettlement will succeed if there is minimal change in social structure. Social Patterns and structures evolve over a length of time. Resettlement schemes will succeed if in the allocation of houses, due regards is given to the existing social structures or wishes of neighbours to remain with themselves.

5. **Continuity in their economic activity:-** Resettlement will be successful if those resettled do not lose their means of livelihood. The provision of livelihood must be done in such a manner that disruption in the continuity of life of the resettlers is minimized, however positive but gradual innovation of their means of livelihood should be encouraged.
6. **Agricultural land policy:-** For a resettlement scheme to be successful, the agricultural land policy should be such that land lost in the process of resettlement is replaced rather than resorting to financial compensation. It was observed in Kainji resettlement scheme, that farmers refused to do any farm work after they were compensated for their houses and farm land. When it became obvious that any disruption of farming activity of the people was bound to be disastrous unless food subsidies were provided, a new policy had to be adopted. The compensation procedure was modified so that payment was made in kind and not in cash as was previously practiced.
7. **Resettlement will succeed if villages are regrouped based on the following principles:-**
- i. Principle of merging villages with similar socio-economic and socio-cultural characteristics. This principle seeks to sustain and promote these established values and practice among the villages involved in a resettlement exercise where the villages have to be regrouped.
 - ii. Principles of regrouping based on similar traditional administrative framework. This principle rests on the fact that every settlement, no matter how small and remote, has linkage especially administrative with other settlements.
 - iii. The principles of merging villages in areas with high potentials and maximum opportunities

4. **Organization and staff:-** whether the scheme is voluntary or compulsory, it will succeed if the planning and organization of the scheme is starts early.

Reining (1966) in his study of the Zande Scheme as reported in Chambers (1969) argued that it is the staff that designs policy and execute it. It is they who perceive or fail to perceive the details of the situation in which a scheme is launched. It is they and not the people affected by the scheme, who hold the initiative, especially in the early stages of a project.

5. **Public participation:-** For resettlement to be successful emphasis should be on the participation of the people from the beginning of the project up to the stage of resettlement / rehabilitation of the population on the chosen site. The affected people must be accorded ample chance and opportunity to participate actively in policy formulation and the implementation of the scheme.

6. **Implementation:-** The success or failure of any strategy adopted for resettlement is a reflection of not only the policies adopted but the approach to implementation of the policies, hence an effective implementation mechanism must be in place, to guarantee the realization of the set goals of the scheme.

7. **Early commencement of resettlers programme:-** For a resettlement exercise to be successful there is the need for an early start of the programme before the commencement of the project proper that calls for the resettlement.

8. **Compensation:-** A resettlement scheme will be successful if the affected people are properly and adequately compensated, so much so that the resettlers feel a good sense of replacement for their losses. One of the reasons why Bakolori resettlement exercise failed is the issue of compensation in terms of plot sizes, slow payment of labour allowances and omission of some genuine farm owners' names on the relocation list.

2.1.15 Related Works on Resettlement in Nigeria

Baffa (1991) centered his work on the Kubwa resettlement scheme and specifically on the adequacy or otherwise of compensation paid to the resettlers for their economic trees as authorized by the FCT Act (1976) Section 6 (1). In his study the resettlers in Maitama Sabo, Maitama Tsoho, Katampe and Kukwaba largely expressed resentments for the inadequate and improper assessment and valuation of their agricultural assets. His work though differing and not the assessments of the present level of physical development as against the provisions of the resettlement scheme at inception but thus, gives a pointer to the number of villages resettled in Kubwa resettlement scheme and their socio-economic characteristics.

Agboola and Jinadu (1997) centered their work on population relocation resulting from slum clearance / forced eviction in Maroko-Lagos, Nigeria. The study however focuses on the legality of the relocation and a comparative analysis of the pre and post eviction living condition. The inference in this relocation exercise even though differing from resettlement is that the peoples' input was utterly disregarded and thus account for the continuous widespread resentments about the (forced) relocation exercise. By this, in all settlement development projects, it gives a pointer to widespread consultation with stakeholders as a fundamental key to the success of the project.

Jinadu (2006), in his work on the FCT focused on the spatial interaction of settlements in the FCT in order to provide information for settlement policy formulation and infrastructure planning that will at all planning stage take due cognizance of settlement (as Zuba, Kubwa, Karu, Nyanyan, Kuje and Gwagwalada) within the mean interaction zones of the FCC. Even as the study is not directly on population relocation and rehabilitation issues, it identifies population and activity centres outside the FCC, which are resettlement areas in the FCT.

2.2 Conceptual Framework

The very best approach to resettle displaced persons is not well known. In the first place, the literature in the field upon which one could draw ideas is scanty. Again even amongst this scanty works, there is no consensus as to the best way forward in the resolution of the problems of resettlement. "These problems are not helped by the lack of a theory or theories of resettlement. In the formulation of policies, one can base decisions either on facts (empirical evidence) or on the postulation of theory. In the absence of theories of resettlement, practitioners in the field are forced to draw heavily on empirical evidence or past experiences which may not only provide guides to practitioners in the field, but might in fact also form the basis for the formulation of theory (Abumere, 1999). In this major search for the solutions for resettlement problems, social scientists and planners have a major role to play because issues of social justice, equity, space, socio-cultural and economic factors, which are some of the major concerns of social scientists, loom large in any resettlement programme.

Writing on the organization of settlement on resettlement schemes in tropical Africa, Chambers (1969) said there is no essence of anybody of ideas that could be called a theory of resettlement. In 1970, when he was also writing on Volta resettlement experience, he discovered that the resettlement officers appointed for Volta resettlement scheme were unable to find anything written on approaches to resettlement problem from the university of Ghana library. However, there is a growing volume of writing most of which is either a description of some aspects of a particular scheme or anthropological.

According to the World Bank Technical Paper Number 80, 'Involuntary Resettlement in Development Projects; Policy Guidelines in World Bank-Financed Projects'. Cernea (The World

Bank, 1988); the World Bank's resettlement policy was formulated by codifying the lessons learned from prior and ongoing relocation operations, and by using research findings, and tools that have emerged from social science studies of such processes. In keeping with the sociological nature of resettlement processes, primary attention is given to the socio-anthropological understanding of resettlement that informs both the policy and the operational recommendations.

The call for developing a more comprehensive theoretical model was advanced by Brenchin, West, Harmon and Kutay (1991) in their write-up on the displacement of resident populations from nature conservation parks. The authors maintained that many development decisions that involve involuntary relocation are made without the full anticipation of the general impact pattern triggered. Calling for a model that would define and predict the *cumulative* impacts of displacement that would provide a practical guide, they wrote:

“What is too little understood both by professionals and scholars alike are the social impact of displacement and relocation. When resident peoples are forced to move, certain general impacts can be expected. But the collective social impact on the community or other social organizations differs widely from case to case; to date no model exists to predict the cumulative effect”.

The Asian Development Bank Handbook (1998) has been prepared from lessons learned from prior and ongoing resettlement project and by using research findings and tools that have emerged from studies for use by Asian Development Bank staff, especially operational staff, consultants and staff of developing member country (DMC) executing agencies who play a role in resettlement planning and management in Asian Development Bank-funded projects.

