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Fishers' Livelihoods Dynamics in the Wake of Declining Fisheries in Lake Victoria, Tanzania: Lessons from Bwiro, Mazinga and Lukuba Islands¹

Elliott P. Niboye²

Abstract

This study sought to establish the livelihood dynamics of fishing communities amid declining fisheries resources in Lake Victoria, Tanzania. Data were collected from 246 respondents using interviews, focus group discussions and observations. The collected data were both qualitative and quantitative. It was found that the decline of fisheries resources in a selected number of islands in Lake Victoria has led to those islands' fishers' communities devising a range of alternative strategies for their livelihoods that included but not confined to investing in heavy and modern fishing machinery, unscrupulous fishing practices and migration. Factors such as age, education level, gender and origin of fishers influenced fishers' choices for particular strategies. Efforts to help in revamping the fisheries sector have been instituted, including the beach management units (BMUs) whose major mandate is to deter unscrupulous fishing practices. This article recommends that measures such as closed fishing season, prevention of unscrupulous fishing practices, and restricted fishing access should be tightened and enforced so as to safeguard the Lake Victoria fisheries resources. On the other hand, the fishing communities should venture into other income generating activities such as aquaculture and farming so as to alleviate the pressure on the fishery ecology and facilitate the resilience of the Lake Victoria's fishers' communities.

Key words: Fishery resource, livelihoods strategies, fishing communities

Introduction

In normal circumstances when people encounter difficulties, they tend to develop different mechanisms to contain the situation. Similarly, in

¹This paper is part of a wider study on the livelihood dynamics of fishing communities amid declined fisheries resources in Lake Victoria, Tanzania, carried out during 2012-2017. The author acknowledges the immense contribution to this work by Dr Sospeter Berling Magolyo of the Rural Planning and Development Institute, Dodoma, Tanzania.

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circumstances of resources scarcity, households tend to undertake a range of mechanisms to sustain life (Ellis, 2000). Lake Victoria fishers exemplify people's struggle to attain livelihoods in a constrained natural resources base. The dwindling of fish catches by fishers of these communities has necessitated households to devise various strategies to attain improved livelihood outcomes. This article attempts to reveal the livelihood dynamics of fishing communities in Lake Victoria Islands following the decline of fisheries resources.

Theoretical Perspectives on Livelihood Dynamics

The concept of livelihood is about individuals, households or groups making a living by attempting to meet their various consumption and economic necessities, coping with uncertainties and responding to new opportunities (Haan and Zoomers, 2003). It connotes the means, activities, entitlements and assets by which people make a living. Consonant with the Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF), livelihood is defined as the activities, the assets, and the access that jointly determine the living gained by an individual or household (Carney, 1998). Others define livelihood by going beyond peoples' pursuit of making a living and portray it to comprise the resources which provide people with the capability to build a satisfactory living, the risk factors that they must consider in managing their resources, and the institutional and policy context that either helps or hinders them in pursuit of improving viable living (Ellis and Allison, 2004). Either way, livelihood is considered sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities, assets and entitlements, without undermining the natural resources base (Chambers and Conway, 1992).

For fishing communities living in Lake Victoria's islands, the decline of fisheries resource has resulted into a complexity of life patterns that the communities undertake so as to achieve improved livelihood outcomes. The community's response towards the decline in natural resources is a function of several factors both internal and external to the communities, in shaping the trend of coping and or adaptation strategies to the resource scarcity (Allison and Horemans, 2006; Ellis, 2000; Chambers and Conway, 1992). In another context, adaptation is considered as the process by which individuals or a community at large constructs a diverse portfolio of strategies for survival and social support in order to improve their standard of living (Ellis,

1998). A combination of livelihood activities undertaken to gain a living are considered as livelihood portfolios (Scoones, 1998). A portfolio may be highly specialized such that it concentrates on one or a few activities, or it may be quite diverse.

In the wake of declined natural resources, households are contended to normally undertake either coping or adaptation strategies which are driven from choice or necessity (Ellis, 2000). Such drives are considered to include survival and accumulation (Hart, 1994). Sometimes this is related to push versus pull reasons that instigate people to migrate (Bigsten, 1996). However, Ellis (2000) infers necessity to involuntary and desperate reasons for diversifying while on the other hand, choice refers to voluntary and proactive reasons for diversifying. As opposed to coping strategies that are responses to impacts once they occur, adaptation can be anticipatory, where systems adjust before the initial impacts take place, or it can be reactive, where change is introduced in response to the onset of impacts that will re-occur and reflect a structural change of the state of the system (Balgis *et al.*, 2005).

Bird and Shepherd (2003) further reiterate that adaptation can involve migrating from an area for strategic periods of time or permanently, or resort to money lenders, etc. This is true, for example, when the decline of fish stocks in an area is perceived, fishers may consider out-migrating as a way of enhancing their livelihood and well-being (Allison and Mvulla, 2002). Although coping and adaptation are sometimes used interchangeably, coping strategies may be considered as a short-term response to a specific shock such as drought whereas actions could include switching to cultivation of drought-resistant crops or reliance on external food aid (Balgis *et al.*, 2005). Adaptation strategies, on the other hand, entail a long-term change in behaviour patterns as a result of a shock or stress (Balgis *et al.*, 2005). The strategies within livelihood portfolios frequently vary between individuals and households depending on differences in asset ownership, income levels, gender, age, caste and social or political status (Lasse, 2001). This suggests that due to the above differences; households are believed to employ a range of mechanisms to create a buffer to the impact of the decline of any dependable natural resources.

The Sustainable Livelihood Framework

The processes and mechanisms exercised during livelihood alteration can best be analyzed in a framework or model that was devised to study dynamics of people's livelihood when subjected to constraints of resources scarcity. The Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF) (Figure 1) is relevant in this case

because of its emphasis on considering a household as an epic centre for the deployment of initiatives to thwart off predicaments brought by declined fisheries resources. The framework is based on the argument that normally people operate in a context of vulnerability and a wider availability of their assets are fundamentally affected by critical trends as well as by shocks and seasonality over which they have limited or no control (DFIDs, 1999). The above factors make up the vulnerability context which has a direct impact upon people’s asset status and the options that are open to them in pursuit of beneficial livelihood outcomes. However, regardless of assets endowments, the SLF shows that household’s assets gain meaning and value through prevailing institutional frameworks which can either inhibit or foster attainment of livelihood outcomes.




Figure1: Sustainable Livelihood Framework

Source: The DFIDs Sustainable Livelihood Framework Guidance Sheet (1999:39)

In the SLF, the power dynamics are clearly indicated showing its influence in livelihood assets, structures and processes, strategies, outcomes and vulnerabilities. In relation to fishing communities, the power structure in the framework is believed to elicit information on how fishing communities in the study areas interact with available institutions and government structures. The differences in interests, conflicts and tensions within and between communities are addressed within the SLF which suggest that poor communities and the poor within communities can have least access to assets, scant influence over structures and processes that govern their lives, and thus the greatest

vulnerability to shocks of all kinds. The model clearly depicts analysis of relations between households, community institutions, immediate structures (local government, market organizations), and other external relations that are important in a livelihoods analysis. Thus, an understanding of political processes and power dynamics in areas of declined fishery resources like the three islands in Lake Victoria will disclose information of fishing communities' struggle for survival.

Despite being the foremost and widely used livelihood model, the DFID's Livelihood model is well known for its incomprehensive coverage of gender issues taking into consideration that the relations between men and women in poor communities are characterized by inequality and social domination and when it comes to the point of shocks and or stresses these groups are affected differently (Carney, 1998). The emphasis on gender considerations during livelihood analysis is also put forward by Laier *et al.*, (1996) whose argument is that women are weaker partners in bargaining over resources which in times of scarcity compromises their capacity to cope. They may pursue the same strategies as men (e.g. income diversification, migration, and borrowing) but they have different starting points. Limited access to resources, lower rates of pay and their reproductive duties tend to make women more vulnerable than men in normal times and in emergencies (Medard *et al.*, 2002). In the analysis of fisheries dynamics in Lake Victoria Islands, the gender dimension is considered by incorporating gender issues in the model as depicted in households assets access and benefits, differential vulnerability between gender and influence of institutional frameworks in fostering or inhibiting either gender to attain livelihood outcomes.