From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that experiences from past resettlement projects has continued to form the basis and largely the source or body of knowledge and empirical evidences resettlement policy (ies) draw from or rest upon.

Since 1980, the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) has accumulated enormous practical experience in confronting the resettlement problems in the FCT. Some successes as well as failures have been recorded. It is important to look back at what was done in order to be able to map out an appropriate way forward for the resettlement of those to be displaced in phases II-IV of the Capital city development. Perhaps as important is the exploration of how, in phases II-IV, resettlement can be used as a means for promoting sustainable urban population relocation and rehabilitation in the Federal Capital territory (FCT).

MATERIALS AND METHODS

The tools and the procedure necessary for gathering the required data for this study is spelt out here, also the length and breadth of the data so required to realize the objective of the study and the method of analysis to be adopted are spelt out.

3.1 Data Types and Sources

The data types are basically primary and secondary. The Primary data connotes data collected by the researcher in the field via questionnaire administration, interviews, observation, photo recording and Focus Group Discussion (FGD). These were collected on site and directly from field surveys.

3.2 Instruments for Data Collection

To achieve the objectives of the study, the instruments designed to collect information fall under four (4) categories of surveys. These are Reconnaissance and Landuse Surveys, Household and Socio-Economic Surveys, Organizational Surveys and Personal Field Survey via direct personal observation.

The first set of questionnaires was directed at resettlers and non-resettlers resident within and around the Kubwa resettlement towns. The questions also seek to probe the level of the resettlers's perception and satisfaction with the resettlement policy and conditions of physical development within and around the resettlement town.

The other set of questionnaires was directed at government officials responsible for planning and implementation of resettlement schemes in the FCT. This is to elicit information on all issues relating to potentials and inhibitions of planning and implementation of resettlement schemes in the FCT.

The Personal Field Survey is to via direct personal observation identify the resettlement scheme; the provisions of the resettlement plan against, the existing condition of facilities on the resettlement site, and level of physical development against development control regulations.

However, before producing the final format of questionnaire guide administered particularly under the Household and Socio-Economic Surveys and the Organizational Surveys. A pilot survey was carried out to arrive at pertinent questions. This was done through initial contact with prospective respondents to ascertain households' view of satisfaction and resentments about resettlement policy and the scheme and to also identify/ascertain departmental responsibilities in implementing resettlement schemes.

3.2.1 Reconnaissance and Landuse Surveys

The study started with reconnaissance survey to establish the boundary of the scheme, the level of physical development of the schemes vis a vis provisions of the Site Development Plan of the study area and the landuse components. It also assess the operational status of the landuses and housing.

After the reconnaissance survey, base map and site development plan covering the study area were collected and updated, so as to incorporate the landuse changes that had taken place between the inception of the scheme and at the time of study.

3.2.2 Household and Socio-Economic Surveys

Using the personal interview method for questionnaire administration, information about population, household size, age, sex, tribe, religion, occupational status, income level etc. was collected from sampled households. The head of household was requested to be respondents for respective households. Focus Group Discussions (Informal discussions) were also held with the villagers and their heads.

3.2.3 Personal Field Survey

Using direct personal observation, information was collected on site regarding the availability and quality or otherwise of such infrastructure, facilities, utilities and services as school, market, portable water supply, electricity supply, roads, clinics etc.

3.2.4 Organizational Surveys

Using random sampling technique, organizational survey was carried out to collect information on the limitations, strength and prospects of the relevant technical and administrative department and agencies of the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA), like Resettlement and Compensation Department, Development Control Department, Bwari Zonal Town Planning Office, and the Bwari Local Planning Authority charged with resettlement schemes.

3.3 Sampling Size and Procedure

The required sample size that will ensure ample and effective representativeness was arrived at, and an efficient sampling procedure which is Systematic-Random Sampling method was also adopted.

RESULTS**4.1 Introduction**

In order to achieve key research objectives, this chapter makes analysis of the results of data collected from field surveys on the assessment of the physical development of the Kubwa Resettlement Schemes. This is to bring to clear focus the capabilities and potentials of the Kubwa Resettlement Schemes and determine the problems hindering their effective functioning.

4.2. Socio-Economic Characteristics of Residents

The data collected on these relate to the population characteristics of the resettlers as it pertain to, its size, tribe, marital status, occupational status etc.

4.2.1 Population

The total number of resettled persons in the Kubwa Resettlement Scheme site was put at 3,684 persons (FCDA, 1989). During the period of this study, the field work carried out in June 2009, revealed 6,140 as the population of the resettlers in Kubwa, while the non-resettlers numbered up to 17,892 persons. By this, the total population of Kubwa Resettlement Scheme town is put at 24,032 persons. (See Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Population

Status	Kubwa	
	Number	%
Resettlers	6140	25.55
Non-Resettlers	17,892	74.45
Total	24,032	100

The statistics shows that the population of the non-resettlers has out-numbered the resettlers. This is indicative of the influx of persons to the Kubwa resettlement sites.

4.2.2 Tribe

The tribal characteristics the people occupying the resettlement sites reflect the predominance of Non-Gbagi. From the field survey, in Kubwa, the Gbagis who are the original inhabitants of the Kubwa Resettlement town constitute about 25.55%, while the non-Gbagi account for 74.45% (non-resettlers). Other Nigerian tribes who migrated from other parts of the FCT to cope with the pressure of housing in the FCC include, Igbo, Yoruba, Hausa, Igala, Idoma, and Tiv etc. (See Table. 4.2)

Table 4.2 Tribal composition in Kubwa Resettlement Town

Status	Kubwa	
Tribe	Number	%
Gbagi	6248	26.00
Non- Gbagi	17783	74.00
Total	24,032	100

4.2.3 Religion

From the field survey, table 4.3 shows that in Kubwa, 48.55% of the people are Christians, 44.45% of the people are Muslims and Other religion who are Idol worshippers and Free-thinkers constitute about 7.00%.

Table 4.3 Religious composition in Kubwa Resettlement Town

Status	Kubwa	
Religion	Number	%
Christianity	349	48.55
Islam	320	44.45
Others	50	7.00
Total	719	100

The Federal Capital Development Authority constructed places of worship within the Kubwa resettlement scheme, a Mosque and a Church was located in New Maitama which is centrally located in the resettlement town. See plate vi and vii.

However, with the increase influx of people to the area, other places of worships have been built to accommodate the demand for place of worship.



Plate vi Church in Kubwa Resettlement Town




Plate vii Mosque in Kubwa Resettlement Town

With the continual immigration and emigration as well as contact with other communities the people of Kubwa Resettlement towns are gradually discarding traditional religion and accepting either Christianity or Islam especially after the emergence of the Federal Capital Territory.

4.2.4 Occupational Status

Data on this is a reflection of the type of occupation engaged in by the populace. It is thus, a reflection of production activities and capacities. From the field survey it was revealed that in Kubwa, 36.55% of the populace engaged in farming, 9.45% engaged in trading, 1.34% engaged in fishing, 9.08% are artisans, 41.45% are civil servants and 2.13% are unemployed. (See Table. 4.4 and Plates viii).

Table 4.4 Occupational Status in Kubwa Resettlement Town

Occupation	Kubwa	
	Number	%
Farming	266	37.00
Trading	72	10.00
Fishing	7	1.00
Artisans	65	9.00
Civil servants	295	41.00
Unemployed	14	2.00
Total	719	100




Plate viii Artisan and Trading activities in Kubwa Resettlement Town

The implication of this is that, even though farming remains the major occupation of the inhabitant of the resettlement sites, there exist a gradual transformation of the occupational characteristics of the people, to reflect such endeavour / activities as trading, fishing, artisans and civil servants. The significant number of civil servants in the occupational structure in Kubwa resettlement town is attributed to the non-resettlers who seek to cope with the pressure of housing in the Federal Capital City.

It is noteworthy that farming activities have remained subsistence, as designated farmland that was to enable resettlers carry out extensive farming activities and improve their lots has been gradually lost to residential development. By this, resettlers have to travel very far away before they can carry out large scale farming practices.

4.2.5 Investigation into the proximity of the resettlers to farmlands was carried out to determine travel distance

This refers to the proximity of the farming populace of the resettlers to farmland area. As shown in Table 4.5, the field survey shows that in Kubwa, 9.35% of the resettlers travel 0-2km to get to their

farmlands, 68.33% travels 2-4km, 20.91% travel 4-6km and 1.41% travel 6km-above to get to their farmlands.

Table 4.5 Proximity to Farmland

Distance	Kubwa	
	Number	%
0-2km	25	9.35
2-4km	182	68.33
4-6km	55	20.91
6 km-above	55	1.41
Total	266	100

The statistics shows that, majority of the farmers travel 2 – 4km to get to their farmland. This distance away from their place of residence is a limiting factor to their production capacities, this however owe largely to the illegal and haphazard development that has permeated the resettlement town and taken over farmlands directly adjoining the resettlement town.

4.2.6 Annual Income Level

This refers to the annual disposable income realized by the resettlers giving the available economic opportunities and that which they engage in. In Kubwa, 10.34% earned between N10,000-N30,000 annually, 25.55% earned between N30,000-N50,000, 49.89 earned between N50,000-N100,000 and

14.22% earned between N100,000-above. (See Fig. 4.6).

Table 4.6 Income Level in Kubwa Resettlement Town

Income(N)	Kubwa	
	Number	%
N10,000-30,000	72	10
N30,000-50,000	187	26
N50,000-100,000	360	50
N100,000-Above	101	14
Total	266	100

The statistics shows that majority of the inhabitants earned between N50,000 and N100,000 annually from their occupation, this income level is viewed as low when compared with the average household size obtainable in this areas. It thus, give indication that if the full production capacities are realized, the annual disposable income of inhabitants will be boosted significantly, thus, enhancing the standard of living of the populace, hence, contributing to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

4.2.7 Limitations Faced by Resettlers whose occupation is Farming

This refers to the various limitations that inhibit the farmers from the full realization of optimum farming practices. The field survey shows that in Kubwa, 50.83% of the respondents opined that limitations faced by farmers is the proximity to farmland, 19.41% opined that it is the lack of storage facilities, 4.86% opined that it is the accessibility to market, and 24.90% opined that it is lack of

capital (funds and farm inputs). (See Table 4.7).

Table 4.7 Limitations faced by Resettlers whose Occupation is Farming

Income(N)	Kubwa	
	Number	%
Proximity to farmland	135	50.83
Lack of storage Facilities	52	19.41
Accessibility to market	13	4.86
Capital (Funds & farm	66	24.90
inputs	266	100
Total		

This is a reflection of the various limitations faced by farmers. These factors inhibit the production capacities of the farmers to such great extent as to limit the realization of the *full potential of their* agricultural practices. However, a setting devoid of these limitations will ensure a higher productivity level and an improved level of income.

4.3.0 Assessment of Citizen Participation and Acceptance of Resettlement Scheme

This implies the assessment of the intricacies of the resettlement schemes vis-à-vis level of citizen participation in the processes involved in resettlement from site selection through design to implementation. Also of importance is the perception of the citizens, of the provisions of the scheme meeting their yearnings and aspirations which is a function of their ultimate acceptance of the scheme.

Focus Group Discussion (FGD)

In line with Focus Group Discussion carried out, the village heads of Kubwa resettlement town were both unanimous in their opinion on the need for a review of the schemes and the need for an effective monitoring approach. This is to prevent the derailment of the resettlement and compensation policy and the Kubwa resettlement scheme from their plan provisions and also express the need for their involvement (Community Participation) in the review / monitoring process.

4.3.1 The Number and Sizes of Villages within the Kubwa Resettlement Scheme

The field survey revealed that in Kubwa, four (4) villages were originally involved in the Kubwa Resettlement Scheme namely Kukwaba, Old Maitama, New Maitama and Katampe. These villages are made up of 206, 153, 203 and 52 households respectively. (See figure 4.8).

Table 4.8 Number of Households in the Original Villages within the Kubwa Resettlement

Town		
Status	Kubwa	
Original Villages	Number	%
Kukwaba	209	34
Old Maitama	154	25
New Maitama	203	33
Katampe	49	8
Total	266	100

4.3.2 Perception and Acceptance of the Resettlement Houses

Here the perception of the people is sought against the background that the pre-resettlement housing was a mixture of round and rectangular rooms with Zink roofs, doors, and windows. Their pre-resettlement housing were characterized by very small rooms, and most rooms were separate round huts. The door ways were frequently screened by mats. Table 4.5 below shows that in Kubwa, 25.55% of the resettlers rated the resettlement houses as satisfactory, while 74.45% rated the resettlement houses as not satisfactory.

Table 4.9 Rating of Level of Satisfaction of Resettlement Houses

Status	Kubwa	
Level of Satisfaction	Number	%
Satisfaction	157	25.55
Not Satisfactory	457	74.45
Total	719	100

The implication of this is that, innovative as the new housing provision is to the resettlers when compared with their pre-resettlement housing, resentment still exists and this is reflected in the structural changes noticed in the buildings.

In the Kubwa Scheme the reason for low level of satisfaction owes largely to the lack of space to accommodate the natural expansion of family or household sizes, which is connected to the seeming loss of open spaces around these houses to the unplanned expansion and residential developments

around the resettlement houses. The lack of storage facilities for agricultural produces, which makes them store produces in their houses, thereby reducing the effective living areas in the houses, is another problem faced by the people.

4.3.3 Structural Modification of Houses

This refers to alterations made to the structural components of a house that results to the change in the character and composition of a structure under consideration. In this context, it is used to refer to the structural changes made by the resettlers to their house design to create additional rooms in their respective houses. Figure 4.9 shows that, in Kubwa, 74.45% of the resettlement houses have undergone structural modifications while 25.55% have not undergone structural modifications. (See Fig. 4.10 and Plate ix - xii).