Lake Victoria's Fisheries Historicity

Historically, Lake Victoria is one of the water bodies that were inhabited by various species of fisheries that provided livelihoods to a multitude of individuals around the Lake Victoria basin (Seehausen *et al.*, 1999). The Lake was once famed to host a highly diverse fish community of over 400 species with about 350 species being endemic to the lake (Graham, 1929; Beauchamp, 1955). Its rich fauna was further documented by Greenwood (1974), Witte *et al.*, (1992) and Seehausen (1996). Lake Victoria Fisheries Organisation (2007) showed that *Tilapiines* and *Haplochromines* were the dominant species with the 83% of the catches in 1970s being comprised of *Haplochromines* and that the commercial fishery was based on the *Tilapiine* (i.e. *Oreochromis esculentus* and *Oreochromis variabilis*). Other important fish species included *Bagrus spp.* (the catfish) *Clarias spp.*, *Synodontis spp.*, *Chile spp.*, *Protopterus spp.*, and *Labeo*

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spp and many others. Nevertheless, Lake Victoria's fisheries have undergone dramatic changes in recent decades characterised by a general decline of fisheries and specifically the depletion of several native fish species (Witte *et al.*, 1992; Ligtvoet and Mkumbo, 1992).

Records show that artisanal fisheries harvested many of the above species from littoral regions using traditional fishing gears which mainly consisted of locally made basket traps, spears, hand lines, lances, hooks and seine nets of papyrus and other local netting materials (Graham, 1929; Worthington, 1929; Kateka, 2010). The fishing effort was low until in 1905 when it began to increase with the introduction of more efficient flax gillnets (Graham, 1929). The introduction of netting materials made of cotton and flax stimulated the development of a commercial fishery, most notably for Tilapia in Lake Victoria (Garrod, 1961). It was during the period between 1905 to 1916 when gillnets were introduced into various parts of Lake Victoria (Keenleyside and Miles, 1991; Balirwa, 1992), and owing to this new development and coupled with the growth of urban centres and communication around the Lake Victoria, the fishing industry assumed a commercial role. By 1950s, the intensified use of outboard motors and nylon nets became more readily available along the Lake Victoria basin (Kitchel *et al.*, 1997). The earliest survey of Lake Victoria fisheries showed that *Tilapiine* species particularly *Oreochromis esculentus* and *Oreochromis variabilis* were then the most important commercial species (Witte *et al.*, 1992; Ogutu-Ohwayo, 1995).

The introduction of Nile Perch (*Lates niloticus*) and several *Tilapiine* species such as *Oreochromis niloticus*, *Oreochromis leucostictus* and *Tilapia zillii* in the 1950s is believed to have changed the Lake Victoria fisheries status (Witte *et al.*, 1992). By the 1950s large numbers of the *Piscivorous* guilds and *Potadromous* species were exploited heavily while many of the *Haplochromine* species remained abundant under continuing exploitation simply because these small-bodied species were deemed to be of modest economic value (Kitchell *et al.*, 1997). Because of its small size and being bony in nature, the *Haplochromines* species were not favoured catches and Coulter *et al.*, (1986) indicated that this was supported by the decision of the colonial administration to introduce the Nile Perch (*Lates niloticus*) in the Lake so as to provide table meat which was preferred over the bony little fishes.


The Evolution of Nile Perch Fishery

Nile Perch was first introduced into Lake Victoria in 1954 (Reynolds *et al.*, 1995; Goldschmidt, 1996). In what seemed as a flopped plan, for about two

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decades since its introduction, there was a very low density of Nile Perch in the lake and this was exemplified by its infrequent catch. Then for reasons still not quite clear to many in the industry, by the mid-1970s, the Nile Perch populations suddenly spiked and this population explosion was commonly termed as the Nile Perch boom (Reynolds *et al.*, 1995; Pringle, 2005). Nevertheless, despite the Nile Perch boom, until 1970s, the Lake Victoria still supported a multi-species fishery dominated mainly by *Tilapiine* and *Haplochromine cichlids* (Jackson, 1971; Fryer, 1972).

Over the years, the total fish catch from Lake Victoria increased but with changes in the contribution of different species to the overall catch (LVFO, 2006). In the year 2000, the estimated annual fish landing was about 620,000 tonnes of which the Nile Perch contributed 42%, Sardines 40%, Tilapia 17% and other species 1%. In 2005, the estimated total catch was 804,000 tonnes of which Nile Perch contributed 29% Sardines 48%, *Haplochromines* 13%, Tilapia 9%, and other species less than 1% (LVFO, 2006). In 2006 the LVFO estimated a total catch of about 1,061,108 tonnes where the Nile Perch contributed 24%, Sardines 54%, Tilapia 7%, *Haplochromines* 13% and other species less than 1%. The LVFO's frame survey data indicated that the catch yield for Nile Perch occurred concurrently with a substantial increase of fishing efforts between 2000 and 2006. As the number of fishers increased by 52% from 129,305 to 196,426, the number of fishing vessels increased by 63% from 42,493 to 69,160. Likewise, the number of fishing crafts using outboard engines increased from 4,108 to 12,000 which was a 211% overall increase in motorization (LVFO, 2014). Over the same period, the total number of gillnets also increased by 88%, from 650,653 in 2000 to 1,222,307 in 2006 and long line hooks by 61% from 3,496,247 to 9,044,550 hooks, respectively. This suggests that in response to the decline of catch yields, fishers invested more in fishing outfits that included deployment of outboard engine boats to enable them travel far from the lake shore in search of fish catch. Because of the Nile Perch boom, Lake Victoria was considered as the most productive freshwater fishery in Africa during 1990s (FAO, 2002). Figure 2 shows fish landing in Lake Victoria where catch yields for Nile Perch spiked starting in late 1980s to early 1990s, after which the dwindling catch of Nile Perch was noted culminating in a substantial decline in 2000s.



F. Year fish Catch Growth in Lake Victoria

Source: LVFO (2005:23)

With increased fishing pressure, predation and competition among species, the multispecies fishery of Lake Victoria fishery changed to mainly three species of Nile Perch, the Pelagic Cyprinid (Sardine), and Nile tilapia all against a continued decrease in catch per unit effort and mean size of fish caught (Othina and Osewe-Odera, 1996; Mkumbo and Cowx, 1999). Following enormous changes in the efficiency of fishing gears, motorization of fishing vessels and extension of fishing grounds, the boom of Nile Perch fishery immediately was followed by decline in mid 1990s (Ogutuh-Ohwayo, 1995; Mkumbo and Cowx, 1999) despite fishery management measures that were taken; control of minimum mesh size, ban on trawling and beach seines as well as closing of some fishing areas and seasons, to protect the spawning stock and ensure recruitment to the fishery.

The Current Fishery Status in Lake Victoria

By the end of 1990s, Nile Perch fishery was already the main fishery in Lake Victoria replacing other fishery types because of the income it generated, including from industrial processing. The mushrooming of fish processing

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factories in cities/towns along shores of Lake Victoria targeting Nile Perch was a clear manifestation of intensification of Nile Perch fishery (Madard, 2001). LVFO (2006) asserts that as industrial demands for Nile Perch intensified tremendously, it attracted a multitude of fishermen into the fishery. Apart from the allurements of income from Nile Perch fishery, there was an influx of people into the fisheries sector due to lack of employment and other unpromising prospects in other sectors of the economy (Awange and Obiero, 2006). However, Mutunga (2002) associated the influx of people into fishery with the access system of fisheries in Lake Victoria which granted open access to enter and exit. Data in Figure 3 shows that by 1990s the Nile Perch harvest peaked to over 350 thousand tonnes and catches of between 300 and 350 thousand tonnes were sustained until 1995. From then catches exhibited a gradual declining trend with a minimum in 2002 of 240,000 tonnes.




Figure 3: Nile Perch harvest trends for the last 30 Years in East African Countries

Source: FAO (2008: 21)

Fishing efforts did not complement the fish catch yields as illustrated in Figure 4 below.




Figure 1: Trends in Fish Catches and Fishing Efforts

Source: LVFO (2006: 22)

Figure 4 shows a dwindling yield of fish catch was more experienced starting in mid 1990s despite the increased fishing efforts exemplified by an increased number of boats. Following the increase in stocks of Nile Perch and its consequential industrial demand, the number of boats in the Lake Victoria increased from 4000 in 1988 to over 8000 in 1990 and over 15000 in 2000 (LVFO, 2006).