Table 4.10 Structural Modifications in Kubwa Resettlement Town

Structural Modification	Kubwa	
	Number	%
Modified	160	26
Not Modified	454	74
Total	614	100



Plate x Resettlers' House devoid of structural modification In Kubwa Resettlement Town



Plate xi Resettlers' House with structural modification In Kubwa Resettlement Town



Plate xii Resettlers' House with structural modification In Kubwa Resettlement Town

The implication of this is that the majority of the structures have been structurally modified. This is an indication of the response of the resettlers to the influx of non-resettlers seeking residential accommodation, and also the expression of the perception of the resettlers of the provision of the plan as not satisfying their yearnings and aspirations in all ramifications. As such, the influx of non-resettlers and the resentments of the resettlers are expressed in the structural modification of house design type. The problem is that these modifications are usually devoid of approved Building Regulations as they lacked adequate ventilation, lacked proper foundation and with poor construction materials. Usually the modifications are usually in the form of provision of additional / attachment rooms (using majorly mud bricks and at times sandcrete blocks) for themselves and also for leasing out to non-resettlers.

4.3.4 Reasons for Structural Modifications

This refers to various reasons that have necessitated the modification of structures by the resettlers. Such reasons ranged from natural expansion to lack of storage facilities and discontentment with house design type. Table 4.6 below shows that in Kubwa, 68.55% account for resettlers who modified their structures due to natural expansion (i.e increase in household size), and 30.14% modified their structures due to lack of storage facilities, while 1.31% account for those who modified their structures for several other reasons as the quest of house design to reflect individual's taste.

Table 4.11 Reasons for Structural Modification

Reasons	Kubwa	
	Number	%
Need for expansion	421	68.55
Lack of storage facilities	185	30.14
Others	8	1.31
Total	614	100

The implication of this is that the structural modification is majorly due to the need for expansion, and these modifications have taken up all open space around their houses. However, it is noteworthy that resettlers also provide additional / attachment rooms for leasing out to non-resettlers which also serve as a source of income to non-resettlers.

4.3.5 Approval for Structural Modifications

This refers to the status of legality of modifications made by resettlers as to whether, approval was sought from the Local Planning Authority, before the structured modifications were carried out.

Table 4.12 Approval of Structural Modifications in Kubwa Resettlement Town

Structural Modification	Kubwa	
	Number	%
Approved	6	1.00
Not Approved	608	99.00
Total	614	100

From Figure 4.12 above, it was found out that in Kubwa, 1.14% sought for approval from the Local Planning Authority before carrying out modifications on structures, while 98.86% did not seek such approval.

The implication of this is that, majority of the modifications were carried out without the approval of the Local Planning Authority, this however explains the un-coordinated development and disorderliness that characterize the structural modifications done by the resettlers. Hence, this is a clear deviation in the provision of the resettlement plan in terms of the provision of houses.

4.3.6 Community Participation in Plan Preparation

This refers to extent of resettlers' involvement in evolving the resettlement plan. Resettlers' involvement / participation in evolving a resettlement plan could be at different stages or all of the stages including formulation of goals, site selection, interactive forum, and implementation to other issues as the peculiarity of the scheme dictates. (See Table 4.7).

Table 4.13 Level of Community Participation

Activity/Process	Kubwa	
	Number	%
Formulation of Goals	-	-
Site Selection	-	-
Interactive Forum	614	100.00
Implementation	-	-
Others	-	-
Total	614	100

Table 4.7 shows that in Kubwa, the resettlers were unanimous as to the fact that they were only involved during the interactive forum, to sensitize them on the Government's decision to resettle them to a new location because of the development of Phase I of the FCC.

The implication of this is that resettlers were not optimally involved in process of evolving and implementing the plan, hence their yearnings / aspirations were not adequately factored into the plan.

This will affect the acceptance of the scheme as considered in the next section.

4.4. Level of Physical Development of the Resettlement Scheme

The detailed site development plan of the Kubwa Resettlement Scheme shows the landuse distribution of the resettlement site, which include residential, commercial, educational, recreational uses. Figure 4.13 show the detailed site development plans.




Fig. 4.14: Kubwa Resettlement Scheme (existing situation)

4.4.1 Housing / Residential Development

Unlike the pre-resettlement era where means of access to land for housing was through inheritance and gift, all respondent gained access to housing through government allocations. Resettlers are supposed to be issued with a statutory certificate of occupancy (C of O) in respect of their holdings.

However, none of the resettlers had received C of O at the time that the field work was conducted in 2010. This came as a result of changes in administration and bureaucracy on the part of the FCDA authority.

Residential plot of 20m x 25m (500m²) and 25m x 30m (750m²) were provided in the resettlement site and the houses are of bricks and corrugate zinc roofing sheets constructed by the Federal Capital Development Authority. As shown in tables 4.8, these houses were allocated to the settlers as compensation for the loss of their pre-resettlement homes in the FCC site.

Table 4.14 Number of Houses in Kukwaba, Old Maitama, New Maitama and Katampe

House Type	Kukwaba		Old Maitama		New Maitama		Katampe	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
2 Bedroom	72	34.95	68	44.44	92	45.32	30	57.69
3 Bedroom	57	27.67	56	36.60	79	38.92	17	32.69
4 Bedroom	77	37.38	29	18.96	32	15.76	5	9.62
Total	206	100	153	100	203	100	52	100

Table 4.8 above shows that seventy-two 2-bedroom, fifty-seven 3-bedroom and seventy-seven 4-bedroom was built for resettlers in Kukwaba village. Also sixty-eight 2-bedroom, fifty-six 3-bedroom and twenty-nine 4-bedroom was built for resettlers in Old Maitama village. In the same light, ninety-two 2-bedroom, seventy-nine 3-bedroom and thirty-two 4-bedroom was built for resettlers in New Maitama village. In Katampe village, thirty 2-bedroom, seventeen 3-bedroom and five 4-bedroom was built for resettlers in Katampe village. See Plates 4.16 and 4.17 below.

4.4.2 Core Housing Design – The Concept and Practice

The core housing is a simple design that comprises one, two, and three bedroom house with entrance (Zaure) and provision for future expansion. The design was adopted by the Authority of FCDA. The houses are all made of burnt bricks and are octagonal in shape. (See Plates xii and xiii).

The octagonal form of the housing design is to reflect the people's traditional round or circular houses. Burnt bricks, steel door and windows building materials were adopted in order to reduce cost in the long term as well as reduce the problem of maintenance.



Plate xii A typical 2 Bedroom House



Plate xiii A typical 1 Bedroom House

4.4.3 Prevailing Housing Stock

The survey conducted indicates that, of 614 housing units built by FCDA in the Kubwa resettlement town, there are two-hundred and sixty two 2-bedrooms, two-hundred and twenty nine 3-bedrooms. The remaining one-hundred and forty three are 4-bedroom houses.

The zonal planning office FCDA, Bwari Area Council, prepared various residential layouts of more than 2,000 and 4000 plots within and around the Kubwa Resettlement Scheme site, and allocated same to applicants. These allottees have processed and are still processing C of O to these titles. They also submitted building plan for approval at the Bwari Zonal Planning Office and more than 25% of them that got approval have commenced development on site.

However, it is noteworthy that the activities of the resettlers of building attachment houses within open spaces around their houses and leasing out same to non-resettlers has significantly contributed to the prevailing housing stock in Kubwa resettlement schemes.

There are also a lot of houses built without building plan approval. The field work revealed that over 70% of the houses built by for the non-resettlers within and around the Kubwa Resettlement scheme site are illegal, as they occupy Open Spaces around resettlers' houses and their farmland areas. The unplanned developments lead to haphazard development. (See Table 4.10 and Figure 4.13 and 4.14).

From table 4.10 the total land area of about 14.56 hectares covering 21.62% designated as farmland area has been taken over by unplanned haphazard residential development.

Table 4.15: Landuse Budget of Kubwa Resettlement Scheme (Existing Situation)

S/No.	LAND USE	AREA IN HECTARES	% COVERED
1	Residential	77.81	40.83
2	Commercial	1.23	0.64
3	Public/Semi-Public	4.22	2.21
4	Open Spaces/ Recreation	11.20	5.88
5	Roads / Circulation	14.69	7.71
6	New Residential Development	61.3	32.16
7	Agricultural land	20.14	10.57
	TOTAL	190.59	100.00

From Table 4.10 the total land area of about 61.3 hectares covering 32.16% designated as Agricultural land has been taken over by new unplanned haphazard residential development.

Plates xiv and xv show a pictorial presentation of one of the two and four bedroom semi-detached house built without building plan approval. This results from the illegal land transaction by the Bwari Local Planning Authority and the resettlers; as they partition the open spaces around their houses, and sold to non-resettlers.




Plate xiv A typical 2-Bedroom House built by Non-resettlers in Kubwa




Plate xv A typical 3-Bedroom House built by Non-resettlers in Kubwa

4.5. Non-Resettlers' Houses

This refers to houses built by non-resettlers within the Kubwa Resettlement Town. These residential developments were not part of the resettlement plan. They only emerged out of felt-need. However, the various house types here varied from compound houses, 1-bedroom, 2-bedrooms, 3-bedrooms to 4-bedroom bungalows.

The pattern of the non-resettlers' residential development is characterized by indiscriminate, unplanned and haphazard development lacking order or coherence to any plan, as they occupy every available space around resettlers houses and the farmland area designated to the resettlers.

4.5.1 Sources of Land Acquisition

This refers to the various sources through which the non-resettlers acquired land for residential development. This could be via the resettlers given out their farmland area or via the Bwari Local Planning Authority.

Figure 4.17 below shows that, in Kubwa 48.52% of the resettlers acquired land from the resettlers, and 51.48% of the resettlers acquired their land from the Bwari Local Planning Authority.

Table 4.16 Source of Land Acquisition by Non Resettlers in Kubwa Resettlement Town

Source	Kubwa	
	Number	%
Resettlers	301	49.00
Bwari Local planning Authority	313	51.00
Total	614	100

The implication of this is that the resettlers and Bwari Local Planning Authority are jointly responsible for the unplanned residential development within and around the Kubwa Resettlement Town. Also, another factor is the inactions of the Bwari Local Planning Authority to adequately enforce planning regulations on the physical development within and around the resettlement town.

4.5.2 Approval of Building Plan

This refers to the seeking of approval from the Local Planning Authority, before commencement of development, in order to ensure that proposed development conforms to the dictates of the plan.

From Table 4.11 below, in Kubwa, 8.43% had their building plans approved by the Local Planning Authority before developing, 22.36% of the resettlers said approval was being processed (but have completed development), and 69.21% did not get approval for their development.

Table 4.17 Approval of Building Plans

Kubwa		
Status	Number	%
Approved	50	8.43
Approval in process	133	22.36
No Approval	413	69.21
Total	614	100

The implication of this is that majority of the non-resettlers houses were developed without building plan approval from the Bwari Local Planning Authority. By this, most of the houses do not conform to the resettlers' house design of the resettlement plan and also lacked the characterization of a planned development, hence indiscriminate / haphazard development.

4.5.3 Types of Houses

This refer to various house types prevalent in the non-resettlers' houses which vary from Compound house, 1 bedroom, 2 bedroom, 3 bedroom, to 4 bedroom.

Table 4.18 Types of Non-Resettler's Houses in Kubwa

Kubwa		
Types	Number	%
Bungalow	301	49
Compound House	270	44
Others	43	7
Total	614	100

From Figure 4.19 above shows that in Kubwa, 48.57% are bungalow types which include 1-bedroom, 2-bedroom, 3-bedroom and 4-bedroom. 44.18% are compound House, while 7.25% account for others which range from 1-room house to 2-rooms house

The implication of this is that majority of the houses are compound houses, indicating a high density residential development.

4.6. Facilities, Utilities and Services in Kubwa Resettlement Scheme

Various Facilities, utilities and services were provided in Kubwa Resettlement Scheme to meet the daily habitation need of the resettlers and ensure a self-sustaining community. The full functionality of any settlement development goes beyond the provision of residential houses to include the requisite facilities, utilities and services as education, market, place of worship, clinic, water and electricity supply. In addition to the questionnaire administration, using the direct personal observations were made to assess and evaluate the availability and adequacy or otherwise of the facilities, utilities and services provided in the scheme.

4.6.1 Education

The Federal Capital Development Authority built one primary school in Kubwa with an area of 3.0 hectares with five classroom blocks, with a population of 3684 persons at inception and is located between Old Maitama and Katampe villages. (See Plate xvi and Figure 4.14).

By the Vagale (2000) planning / spatial standards this is considered adequate, and the land area is large enough to accommodate a secondary school. This primary school has gradually become inadequate vis-à-vis the increasing population of the people in Kubwa Resettlement Scheme Town.




Plate xvi Primary School built by FCDA in Kubwa Resettlement Town

Private initiatives have brought about the establishment of private primary schools in Kubwa Resettlement Scheme. These schools number up to twelve with three schools in Old Maitama, four in New Maitama, four in Kukwaba and one in Katampe villages.

In Kubwa Resettlement Scheme site, the survey revealed that the Primary School has been upgraded to accommodate a Junior secondary school. By this, the already congested primary school now has pressure put on it via the up-grade to a junior secondary school, this is evident in the construction of additional classroom in the background of plate xvii below.



Plate xvi Primary School built by FCDA in Kubwa Resettlement Town up-graded to a Junior Sec. School




Plate xvii Construction of additional classroom blocks within the primary school premises in Kubwa

The up-grading of the primary school in Kubwa resettlement town to create avenue for accommodating the Junior secondary school is an indication of the inadequacies of the educational facilities existing in the Kubwa Resettlement Scheme in view of the high increases in the population as against the planned population.

4.6.2 Market

Provision was made for market in Kubwa Resettlement Town and is located in the Maitama village covering an area of 2.6 hectares and was built by the Bwari Area Council. Market stalls have been built to cater for traders' need.