Furthermore, during the same time the total number of gillnets also increased by 88% and long line hooks by 61% (LVFO, 2006). The increased trade in fisheries resources was a recipe for more destructive methods of exploitation of the fisheries resources in a bid to increase profits. The use of commercial trawling, drift nets, beach seines and several forced capture methods became the norm (LVFO, 2006). The sustained use of illegal fishing gear and methods is said to have collectively resulted into catching high proportions of immature fish, indicative of a declining fishery (Ogutu-Ohwayo, 1995). The observed trends of increased fishing efforts with a consequential decline of fish catch yields lend credence to the theory of catch yields having reached the maximum sustainable level above which even extra effort in fishing will not result in any increase in fish catch (Sparre and Venema, 1992). The decline in yields and catch per unit effort (CPUE) normally leads to fishers deploying more canoes and the likelihood of using destructive fishing gears and methods leading to overfishing and depletion of stocks (Ogutu-Ohwayo *et al.*, 1997).

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The other feature that depicted the decline of fisheries resources is the low capacity operation of fish processing factories in towns along Lake Victoria. Many of the established fish factories have ever since been operating at less than half of their installed capacities, largely owing to insufficient fish supplies since the mid 1990s (Jansen, 1997). One further observation is that many of the factories have often been buying Nile Perch fishes that are as low as one kilogram in weight and lower than the minimum size allowed by authorities. Moreover, some fishers have resorted to using unscrupulous methods of fishing such as beach seining to meet the insatiable market demand (Yongo *et al.*, 2005).

The Consequences of Nile Perch Fishery Boom

The lucrative business of the Nile Perch did take long before its adverse impacts became apparent both in fishing and non-fishing communities. Livelihood changes started to occur as fishing communities were no longer able to draw sustenance from the lake's rich fishing grounds. This was compounded by the advent of the European market for Nile Perch fillets in the 1980s, which led to foreign investors investing massively in trawlers fishery and fish fillet processing factories (Madard, 2001). Following this development, Nile Perch fishing became almost totally a product for the export market, depriving the local communities of consumable fish and curtailing fish workers occupation in traditional fish processing (Mugabe *et al.*, 2009; Staples and Smith, 2007). The decreasing stock of fish pushed communities to devise several measures so as to sustain a living. Communities tended to resort to unsustainable livelihood activities that included but were not limited to hazardous fishing techniques, ecological destruction of wetlands for agricultural activities as well as indiscriminate felling of useful fruit trees (Tungaraza, 2007; Tumbo, 2008). In the Simiyu wetland, for example, climate variations in the area have caused difficulties to communities which depended on the wetland resources for their survival (Tumbo, 2008).

The Study Areas

Fishing communities in three islands of Lake Victoria Tanzania were surveyed, namely; Mazinga Island in Muleba District, Kagera, Bwiro Island in Ukerewe District, Mwanza, and Lukuba Island in Musoma Rural District, Mara (Figure 5).

Mazinga Island

Mazinga Island is administratively located in Muleba District at Mazinga Kisiwani Ward, which comprises of 16 small islands where Mazinga is the

largest. The Mazinga island lies at a latitude of 1.9666700 South and longitude of 31.7833300 East. It is located at an elevation of 1134 meters above sea level. It is one of the areas with the highest population in Muleba District having 6,730 people (URT, 2013). The island has an average of 3.8 persons per household. The island is composed of several ethnic groups but the Haya comprise the majority of the natives. Fishing is the main economic activity where three main fish species are commonly harvested on the island, namely; Nile Perch, Sardine and Tilapia.




Figure 5: Map of Lake Victoria Indicating Surveyed Islands

Source: Geography Cartographic Unit, UDSM (2016)

Bwiro Island

Bwiro Island is one of the largest islands within Ukerewe District in Mwanza region. It is located in Bwiro ward with a total population of 18,908 (9,526 men and 9,382 women) and with an average household size of 5.9, which is greater than the national average household size of 4.8 (URT, 2013). The island is inhabited by the ethnic Kerewe. Most of the natives are involved in fisheries activities whereas agricultural activities are undertaken at subsistence level.

Lukuba Island

Lukuba Island is located in Musoma Rural District in Mara Region. The island is surrounded by other smaller inhabitable islets. The island bears characteristics similar to several other islands in Lake Victoria that are occupied by fishing communities. Lukuba Island has a total population of 10,492 (5,339 men and 5,153 women), and with a household size of 5.6 persons (URT, 2013). The Bakwaya are the natives of the island while other tribes are immigrants.

Methodology

This study adopted a cross-sectional research design. Three sampling phases were undertaken. The first phase involved purposeful selection of the three islands; the second phase involved the random sampling of landing sites amongst the list of landing sites at particular islands; and, lastly, the third phase involves the random sampling of respondents through a sampling frame comprising names of registered fishers at Beach Management Units and village councils. A stratified random sampling was used to select a total of 246 respondents in the three islands studied. Random selection of fishers was made possible by the register of residents which acted as sampling frame provided by village governments in collaboration with BMU offices. Data were obtained through face to face interviews and through focus group discussions with identified fishers as well as from key informants. Subsequent focus group discussions were earmarked and organized from village and BMUs registers. Key informants were identified during interviews and focus group discussions. These key informants were invited for further discussions so as to shed more light on some issues that were not clearly described during the focus group discussions and interviews. Other sources of data included journals, books and published articles as well as other library archives. Participatory rural appraisal tools were used mainly for identification and descriptions of livelihood patterns for fishing communities with regards to the decline of fisheries resources. The collected data were processed prior to analysis. Data processing was done sequentially, and involved cleaning, sorting, coding and finally running the data into the SPSS spread sheet version 19.0 for subsequent analysis. Qualitative information from key informants and focus group discussions were coded and organised into categorical values before being subjected to descriptive analysis where measures such as frequencies and percentages being computed. Quantitative data were analyzed and presented using descriptive statistics. In determining factors which enhance choice of livelihood strategies, respondents' characteristics were subjected to a binary logistic regression analysis where the variables that were hypothesized to foster or inhibit fisher's choice of particular livelihood strategy were determined.

Findings

The findings discussed in this section of the article reflect the fishers' evaluative perceptions on the declining fisheries in Lake Victoria. Their responses are organised in four subsections relating to the changes in fish consumption, changes in fishing activities patterns, other adaptive strategies towards fishery resource decline and how labour has been gendered as a result of fishery decline in the study areas.

Fish Consumption Pattern

The demand for Nile Perch for export escalated the inadequacy of fish yields for purposes of use by local Tanzanians on their local menu. This was not only for the fishing communities but also to non-fishing communities along the Lake Victoria region. Many respondents noted that by early 2000s, they had started experiencing shortages of fish and it was apparent that local people were no longer able to get enough fish for food (see Table 1).

Table 1: Frequency of Fish and Vegetable consumption in the study area (%)

Consumption frequency	Sardine	Nile Perch (fresh)	Nile Perch (reject/ juvenile)	Tilapia	Vegetables
Not at all	39.0	42.3	12.2	40.7	28.0
Occasionally	30.5	30.1	30.1	30.1	30.1
Frequently	30.5	27.6	57.7	29.3	41.9
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Field Data (2014).

The data in table 1 above are contrary to what was the case before the 1980s when artisanal fishery in Lake Victoria was characterized by the abundance of several endemic fish species that were easily afforded by the local community members. This study revealed that with the decline of fishery resources, people have opted into eating what was previously regarded as unpalatable fish such as sardine. Sardine, previously known as "poor man's food", has become one of the main sources of protein especially to many low income fish consumers because it is affordable. However, despite its affordability, its consumption is still fairly low compared to vegetables and juvenile Nile Perch (Table 1). The low consumption of sardine is due to its limited availability as it is highly demanded by animal feeds producers who pay high price and need huge quantities of the sardines for their factories.

Many respondents who happened to be fishers indicated that they experience more difficulties in eking a living from fishing compared to what was felt by

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other categories of respondents who happened to be engaged in other fisheries-related activities. About 63.5% of fishers revealed the high running cost involved in fishing vis-a-vis the low fish catch. The shortage is also reflected in the type of local people's food consumed. The consumption of fish, especially for the islands people who are traditionally fish eaters, is tremendously very low. What is revealed does not only occur in the riparian communities but also in nearby non-fishing communities which for years have experienced trickledown benefits from fisheries activities. The implication here is that the commercialization of the Nile Perch fishery has had a negative impact on other fishes that provided protein to the local communities. Nevertheless, despite the effect of the declining fishery resources in supporting livelihoods in the Lake Victoria islands, fishers still relied on the lake to eke their living. The declining stock of the Nile Perch, the major predator of other fishes in Lake Victoria, has led to the resurgence of several species endemic to the lake that were once important sources of food and livelihood for the islands' fishing communities. On the other hand, the decline of the fisheries resource and thus subsequent decline of fishers' income, has contributed to the rise of some social ills amongst the communities around Lake Victoria and even much more so amongst the fishing communities residing on the islands. These social ills, which are summarized in Table 2 below that also indicates the magnitude of their occurrence, are being committed by the islanders in a bid to raise income to sustain their livelihoods.

Table 2: Types of Social Ills Associated with Decline in Fisheries Resources (%)

Types of Immoral Acts	Bwiro (n=82)	Lukuba (n=82)	Mazinga (n=82)	Total (N=246)
Emergence of commercial sex workers	45.2	72.7	50.0	56.3
Dissolution of marriages	4.8	1.5	3.2	3.2
Illegal fishing practices	37.1	21.2	35.5	31.1
Robberies	12.9	4.5	11.3	9.5
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: Field Data (2014).

Although households' accessibility to fish in the study area was reported to be determined by the households' purchasing power, still those households that are located in proximity to the lake shore were much inclined to access fish at landing sites than those households that are located in the hinterland. Nevertheless, this situation was true before the collapse of artisanal fishery when people used to exchange various types of food for fish at landing sites.

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This observation is exemplified by a focus group discussion with a group of elders at Bwiro Island who asserted that:

“In the past, normally we fishermen did not involve ourselves in agriculture as we were assured of getting food through barter trade. We used to exchange fish for agricultural food items that non-fishing communities were selling” (Focus group discussion).

Such barter system prevailed up to the early 1990s after which the money economy started to dominate the Lake Victoria fisheries and this situation was aggravated by the market demands for Nile Perch. The monetization of the Lake Victoria fishery created inaccessibility of fish to many households on the Lake Victoria islands. For example, while respondents at Lukuba Island complained of unavailability of tilapia fish, which is a favourite delicacy for the majority of the local people, a quick visit at a nearby fish market of Mwigobelo in Musoma town revealed that tilapia, were plenty thus the only limiting factor was the low purchasing power of many local people. This suggests that fish like tilapia and fresh Nile Perch are only afforded by the well-off families because of their hiked price while other fish species of little economic value were afforded by ordinary families.

Many reasons were advanced in explaining the effects of the Nile Perch fishery on food security. About 38.5% of respondents associated the prevailing shortage of food crops in the study areas to the influx of fishers on the islands. For example, in Bwiro Island that is inhabited by more fishers than any other island in the study area, about 74.3% of its natives contended that engagement into activities other than fisheries was done to augment subsistence in the wake of diminishing food supply. The decline of fish was also clearly manifested in low fish catch per capita such that many respondents (about 72.0 %) had opted to consuming green vegetables as an alternative to fish as stated earlier. This observation is supported by Abila (2003) who found that the per capita fish supply along the Lake Victoria basin has declined in all three countries in the past 10 years with the fastest rates of decrease being observed in Tanzania and Uganda.

Fishers Adaptive Strategies towards Dwindling Fish Catches

Different mechanisms have been devised by fishers in Lake Victoria as a response to dwindling fish catches. Most of the fishers (76%) have acquired new fishing gear such as big sized nets that allows them to trap fish even in deep waters. A few others (18%) have invested in outboard engines that are

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mounted on their vessels to enable them to go further away from the lake shore, and thus further within the lake, in search of fish and also enabling the fishers to reach the market places easily. In some situations, some fishers have adopted some unscrupulous fishing practices such as using illegal fishing gear, fishing in prohibited areas, and stealing other fisher's property as a way of compensating for their lost property.

Table 3: Livelihood Strategies Devised by Fishers at Islands (%)

Livelihood Strategies	Bwiro (n=82)	Lukuba (n=82)	Mazinga (n=82)	Total (N=246)
Travelling very far in search of fish	17.1	17.1	23.2	19.1
Migration/mobility	7.3	18.3	11.0	12.2
Maximizing fishing efforts	13.4	15.9	7.3	12.2
Diversifies into non-fisheries	7.3	11.0	15.9	11.4
No action just continue as in the past	42.7	6.1	23.2	24.0
Stop fishing	9.8	26.8	6.1	14.2
Illegal fishing practices	2.4	4.9	13.4	6.9
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: Field Data (2014).

Other fishers chose to migrate away or engage in frequent mobility from one beach to another in search of favourable areas for fisheries activities (high fish catch, good climatic condition, security and safety, and access to reliable markets) (Table 3). In extreme cases, fishers who previously owned fishing gears decided to sell them and resorted to working as crews or labourers on other fishers' vessels due to the high cost of running their own vessels.

Changes in Patterns of Fisheries Activities

The decline of fisheries resources in Lake Victoria not only shrunk people's earning prospects but also transformed their fishing patterns. It is revealed that fishing activities have moved from the use of traditional fishing gears to using modern and heavy fishing outfits. The commonly used traditional gears during

artisanal fishery, including traps, baskets and papyrus threads, could no longer suffice to land the required fish catch. Thus, as the fish stocks continue to diminish, coupled with escalating market demands, fishers have no choice but to invest more in appropriate and sometimes inappropriate fishing outfits so as to capture more fish. Nevertheless, despite the investments in fishing paraphernalia, low fish catch has continued to be realized. Consequently, fishers tended to invest more in fishing outfits such as outboard engines and powerful boats, changes in the mode of fishing gears operations, travelling long distance from the landing sites in search of better fish catch. Despite such fishing efforts, majority of the fishers (76.4%) who invested in huge outfits continued to experience limited catch of the Nile Perch. Subsequently, some fishers have often been harvesting fish species that were previously proclaimed to have disappeared due to being food for the Nile Perch. Gillnets, trawls, long lines, and small mesh size nets have remained the basic fishing gears used by most fishers in the islands and they mostly target the three dominant fish species in the lake, that is Nile Perch, Tilapia and Sardines. It has to be mentioned, however, that despite the three countries that share the waters of Lake Victoria and have an agreement on the control of the uses of the waters of the Lake and on measures meant to prevent illegal fishing (LVBC, 2011), the use of illegal fishing gear in the Lake Victoria islands still prevail. The illegal gears used include beach seines, undersized gillnets, monofilament nets, cast nets and traps or baskets as summarized in Table 4 hereunder.

Table 4: Trend of Illegal Fishing Gears Targeting Nile Perch on Lake Victoria

Gear Description	2008	2010
Traps/baskets	604	928
Cast net	43	44
Long line hooks	4,137,774	4,160,618
Beach seines	1,776	1,301
Monofilament	4,801	2,905
Gillnet less than 5	87,579	44,843

Source: LVFO Frame Survey, 2008 and 2010.

Table 4 shows that while there was a decrease in the use of some illegal gear including beach seines, monofilaments, gillnets (< 5) during 2008-2010, there

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was also an increase in the use of trap baskets, cast nets and long line hooks which indicated a persistence of the use of traditional fishing gears. About 62% of fishers asserted that the continual use of illegal fishing practices was due to the dwindling fish catch which prompted fishers to indulge in unscrupulous fishing practices to meet market demands. About 42.8% of fishers blamed the governments for exercising little efforts in curbing illegal fishing. Their main argument to this state of affairs was that most of illegal fishing gear is manufactured from the industries which the government could easily control.

The fishers' decision to sail far away from landing sites to fishing grounds that was assumed to be likely to result in better fish catch was influenced by several characteristics as summarized in Table 5 hereunder. A binary logistic regression analysis was run based on the formulated model that had seven variables which were presumed to influence the choice for travelling far in search of fish catches. These variables were household type, age, education level, marital status, occupation, type of residence, ability to diversify fisheries. Of the seven variables entered into the binary logistic model, only three variables significantly enhanced fishers' propensity to sail far in search of better fish catch (Table 5).

Table 5: Results of Binary Logic Model Indicating Factors which Enhance Choice for Travelling far in Search of Better Fish Catch

Predictor Variables	B	Sig.	Exp (B)
Living at fish camps	1.177	0.002	3.2
Age	0.097	0.010	1.1
Youth	3.655	0.014	38.6
Constant	-8.306	0.001	0

Source: Field Data (2014).