The market has grown so well that space within the market are presently over-used making circulation within the market cumbersome, similarly the market has invaded all adjoining residential landuses, by this, roads around the market have traffic-bottle-necks causing congestion and loss of man-hour in traffic jam. (see Plate xviii).



Plate xviii View of the market in Kubwa Resettlement Scheme

4.6.3 Water Supply

As at the time of the field survey in 2010 in Kubwa, the supply of pipe-borne water to the resettlement town is fairly stable, as the Usuma dam water works do supply water regularly to this area. There are also public faucets around the villages to provide supply of water around the villages. However, the continual influx of non-resettlers into the Kubwa resettlement scheme is increasingly posing a threat to the adequate supply of portable water supply.

4.6.4 Electricity Supply

The Kubwa Resettlement Scheme site is a fast growing resettlement town with the influx of people from various parts of the FCT. In Kubwa resettlement town, a 22Kva transformer was provided to serve the villages. It was gathered from the field survey that, at inception, the supply of electricity to these villages was quite efficient. Now with the influx of non-resettlers to this area, increased pressures have been exerted upon the existing electricity supply infrastructure to make the supply erratic. However, the PHCN have tried to complement the existing transformer by providing an additional 11kva transformer to supply electricity to this area, but the ever increasing influx of people to the area has continually made the supply of electricity to the area epileptic. Hence the poor power supply.

4.6.5 Clinic

The health centre so provided to serve the resettlement town is the Kubwa General Hospital located in the Central Area of the entire Kubwa Resettlement Area Plan before its implementation was stopped mid-way. However, the General Hospital now serves the resettlement town and the new Kubwa town. According to Vagale (2000), the threshold population for a General Hospital is 0.5 – 1 million persons, by this hospital is still under-utilized. The Hospital is known to provide good medical service

to the people. Several Private hospitals have also been established to compliment the efforts of the General hospital in the provision of good health care to the entire populace.

4.6.6 Roads

Roads provide access to all landuses and the better the condition of these roads the easier, convenient and less time-consuming commuting between one point and another.

In the Kubwa resettlement towns, the roads are in deplorable conditions as they lack repairs and maintenance, thus, bringing about lack of convenience in commuting around the areas. (See Plates xix and xx,).



Plate xix Bad Road in Kubwa Resettlement Town



Plate xx Bad Road in Kubwa Resettlement Town

The deplorable state of these roads within the resettlement town is a pointer to the fact that the schemes lacked efficient and timely review and monitoring.

4.6.7 Places of Worship

This refers to place designated to serve the need of the populace for religious purposes, hence the spatial expression of this is seen in places designated as Churches and Mosques. Vagale (2000) recommended 0.8 – 1.2 hectare for Church / Mosque for a population of 5000 – 15,000.


In the Kubwa resettlement scheme, a site was provided for Church and Mosque with size 0.9 hectares and 0.6 hectares respectively, and has been built by the respective religious communities / groups. (see Plates 4.1 and 4.2, and Figure 4.14). However, the continual increase of the population here has necessitated the establishment of more Churches and Mosques. The new churches and mosques in Kubwa are indiscriminately located without any development plan guiding their locations.

It however suffices to say here that the provision of the scheme as it relates to place of worship has fallen below the requirement of the present population and has brought about the creation of new place of worship. Most of the places of worship lacked approval before building, hence they constitute unplanned developments.

4.6.8 Recreation

This refers to provision of space for playground and garden to serve the recreational needs of the populace. From the house design, spaces around the resettlers' houses were to serve as spaces for recreational activities. The field survey shows that all of these spaces have been built up. Hence, children in this neighbourhood recourse to playing on the street, endangering their lives and putting them at risks. (See Plate xxi).

According to Vagale (2000), his work on planning / spatial standards, it states that for a population of 1,000 persons, a space of about 0.6 – 0.8 hectares be set aside for recreational purposes. The Kubwa Resettlement scheme with population at about 3684 at inception had an area of about 64.99ha designated to recreation and open space for the entire resettlement town, which is considered adequate (see Figure 4.14 above). However, with the continual influx of people into the part of the resettlement town that was implemented (before stopping the implementation half way), spaces designated for recreational open space have been taken over by unplanned residential development. In addition, all complementary open space around resettlers' houses meant for recreational purposes have been taken over by unplanned residential development. By this, with the population of the Kubwa Resettlement Town raising to about 24,032 persons, the required space for recreational purposes is about 16.8ha. This calls for the provision of spaces to serve and accommodate the recreational needs of the populace.



**Plate xxi A view of Children Playing on the street in
The Kubwa Resettlement Town**

4.7 Organization / Institutional Challenges to Implementing Resettlement Schemes

The department of resettlement and compensation was contacted on the status of resettlement sites in the FCT, and particularly on Kubwa Resettlement Schemes. The reasons adduced for their present state that present a scenario of schemes devoid of adequate monitoring and review, centered around; lack of adequate funds, inadequate trained personnel, logistics for monitoring (e.g Vehicles etc), frequent change in administration and a consequent change in policy and priorities.

(i) Lack of adequate funds

This is here used to refer to the lack of adequate funds to carry out / implement all resettlement programmes (payment of compensation and the building of resettlement schemes) set out to realize the set goal and objectives of the government's resettlement policy. The lack of funds has greatly hampered and delays the execution of the set resettlement programmes (timely payment of compensation and development of resettlement schemes) by the department of resettlement and compensation.

ii) Inadequate Trained Personnel

This goes to express the qualitative shortage of manpower to effectively champion the implementation and monitoring of the set resettlement programmes, hence, the imperatives and the need for effective and sustainable capacity building, to enhance the manpower development of the resettlement and compensation department. Adequate trained personnel were seemingly inadequate in the department of resettlement and compensation.

iii) Logistics for monitoring

This is here used to refer to the ability to efficiently organize the implementation of resettlement schemes with the availability of the appropriate inputs as functional vehicles, materials etc at the right proportion and time. The unavailability of appropriate logistics at the right time can seriously hamper the successful implementation of any programme. These appropriate logistic was seemingly inadequate in the department of resettlement and compensation.

iv) Frequent Change in Administration

This is here used to refer to the instability and the consequent inconsistencies in the resettlement policies resulting from the frequent change in administration in the FCT. This seeming frequent change in administration in the FCT has contributed largely to the changes in resettlement policy(ies), delay in the resettlement time-table of the indigenous populace, and by extension increased the financial implication of the resettlement programme.

Until the last two administrations in the FCT (1999-2003 and 2004-2007), the task of resettlement has remained domiciled in unit / section of some department, and even as Taskforce / Committee in outlook.

And also for the observed / apparent distortions in the provisions of the Kubwa Resettlement scheme that has led to indiscriminate development within and around the resettlement site, the Bwari Area Council Local Planning Authority was said to be responsible for preparing layouts plans and allocating to developers without the prior approval of the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA).

4.8 Statistical Analysis of Findings

This section is intended to decide whether the idea hypothesized is supported by the field sample data. This step will aid the research to arrive at correct conclusions as a prelude to proffering appropriate solutions.

Chi-Square Test Procedure was used to test the hypothesis. The variables are extracted from the administered questionnaires and the stipulated level of significance value of five (5) percent (0.05) was selected. By this if the P value is less than 0.05 then the Test is significant.