As the age of fishers increased by one year, it exerted a 9% increase in the decision to travel far in search of fish. Out of the total fishers who confirmed to have adopted the strategy of travelling far away in search of fish, about 60.9% comprised of youth and 32.6% and 6.5% comprised of adults and elders, respectively. The youths are estimated to be 38 times more likely to travel very far away from landing sites in search of fish catch being plenty as compared to elders. The more likelihood of youth to travel far as compared to other age categories is due to the motivation to succeed in life and also due to the fact that

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they are more energetic compared to older people. Although the difference between elders and adults showed no significant difference on decision to travel very far in search of fish ($P > 0.05$), nevertheless, adults indicated to have four times more likelihood of travelling far compared to elders.

Being in a marriage relationship or not did not exert a significant influence on the decision to travel far in search of fish, but fishers in marriage revealed to have less inclination for travelling farther than their counterparts. Further, cross-tabulation indicated that single persons were more likely to sail far away from landing sites in search of fish than other categories of respondents. Married individuals seemed sometimes occupied with family obligations which deterred easiness to sail far from home.

Other substantial changes observed were the establishment of several new landing sites which also doubled as settlements for fishers. Several areas along the lake shorelines were converted into landing sites culminating in many fishing camps. This is supported by a study conducted by LVFO (2000) to determine the level of fishing efforts in Lake Victoria, that revealed the presence of 1,493 landing sites along the 3,450 km lake shoreline, which is equivalent to one landing site for every 2.3 km of shoreline (LVFO, 2001). As a result of the Nile Perch fishery and its commercialisation, a number of fish products emerged that were not useful before but are now highly sought after. These fish products, apart from the Nile Perch fillets, were the Nile Perch maws, trimmings, fats, cheeks, fish frames and other wastes especially after industrial fillets have been skimmed (Plates 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5) (Gumisiriza *et al.*, 2009; Kabehenda *et al.*, 2009a; Kabehenda *et al.*, 2009b). These fish products are a source of income for the local fishers' communities as they sell them to those who make animal feeds.

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Plate1: Nile Perch Skeletons



Plate 2: Nile Perch Fins



Plate 3: Nile Perch Heads

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Plate 4: Nile Perch Red Fillets



Plate 5: Nile Perch Oil Extraction

Gendered Labour Response to the Decline of Fisheries Resources

The fisheries activities of Lake Victoria continue to be highly characterized by men being the ones dominating fish capture activities while women are largely occupied by post fish harvest activities. Table 6 present the state of gender participation in fisheries in the study area.

Table 6: Gender Participation in Fisheries Activities in the studied islands

Gender	Fisheries activities undertaken by Gender	Bwiro (n=82)	Lukuba (n=82)	Mazinga (n=82)	Total (N=246)
Males (n=229)	In-water fish capture	74.7	67.9	81.6	74.7
	Offloading fish from vessel	4.0	5.1	0	3.1
	Fish trading	2.7	7.7	1.3	3.9
	Fish processing	9.3	15.4	10.5	11.8
	Boat and Net repairing	9.3	3.8	6.6	6.6
	Total	100	100	100	100
Females (n=17)	Offloading fish from vessel	42.9	0	0	17.6
	Fish trading	0	25.0	0	5.9
	Fish processing	57.1	75.0	100.0	76.5
	Total	100	100	100	100

Source: Computed from Field Data (2014).

According to the data in table 6 above, the majority (76.5%) of the women who participated in this study were employed in onshore fish processing, and about 5.9% were involved in fish trading mostly as fishmongers, whereas 17.6% worked as porters who offloaded fish from vessels. This showed that although women are engaged in a diverse range of offshore fisheries activities, fish trading and unloading fish from vessels were undertaken by women only at Lukuba and Bwiro Islands. This is due to the geographical location of the two islands whereby Lukuba and Bwiro islands are located very close to the mainland which enables some women to commute for fish trading. This was much evidenced at Bwiro Island where some women fish traders were regularly observed boarding boat transport in the evening returning to their home places on the mainland.

Women activities were usurped by men who undertook fisheries activities that were formerly carried out by women. This was due to the fact that following an increase in export demand for Nile Perch, the women's role in fish processing and other post-harvest activities were immediately occupied by fishermen

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and/or male fish agents. For example, in one of the focus group discussions, women at Lukuba Island revealed that most of the fish processing activities (fish smoking, deep frying) and marketing around lake shores were formerly undertaken by women until the late 1990s.

During this study it was indicated that much of the Nile Perch once offloaded from fishing boats went directly to the weighing fleets where they were loaded into refrigerated trucks or boats, and all these activities were undertaken by men. This suggests that because of high remuneration from Nile Perch fishery, men tended to occupy most of the post harvest processing activities which were formerly regarded as inferior to them. During artisanal fishery, the majority of the men considered involvement with fishery activities as a status symbol while it was regarding it as inappropriate for women to equally do so. Though men have extended their working spheres they are still dominant in fishery activities as fishing crews, fishing gear repairers, transporters and traders. Wives and or partners of fishermen living at fishing camps were involved much in supporting activities conducted at the beaches. As such, the majority of the women diversified into running restaurants, groceries, kiosks, and other household chores undertaken at the beaches to sustain their livelihoods. Leendertse (1990) observed that early before the late 1980's women were being increasingly marginalized in the fishery industry occupying the smaller scale and less remunerative processing of traditional species while the newer technologies associated with the Nile Perch were dominated by men.

There is a remarkable difference in types of activities that women engage in that is a function of the type of households the women come from. Women from female-headed households had much more freedom to engage in various fishery activities undertaken at the beaches as compared to women from male-headed households. This shows that the patriarchy system determines how women are involved in fisheries activities. In one focus group discussion at Lukuba Island, men asserted that women are culturally required to undertake most if not necessary domestic chores and this, in turn leave them with very little opportunity to engage in fish capture that normally takes place at night. The involvement of women in fisheries activities was shown to spur far reaching positive consequences to household's development according to females who head their households. Divorced and widowed women comprised the majority of women fishers who work in fisheries ancillaries. Furthermore, many women are involved in non-fisheries activities including participation in locally-based credit schemes. Drawing from the case of Bwiro Island, the credit scheme was a kind of a rotational saving and credit scheme whereby each woman saved a

certain amount of money per week and the members accessed the loans on a rotational basis. Through this kind of rotational saving and credit schemes women can afford to buy fishing gear and fulfil other family obligations.

Conclusion

For years fisheries activities in Lake Victoria have been a major source of livelihoods to riparian communities until the early 1990s when artisanal fishery was transformed into commercial fishery. Ever since, the dynamics of livelihoods for fishing communities in the islands in Lake Victoria changed as a result of declining fisheries resources. In all the three islands that were studied, the inhabitants were negatively impacted by the decline of fisheries. Consequently, the fishing communities devised a range of strategies to mitigate such negative impacts. The decision to engage in either fisheries or non-fisheries activities were triggered by the anticipated benefits and operations of institutional structures and frameworks which either enhanced or inhibited attainment of livelihood outcomes. The noted differences on capacity to deal with the aggravated impact of declined fisheries among community members was influenced by a multidimensional set of factors as depicted in the derived Sustainable Livelihood Framework. For example, the capacity of women to deal with implications of fish decline significantly differed from that of men and a similar scenario was noted regarding community members of different age cohorts, marital statuses, occupations, and education levels. The role of all individuals in a household, be they men or women, was found to be vital in enhancing adaptive capacity as a key consideration for the deployment of given livelihood strategies. Additionally, differences in the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of fishers for most part determined the choice for a particular adaptive strategy. For example, the youth were more likely to sail very far away from landing sites in search of more fish catch as compared to elders, and were 5 times more likely to migrate compared to adults.

Although there are remarkable efforts done by the beach management units (BMUs) and other fisheries stakeholders in curbing illegal fishing, still some unscrupulous fishing practices prevailed. This calls for increased awareness among community members on the importance of sustainable resource management for sustained livelihoods. Sanctions such as apprehension of the defaulters seem to have raised awareness among fishers on the need to avoid illegal fishing practices. Thus apprehension has a role to play in shaping fishers' behaviour in relation to curbing illegal fishing. Furthermore, measures such as closing fishing seasons, prohibiting unscrupulous fishing practices and restricting fishing access could be used to help the rejuvenation of Lake

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Victoria fisheries. In the meantime, establishment of other income generating activities such as aquaculture could be given more attention by the fishing communities so as to minimise dependence on lake resources.

Since the decline of income from fisheries activities seem to have rendered the fishing communities poor, creation of non-fisheries income generating activities cannot be overemphasized. Establishment of fish farms (aquaculture) in some areas along the lake basin holds promising prospects and could be facilitated. Community members should be educated to acquire skills on fish farming as this will reduce their reliance on the lake's fisheries and eventually allow for the rejuvenation of fisheries resources.

Since the open access fishery system of Lake Victoria is the contributing factor that led to overfishing especially by the commercial fishers, this system should be revisited to regulate entry into fisheries activities on the Lake. Frequent monitoring of fishing practices (gears and fishing techniques) should not be left to the beach management units (BMUs) and the district fisheries officers alone, but the participation of community members is vital since they are the ones negatively impacted by the mismanagement of the fisheries. Therefore, a synergy between the policy makers at ministerial level, local level institutions such as BMUs and communities are found wanting in the implementation of measures to regulate fisheries activities. Mechanisms such as compliance to the recommended fishing gear, crafts and techniques before a fishing licence can be granted is important for the sustainable livelihoods of the whole of riparian community along the Lake Victoria basin.

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Urban Crime Prevention and Adaptation Measures in Ilorin, Nigeria

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Abstract

The current high rate of crime in Nigeria, which is attributed largely to high population growth, rapid rate of urbanization and a correspondingly high rate of impoverishment among the population owing to the disproportionate growth of the national economy, is fast making urban centers in Nigeria unsafe. With a police force that is short in capacity, urban residents have adopted safety measures to prevent and adapt to the increase in crimes in their residential neighbourhoods. Using a combination of primary and secondary data from a medium-sized city that reflects the attributes of the typical Nigerian urban centers, this study appraised the effectiveness of these prevention and adaptation measures. Among several identified measures, the use of fences and gates around buildings proved to be the most effective measure against the eight commonly identified crimes in the study area. The study concludes that the usage of this measure should form part of the building approval process by the relevant physical planning authorities in Nigeria.

Key Words: Crime, Residential Neighbourhoods, Spatial Pattern, Crime Prevention, Nigeria

Introduction

The twin issues of the unprecedented rate of urbanization and high population growth rates in developing countries in the last few decades have become sources of concerns to governments, development planners and urban residents. Urban growth rate in Nigeria, for instance, is estimated at about 4.4% (World Bank, 2015), and this level of urbanization has been accompanied by myriads of social and economic challenges including increasing hunger, poverty, unemployment, and squalid human settlements (Cohen, 2006). These challenges have further given birth to several other social problems such as increased drug abuse among youths, prostitution, general restiveness and

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increasing incidence of crime and general insecurity (Ahmed, 2012; Ayoola *et al.*, 2015; Fajemirokun *et al.*, 2006). Violent crimes are now being described as endemic to the African continent and actually worsening in many countries, including in Nigeria, where armed robbery, kidnapping, assassination and acts of terrorism dot many urban landscapes (Baker, 2010). The current high crime rates and general pervasive sense of insecurity in Nigeria, typified by daily threats to lives and property of many urban residents (Ayoola *et al.*, 2015), have been largely responsible for the country's perpetual low ranking on the Global Peace Index (GPI, 2014). Apart from the general pervasive fear of crime and sense of insecurity among the citizenry, the various residential neighborhoods of Nigerian urban centers are also threatened by an increasing trend of sundry neighborhood crimes such as petty theft, automobile theft, armed robbery, house-breaking, kidnapping, and assault of various kinds, including rape and battery. In the midst of all these crimes, police coverage in Nigeria is poor and inadequate.

Nigeria operates a three-tiered system of government: federal, state, and local. Policing is the exclusive preserve of the federal tier of government in Nigeria, and its command structure is also federal in nature with lower order commands spread across the states. Local governments have divisional police commands reporting to the states. The current staff strength of the Nigerian Police Force is about 370,000 (www.npf.gov.ng) in a country of about 200 million people. This translates to one police force member to nearly 550 people; a hundred more people than recommended by the United Nations (Kimani, 2009). With this inadequacy and other operational problems associated with policing in Nigeria, as elsewhere, urban residents in Nigeria are forced to devise crime prevention and adaptation measures to complement police efforts in the safeguard of their lives and properties (Sanni, 2017; Agbola, 1997). What these measures are and how well they have been effective in urban Nigeria is the main preoccupation of this article. In attaining such a quest, types of crimes, their spatial incidence, and pattern of policing in the study area are described.

This study becomes important for several reasons. In the first instance, crime, described as an infraction against law and order and norms which

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regulate civilized behavior (Eme, 2012) and a violation of rules that guide and regulate societal conducts (Siegel, 1995; World Bank, 1998; UN-Habitat, 2007; Oxford Dictionary of Sociology, 2009), has a spatial dimension (Agbola, 1997; Doran & Lees, 2005; Bernasco & Elffers, 2010; Jinadu *et al.*, 2012; Sanni, 2017). Urban criminality enclaves and crime hotspots are rarely evenly distributed in space as some areas of the cities are known to experience more crimes than others, while some areas are also notorious for specific kinds of crimes (Ackerman, 2000; UN-Habitat, 2007; Jinadu *et al.*, 2012; International Association of Crime Analysts, 2013; Sanni, 2017). Chinwokwu (2014) particularly posited that crime tends to be able to be explained in terms of the nature of the interaction between environmental (space), economic and social factors. The spatial variation in crime is usually associated with population and housing density, socio-economic characteristics of residents, aggregate housing types and conditions, level of infrastructural facilities provision and the nature of the general physical development of the environment (Taylor, 2002; Brown *et al.*, 2004; Jinadu *et al.*, Marzbali *et al.*, 2012; Sanni, 2017). More importantly, the spatial variation of crime has parallel implications for its prevention and control, and for urban policing. An understanding of the related patterns as attempted in this study will be beneficial in this regard.

Igbo (2015) and Jinadu *et al.*, (2012) categorized crimes as personal crimes, property crimes and crimes against public order. Crimes against persons or personal crimes are of different kinds and are mostly those that are targeted at individuals and sometimes groups. These types of crimes usually are those that threaten or cause bodily harm, injuries and sometimes deaths. They include assault, rape, armed robbery, kidnapping, suicide, manslaughter or murder amongst others. However, suicide, in some circumstances, may be counted among the next category of crimes, i.e. crimes against public order. These are those targeted at the public and/or seen to border on moral infractions (UN-Habitat, 2007). Other examples of crimes in this category are fraud, public corruption, conspiracy, perjury, disruption of public tranquility, and cultism, amongst others. Cultism in contemporary Nigeria (Nnam, 2014) refers to secret societies whose major stocks in trade are violence, kidnapping and murder perpetrated against members of rival groups or members of the general public who are perceived or reported to have encroached on or violated the freedom, choices and codes of conducts of the secret societies or any of their members. Cult groups are mostly found in universities in Nigeria while some are based in the communities (Amaele, 2013).

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Ilorin is located about 350 kilometers from Lagos, Nigeria's largest commercial hub and economic capital, and about 500 kilometers from Abuja, the country's political capital. The city lies at the borders of northern and southern Nigeria. It is generally regarded as the northernmost city of southern Nigeria and the southernmost city of northern Nigeria. Ilorin has an estimated population of 1.1 million people who hail from all tribes and cultural backgrounds in Nigeria and from outside the country. The city also typifies the average Nigerian urban center with its spatial structure and neighbourhood differentiation along residential density lines and patterns of physical development.

It was from the residential neighbourhoods in the study area that the primary data employed for the study were collected using a structured questionnaire. A total of 960 copies of the questionnaire were administered on randomly selected household heads in the identified 35 neighbourhoods of the study area. The primary data collected included types of crime, major types of crime prevention and adaptation measures adopted by various households and neighbourhoods, and police patrols of the various neighbourhoods. The neighbourhoods are Adewole Estate, Fate, Federal Housing Estate, GaaAkanbi, Gaa Imam, Oloje, Olorunshogo, GRA, Pakata, Sabo Oke and Irewolede Estate. Others are Idi Ape, Maraba, New Yidi Road, Agbabiaka, Offa Garage, OjaGboro, Oja Oba, Okelele and Okesuna. Olorunshogo Estate, Agbo Oba, Sango, Saw Mill, Surulere, Taiwo Road, Tanke, Unity Road, BalogunGambari, Post Office Area, Alagba Estate, Amilegbe, Asa Dam Road and River Basin Estate complete the list of study neighbourhoods. The secondary data employed for the study were sourced from existing literature and previous studies on crime in the study area, particularly Sanni (2017) who worked on the spatial analysis of neighbourhoods' crime vulnerability and victimization patterns in the study area. A chi-square test was used to analyze the data obtained regarding the pattern of police patrol among the neighbourhoods, while frequency and cross-tabulation were used to analyze data on identified crime prevention and adaptation measures. The results of the analysis were presented in the form of frequency tables and bar graphs.