(i)Testing of Hypothesis (*number of resettlers whose perception of the resettlement policy and scheme is not satisfactory*)

Ho – There is no statistical significant difference in the number of resettlers whose perception of the resettlement policy and scheme is not satisfactory.

Hi – There is statistical significant difference in the number of resettlers whose perception of the resettlement policy and scheme is not satisfactory.

Frequency of Resettlers whose Perception of the Resettlement Policy and Scheme is Not Satisfactory

	Observed N	Expected N	Residual
457	457	228.5	228.5
Total	457		

Test Statistics

	Frequency of Resettlers whose Perception of the Resettlement Policy and Scheme is Not Satisfactory
Chi-Square(a)	189.898
Df	1
Asymp. Sig.	.000

a.0 cells (.0%) have frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 228.

Interpretation

Since the calculated P value is .0001 which is less than the table value of 0.05 alpha levels ($P \leq 0.05$), then H_1 is accepted and H_0 is rejected. There are statistical significant difference in the number of resettlers whose perception of the resettlement policy and scheme is not satisfactory. Hence, this significant difference in the number of resettlers whose perception of the resettlement policy and scheme is not satisfactory is an indication of the level of dissatisfaction and resentments with the provisions of the resettlement policy and scheme.

(ii) Testing of Hypothesis (*number of modified 2, 3 and 4 bedroom houses in Kubwa Resettlement Scheme*)

H_0 – There is no statistical significant difference in the number of modified 2, 3 and 4 bedroom houses in Kubwa Resettlement Schemes.

H_1 – There is statistical significant difference in the number of modified 2, 3 and 4 bedroom houses in Kubwa Resettlement Schemes.

Frequency of Modified 2, 3 and 4 Bedroom Houses

	Observed N	Expected N	Residual
454	454	227	227
Total	454	Expected N	Residual
	Observed N		
454	454	227	227
Total	454		

Test Statistics

	Frequency of Modified 2, 3 and 4 bedroom Houses
Chi-Square(a)	158.944
Df	1
Asymp. Sig.	.000

a.0 cells (.0%) have frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 227

Interpretation

Since the calculated P value is .0001 which is less than the table value of 0.05 alpha levels ($P \leq 0.05$), then H_1 is accepted and H_0 is rejected. There are significant difference in the frequency of modified 2, 3 and 4 bedroom houses in Kubwa Resettlement Schemes. Hence, this significant difference in the frequency of modified houses by the resettlers is an indication of the level of dissatisfaction and resentments with the housing provisions of the resettlement schemes.

(iii) Testing of Hypothesis (Residential landuse plan in Kubwa Resettlement Scheme)

H_0 – There is no statistical significant difference in the residential landuse plan in Kubwa Resettlement Scheme.

H_1 – There is statistical significant difference in the residential landuse plan in Kubwa Resettlement Scheme.

Frequency of Modified Residential Landuse Plan in Kubwa

	Observed N	Expected N	Residual
454	454	227	227
Total	454	Expected N	Residual
	Observed N		
461	461	230.5	230.5
Total	461		

Test Statistics

	Frequency of Modified Residential Landuse Plan in Kubwa
Chi-Square(a)	200.139
Df	1
Asymp. Sig.	.000

a.0 cells (.0%) have frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 230.5

Interpretation

Since the calculated P value is .0001 which is less than the table value of 0.05 alpha levels ($P \leq 0.05$), then H_1 is accepted and H_0 is rejected. There are significant difference in the frequency of modified residential landuse plan in Kubwa Resettlement Schemes. Hence, this significant difference in the frequency of modified residential landuse plan by the resettlers is an indication of the level of dissatisfaction and resentments with the provisions of the residential landuse plan of the resettlement schemes.

5.0

CHAPTER FIVE

DICUSSION ,CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In this chapter, the preceding discussion of the research findings and analysis revealed all that is summarized here. Premised upon this summary, recommendations are made to ameliorate all problems identified in the findings of the study and conclusions are drawn from the recommendations so made.

5.1 Discussion

The present total population of Kubwa resettlement town is 24,032. And 25.55% of the population in Kubwa resettlement town are Resettlers. Similarly, 74.45% of the population in Kubwa resettlement town respectively are Non-Resettlers.

Farming remains largely the occupation of the resettlers. They also work as Traders, Fishermen, Artisans and Civil Servants. However, the non-resettlers are majorly the Civil Servants living in the resettlement site. From the survey, in Kubwa resettlement town 36.55% engage in Farming, 9.45% Trading, 1.34% Fishing, 9.08% Artisans, 41.45% Civil Servants, and 2.13 Unemployed.

The populace whose occupation is farming (whom are majorly resettlers) travel about 2-4km to get to their farmlands, as nearby farmlands provided for them have been sold out to the non-resettlers for residential development. This is due to the influx of people into the resettlement town and the consequent pressure of housing. 68.33% of the resettlers that engage in farming in Kubwa resettlement towns respectively travel 2 – 4km to get to farmland area.

Similarly, 49.89% of the populace in Kubwa resettlement towns respectively earn between N50,000 – N100,000 annually from their economic activities. The populace who are farmers responded that

the lack of proximity to their farmlands, lack of storage facilities, accessibility to market and importantly Inputs for improved farming techniques and access to agricultural loans are great inhibitions to increasing their production capacities and annual disposable income. Also, that their income use to be higher before farmland area were taken over by unplanned residential development.

Such occupational practices as Artisan, Trading and Civil servant are a indications that the community is experiencing economic and social transformation, diversification and a gradual departure from purely agrarian setting.

Four villages were resettled with 614 households in Kubwa in Bwari Area Council in the FCT because of the development of the Federal Capital City (FCC). Housing types provided varied from 4-Bedroom, 3-Bedroom, 2-Bedroom to 1-Bedroom apartment, with Zaure. Also provided are Facilities, Utilities and Services as School (Primary School), Place of Worship (Mosque and Church), Clinic, Electricity, and Water Supply. From the perception surveys carried out 74.45% of the resettlers in Kubwa resettlement towns, expressed dissatisfaction with the provisions of the resettlement and compensation policy and scheme. The reasons adduced for the observed resentments included; few numbers of rooms inhibiting natural expansion, Lack of storage facilities, loss of farmland to haphazard residential development, and the deplorable state of Facilities, Utilities and Services.

These resentments, particularly relating to house designs has its spatial expressions in the structural modifications of house designs by building attachment rooms devoid of approved building regulations, consequently 74.45% in Kubwa resettlement towns respectively have modified their

houses. Also, 68.95% of the resettlers in Kubwa resettlement towns respectively adduced reasons for modification to the need to accommodate natural expansion.

The survey also revealed that 98.86% of the resettlers in Kubwa resettlement towns respectively did not seek approval before these modifications were made. The resettlers were also unanimous about their level of participation and involvement in preparing the plan to be only at interactive forum level and not at, site selection, implementation, nor any other aspects of the preparation of the scheme.