Results and Discussion

Types of Crimes in the Neighbourhoods

Eight commonly experienced neighbourhood crimes were identified in Ilorin as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Common Crimes Experienced in Ilorin

Crime Type	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Petty Theft/Stealing	662	72.59
House/shop Breaking	563	61.73
Assault	423	46.38
Armed Robbery	268	29.39
Rape/Indecent assault	179	19.63
Automobile theft	175	19.19
Kidnapping	56	6.14
Assassination	7	0.77

Source: Authors' Analysis, 2017

Further, 72.59% of the sampled households in various neighbourhoods of the city have had at least a member of the households falling victim to petty theft or stealing in a span of five years. Within the same time frame households that have had at least a member experiencing house burglary, assault, armed robbery and rape or indecent assault constitute 61.73%, 46.38%, 29.39% and 19.63%, respectively. Other common crimes that were frequently experienced by household members in the various neighbourhoods are automobile theft (19.19%), kidnapping (6.14%) and murder (0.77%). This shows that the commonly experienced crimes in Ilorin are not different from those experienced in most towns and cities in Nigeria; Minna (Jinadu *et al.*, 2012), Lagos (Alemika & Chukwuma, 2005) and towns in Osun State (Ahmed, 2012), for instance. Despite its documented weaknesses and flaws, the police records of crimes in Ilorin obtained by Sanni (2017) also show that these are among the most frequently reported crimes in the city.

Spatial Classification of Crime Frequency in Study Area

From the analysis of the frequency of occurrence of crimes in the study area, the lowest frequency was 11 while the highest was 117. Using the quartile ranges, the neighbourhoods were grouped into four classes of low, moderate, high and very high crime neighbourhoods, as shown in Table 2.

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Table 2: Spatial Classification of Distribution of Crimes in Ilorin

Classification	Neighbourhood	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Low Crime	Adewole Estate	32	1.37
	Federal Housing Estate	15	0.64
	GRA	11	0.47
	Irewolede Estate	35	1.50
	Olorunshogo Estate	26	1.11
	Airport Area	15	0.64
	Alagba Estate	31	1.33
	7	165	7.07
Moderate Crime	Fate	62	2.66
	New Yidi Road	47	2.01
	Okelele	64	2.74
	Oloje	52	2.23
	Olorunshogo	68	2.91
	Sabo Oke	52	2.23
	Saw-Mill	58	2.49
	Surulere	60	2.57
	BalogunGambari	67	2.87
	River Basin Estate	65	2.79
		10	595
High Crime	Asa Dam Road	89	3.81
	Amilegbe	93	3.99
	Post Office Area	89	3.81
	Unity Road	77	3.30
	Tanke	86	3.69
	Sango	84	3.60
	Pakata	78	3.34
	Okesuna	79	3.39
	Oja Oba	91	3.90
	OjaGboro	87	3.73
	Offa Garage	80	3.43
	Agbabiaka	87	3.73
	Maraba	87	3.73
	Idi-Ape	80	3.43
	Gaa Imam	79	3.39
	GaaAkanbi	75	3.21
	16	1341	57.48
Very High Crime	Agbo Oba	115	4.93
	Taiwo Road	117	5.02
		2	232
Total	35	2333	100.0

Source: Authors' Analysis, 2017

As shown in Table 2, neighbourhoods that experienced an average of between 11 and 35 crime incidences, irrespective of types of crimes, were Adewole Estate, Federal Housing Estate, GRA and Irewolede Estate. Others in this category were Olorunshogo Estate, Airport Area and Alagba Estate. Another 10 neighbourhoods of the city that experienced an average of 47 to 68 crime incidences were classified as moderate crime neighbourhoods. These are Fate, New Yidi, Okelele, Oloje and Olorunshogo. Others in this category are Sabo Oke, Saw Mill, Surulere, Balogun Gambari and River Basin Estate.

A total of 16 neighbourhoods of the study area were further classified as high crime areas based on the average frequency of between 75 and 93 crime incidences experienced. These neighbourhoods include Asa Dam Road, Post Office, Amilegbe, Unity Road, Tanke, Sango, Pakata, Okesuna, Oja Oba and OjaGboro. Others are Offa Garage Road, Agbabiaka, Maraba, Idi Ape, Gaa Imam and GaaAkanbi. Two neighbourhoods of the city were classified as very high crime areas owing to the very high average number of total crime incidences experienced. These were Taiwo Road and Agbo Oba. It was observed from the various crime density clusters that except for GRA, which is regarded as low density neighbourhood, all the other six neighbourhoods classified as low crime areas are regarded as medium density areas. In a similar dimension, except for Asa Dam Road and Tanke, all other neighbourhoods classified as high and very high crime areas are high density areas.

Pattern of Police Patrol and Frequency of Crime

The study also sampled the opinions of respondents in the various neighbourhoods about the pattern of police patrol in their areas as illustrated in Table 3.

Table 3: Frequency of Police Patrol of Neighbourhoods of Ilorin

Pattern	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Daily	213	41.28
2 – 3 times weekly	299	57.94
Weekly	2	0.39
Occasionally	2	0.39
Total	516	100.0

Source: Authors' Analysis, 2017

As shown in Table 3 a total of 41.28% of respondents reported that their areas were patrolled daily by the police, while a little more than half (57.94%) were of the view that they experienced police patrols between two and three times

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weekly in their areas. This pattern of police patrols therefore, shows a relative strong presence of police in the neighbourhoods of Ilorin.

When the data on pattern of police patrols of the various neighbourhoods were subjected to a chi-square test, the result of the analysis indicates that there was no significant association between the pattern of police patrol and frequency of crimes in the neighbourhoods as shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Chi-square Test of Association between Neighbourhood Criminality and

Police Patrol in Ilorin			
	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3.497	3	0.321
Likelihood Ratio	3.505	3	0.320
N of Valid Cases	912		

Source: Authors' Analysis, 2017

Crime Prevention and Adaptation Measures

Studies, including Agbola (1997) and Alemika (2013) have revealed that, faced with increasing fear or threats of crime, urban households tend to evolve different crime prevention, mitigation or adaptation measures. The study therefore, examined the various crime prevention and adaptation measures adopted by households across the various neighbourhoods of the study area. The study revealed that a large number of households in the study area adopted one or more crime prevention and adaptation measures. These include maintenance of private security guards, erection of high walled fencing with gates around the house, erection of different forms of iron barricades at entrances and at the back of houses, maintenance of guard dogs and formation of vigilante groups. There was also a noticeable minimal use of closed-circuit television among relatively affluent households in the low density areas, although the functionality of the CCT gadgetry could not be ascertained.

As shown in Figure 2, the use of the four main crime preventive and adaptation measures among households across neighbourhoods in the different crime density zones indicate that 21.3% of households maintained private security guards, 37.21% erected high walled fences with gates around their houses, while 18.33% installed iron barricades of different forms either at the entrance and around vital areas of their houses or both. Another 23.16% of households across the various established crime density classes-maintained guard dogs.




Figure 2: Households Crime Prevention and Adaptation Measures in Ilorin
Source: Authors' Analysis, 2017

Effectiveness of Crime Prevention and Adaptation Measures

To determine the effectiveness or otherwise of the four main prevention and adaptation measures, their usage across the residential neighbourhoods vis-à-vis the frequency of crimes in the neighbourhoods was further analyzed, the results of which are summarized in Table 5.