Residential development built by FCDA in Kubwa resettlement town varied from 2, 3 to 4 bedroom with Zaure. In Kukwaba, seventy-two (72) 2-Bedrooms, fifty-seven (57) 3-Bedroom and seventy-seven (77) 4-Bedroom. In Old Maitama sixty-eight (68) 2-Bedroom, fifty-six (56) 3-Bedroom and twenty-nine (29) 4-Bedroom. In New Maitama ninety-two (92) 2-Bedroom, seventy-nine (79) 3-Bedroom and thirty-two (32) 4-Bedroom, and in Katampe, thirty (30) 2-Bedroom, seventeen (17) 3-Bedroom and five (5) 4-Bedroom. (giving a total of two-hundred and sixty two (262) 2-Bedroom, two-hundred and nine (209) 3-Bedroom and one-hundred and forty three (143) 4-Bedroom.)

With the prevalence of the unplanned residential development by non-resettlers, and consequent explosion of the population of the resettlement site, this has made the Facilities, Utilities and Services (School, Clinic, Electricity, Access Roads, Portable Water, and Places of Worship) so provided for the resettlement site to be under pressure and become over-stretched. Thus, creating the need for upgrading and maintaining these Facilities, Utilities and Services.

Residential / Housing units that are not part of the Kubwa Resettlement scheme sprang up (to accommodate the non-resettlers) and infiltrated the resettlement site and these has taken over spaces meant for expansion by the resettlers' housing units, and also taken over adjoining lands designated to farmland, thus making farmland area far away from resettlers. Hence, constituting unplanned and haphazard development.

In Kubwa resettlement town 51.48% of non-resettlers acquired their lands from the Bwari Local Planning Authority, and 48.52% acquired from sale from the resettlers. By this the Resettlers and the Bwari Local Planning Authority are jointly responsible for the un-planned residential development within and around the resettlement towns.

From the survey, in Kubwa resettlement town 69.21% did not get approval before building, 22.36% say their approval are in process, 4.43% got approval before building. This goes to show that large spectrum of the buildings lacked necessary legal approval.

The resettlement and compensation department of FCDA responsible for resettlement tasks in the FCT expresses the reasons for the present state of the Kubwa Resettlement schemes as; Lack of Funds, Inadequate Trained Personnel, Logistics for Monitoring (e.g Vehicles etc), Frequent Change in administration and a consequent change and inconsistencies in policy and priorities.

5.2 Conclusion

This study has assessed the impact of the resettlement and compensation policy on the level of physical development of the Kubwa Resettlement Scheme Plan. It achieved this through analysis of resettlers' perception of the resettlement and compensation policy and the scheme and the spatial expressions of their resentments in structural modification of their house designs; and upsurge of unplanned residential development on land area designated as resettlers' farmland area, level of

community participation in evolving and implementing the schemes, level of infrastructure decay and institutional lapses in keeping the scheme in line with stated goal and objectives.

It is thus believed that the findings and recommendations of this research are pertinent to the improvement of the resettlement and compensation policy and scheme to make it sustainable.

By this, resettlement and compensation policy, and the scheme become strategic to the development of the FCT and pragmatic efforts should be made to enhance the relevance and sustainability of resettlement and compensation policy vis a vis indigenous settlements in the FCT.

5.3 Recommendations

To achieve efficiency and sustainability in the Kubwa Resettlement Schemes and make these schemes serves as sustainable model for urban population relocation and rehabilitation in the FCT, the following are needful to be in place

1. A review of the FCT Resettlement policy and particularly the Kubwa Resettlement Scheme be made and be directed towards putting in place an effective development control mechanisms to evaluate contraventions in order to identify distortions to be removed (e.g encroachment on recreational spaces) and those to be retained. The development control mechanism to be an embodiment of the Resettlement and Compensation department, Development Control department, Bwari Local Planning Authority and Representative of the Resettlers. The essence is to involve all stakeholders and importantly to greatly involve the resettlers in these processes to foster acceptance and engender community responsibility for the scheme. This will prevent derailment of the provisions of the resettlement and compensation policy and the scheme.

2. The resettlement and compensation department should, in collaboration with the resettlers, evolve plan / design for structural expansion to be adopted by resettlers desiring expansion / modifications to their houses due to natural expansion. Since the resettlers' house design is core-housing and provided opportunity for expansion in its design, the essence is to harmonize the expansion / modification across the resettlement towns. The owners of houses already modified are to be urged and encouraged to comply with the evolved expansion / modification plan. Hence, uniformity will be achieved and the eyesore in the haphazard development using poor construction material will be prevented, and the risk of building collapse averted.
3. Adequate funding of the department of resettlement should be made to ensure full implementation of the provisions of the resettlement policy and resettlement plan, rehabilitation of infrastructure and importantly efficient monitoring and review of the Kubwa Resettlement Scheme. This is to make the scheme relevant to the present realities and to achieve its aim and realize the full potentials of the scheme as tools for to achieving sustainable resettlement and compensation policy.
4. The primary schools should have more blocks of classrooms constructed to prevent congestion of pupils and encourage a better learning environment, since the school now has a junior secondary school wing. The on-going construction of block of classrooms in the Kubwa Resettlement town should be completed.

In the Kubwa resettlement town, the activities of street traders around the market should be discourage to prevent the traffic bottleneck created to reduce the inconveniences faced by motorist around the market.

Portable water supply should be leveraged as this will reduce to a large extent, the difficulties faced by the populace in accessing portable water.

The Power Holding Company (PHCN) should be urged to provide larger capacity electricity transformer as 32kv, to the Kubwa resettlement towns in order to improve on the power supply to these areas, in view of its increasing population.

The Hospital in Kubwa resettlement town should be further equipped with qualified medical personnel (Doctors and Nurses), requisite diagnostic equipments and drugs, enough to guarantee the provision primary health care services to the populace. This is to prevent the inconvenience faced by the populace of access to health service. This should be done in full collaboration with the FCT Health Secretariat.

The access roads in deplorable conditions within the Kubwa resettlement town should be rehabilitated to ensure ease of communication by the populace within and around these areas.

Areas so designated to recreational purposes in the Kubwa resettlement town should be restored by demolishing the development on these parcels of land, this is to allow for spaces and opportunities for the wholesome pursuit of recreational activities by the populace.

5. The Bwari Area Council Authority should be stopped from initiating further, any residential / commercial layout scheme that necessitates encroachment within and around the Kubwa Resettlement scheme sites without the express permission of the Minister of the FCT via the resettlement department of FCDA.
6. The Resettlement and Compensation department, FCDA should evolve and demarcate farmland layouts for resettlers and create access roads to facilitate accessibility and

movement of farm produces. These farmland parcels to be given to these farmers will be devoid of title documents to prevent sale to people for residential development and other purposes.

7. Since the occupational structure of these area is gradually becoming diverse, it is imperative that a Livelihood Training Programme and Vocational and Skill Acquisition Centre be put in place to further engender the diversification of the occupational characteristics / economy of the area and create opportunities for the teeming youth population to be empowered via various productive economic activities, to create young entrepreneurs with capacities for sustained self-employment

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