Table 5: Effectiveness of Adaptation Measures

Crime Density	Frequency	Fence and gate		Total	Crime Density	Frequency	Private security		Total
		YES	NO				YES	NO	
Low Crime	Count	110	70	180	Low Crime	Count	101	81	182
	Percentage	61.11	38.89	100.0		Percentage	55.49	44.51	100.0
Moderate Crime	Count	113	123	236	Moderate Crime	Count	52	184	236
	Percentage	47.88	52.12	100.0		Percentage	22.03	77.97	100.0
High Crime	Count	106	321	427	High Crime	Count	32	395	427
	Percentage	24.82	75.18	100.0		Percentage	7.49		100.0
Very High Crime	Count	10	57	67	Very High Crime	Count	9	92.51	67
	Percentage	14.93	85.07	100.0		Percentage	13.43	58	86.57
Total	Count	339	571	910	Total	Count	211	701	912
	Percentage	37.25	62.75	100.0		Percentage	23.14	76.86	100.0

Source: Authors' Analysis, 2017

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As shown in Table 5, while a total of 61.11% of households in low crime neighbourhoods had fenced houses with gates, 38.89% did not. Also, 47.88% of households in moderate crime areas had fences and gates, while the remaining 52.12% did not. However, in the high crime and very high crime areas only 24.82% and 14.93% of households respectively had such facilities. A Chi Square test on this distribution across the neighbourhoods confirmed that the usage of fences and gates is inversely related to the high incidence of crime in the study area ($P < 0.05$). What this means is that the more the facilities are used, the less the incidence of crime are recorded. This implies that the measure is relatively effective as a crime prevention and adaptation measure.

The same pattern of effectiveness of fences with gates as a crime prevention and adaptation measures can be attributed to the maintenance of private security guards by households when viewed along the established crime densities. As also discernible from Table 5, the use of private security guards had relative impacts on crime incidences. For instance, 55.49% and 22.03% of households in low and moderate crime neighbourhoods respectively maintained such measure, while as low as 7.49% households in the high crime neighbourhoods had same.

It is however discernible from Table 6 that the same level of effectiveness of fences with gates and maintenance of private security guards as crime prevention and adaptation measures cannot be attributed to the use of iron barricades in buildings and maintenance of guard dogs as summarized in Table 6.

Table 6: Effectiveness of Adaptation Measures (continued)

Crime Density	Frequency	Iron Barricades and Locks		Total	Crime Density	Frequency	Use of Guard Dogs		Total
		YES	NO				YES	NO	
Low Crime	Count	25	157	182	Low Crime	Count	57	125	182
	Percentage	13.74	86.26	100.0		Percentage	31.32	68.68	100.0
Moderate Crime	Count	38	198	236	Moderate Crime	Count	52	184	236
	Percentage	16.10	83.90	100.0		Percentage	22.03	77.97	100.0
High Crime	Count	93	334	427	High Crime	Count	79	348	427
	Percentage	21.78	78.22	100.0		Percentage	18.50	65.50	100.0
Very High Crime	Count	11	56	67	Very High Crime	Count	23	44	67
	Percentage	16.42	83.58	100.0		Percentage	34.33	65.67	100.0
Total	Count	167	745	912	Total	Count	211	701	912
	Percentage	18.31	81.69	100.0		Percentage	23.14	76.86	100.0

Source: Authors' Analysis, 2017

As shown in the Table a total of 68.68% and 77.97% of households in crime and moderate crime neighbourhoods, respectively, did not maintain guard dogs and crimes were still relatively low in such places. A similar ineffectiveness pattern is observable in the high and very high crime neighbourhoods where 81.50% and 65.67% of households in neighbourhoods considered as high crime and very high crime zones respectively did not maintain guard dogs. Therefore, since the use of this particular prevention measure was generally low in all crime density areas it can thus be regarded as an ineffective prevention measure. In the same Table 6, the same pattern of ineffectiveness of guard dog maintenance as a crime prevention measure is observable in the installation of iron barricades in buildings across the different crime density zones of the study area. For instance, in spite of the relatively high level of the use of this measure in neighbourhoods categorized as high crime (21.78%) and very high crime (16.42%) density areas, the level of crime occurrence was still relatively high, while its usage was also not impactful among households in low crime and moderate crime neighbourhoods as it was poorly used among households in these two neighbourhoods.

Conclusion

The study, having examined both the pattern of police patrol and the use of unconventional crime prevention and adaptation measures among neighbourhoods of Ilorin, concludes that the relative presence of police in neighbourhoods, maintenance of guard dogs and installation of iron barricades in houses are not very effective in preventing crimes in the study area. However, the maintenance of private security guards by households as well as the usage of high fences and gates in buildings proved to be relatively effective in preventing crimes among households in Ilorin. As a result of its effectiveness in minimizing vulnerability to households-level crime, the study recommends that the erection of fences around buildings be encouraged and integrated into the housing construction and development processes. The various physical planning authorities should be encouraged to recognize this measure and approve its construction during the plan approval process as part of the overall housing development processes. Additionally, the study recommends that the structure of policing in Nigeria be reviewed as to allow for the introduction of community policing where policemen are made to serve within the neighbourhoods where they are resident. Such a measure would allow for effective policing as the knowledge of the peculiar security conditions and challenges of the community by policemen who are themselves members of such communities would impact positively on their job of crime prevention.

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Paradox of Gender Mainstreaming Strategies: Why Are They Not Fully Realized in Sexual Reproductive Health Projects in Malawi?

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Abstract

Gender mainstreaming in sexual and reproductive health (SRH) services like family planning in Malawi remains a significant approach in development. Yet, the expected gender related changes in gender mainstreaming focused SRH projects have been inadequate. The central aim of this paper is to expose the salient reasons behind the inadequate gender relations changes in the family planning (FP) SRH projects implemented by the local organisations. The study employed an exploratory design with more qualitative focus and a bit of quantitative approach. The empirical data for this article was collected in gender focused SRH projects implemented in selected communities in the last five years by three organisations in Malawi.⁴ The findings show that, the way project staffs understood the gender mainstreaming strategy affected how they designed and introduced the strategy. Subsequently, this affected the realization of the gender related changes from the projects. Furthermore, it was found that gender related changes were compromised where gender analysis had not been done. Further, the involvement and inclusion of men and women during the family planning projects implementation was mere tokenism. Therefore, the paper recommends that, a systematic process need to be in place when introducing gender mainstreaming in SRH projects for the organisations to achieve gender related outcomes. This entails ensuring that gender analysis is done prior to the SRH projects implementation to understand gender needs and before the staff involves men and women jointly during the projects cycle stages. This paper will contribute to the discussion on the determinants of gender mainstreaming strategy in SRH programmes.

Key words: *Gender mainstreaming, sexual and reproductive health, family planning, gender relations*

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⁴ The organisations were: Banja La Mtsogolo (BLM), Family Planning Association of Malawi (FPAM) and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and partners. All the organisations specialised in SRH and focused on gender mainstreaming strategy. They have all operated for over 15 years working with stakeholders and government in various districts of Malawi. The UNFPA Partners were WORLEC (Women Legal Resources Centre) and (CCJP) Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace of Chikhwawa Diocese.

Introduction

Gender mainstreaming (GM) was adopted at the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in 1994 and the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 by the United Nations member states as an integral strategy in development. As a strategy, it entailed that the interests and experiences of both women and men are considered in the design and planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of any initiative; for example; laws, policies, programmes and projects (Moser, 2003). The aim is to ensure equality of benefits to both men and women arising from the initiatives. The ICPD Programme of Action (POA) placed special emphasis on the centrality of gender mainstreaming in Sexual Reproductive Health (SRH) (Payne, 2011). According to WHO Sexual and Reproductive Health is understood as a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity in all matters relating to the reproductive system and to its function and processes (UNFPA, 2012). It has a number of components, namely; family planning, antenatal and postnatal care, prevention and treatment of infertility, prevention of abortion and its consequences, treatment of reproductive tract infections, prevention and care of HIV/AIDS and STIs, information on human sexuality, prevention of violence against women and removal of harmful traditional practices and, lastly, appropriate referral services equipped to deal with SRH issues (*ibid*). In that study, SRH understanding was limited to Family Planning and HIV and AIDS projects in Malawi and in this paper focus has only been on the family planning component in SRH programmes.

The emphasis on gender gained importance in SRH as a key social determinant for the success of reproductive health projects. Gender denotes the men and women identities in terms of roles and responsibilities as defined by a society (Nnena, 2015). These roles can change over time and space. Hence, the understanding of gender in SRH is central because in family planning projects, there are a lot of gender dimensions on power inequality between men and women around choices and opportunity to access these services as part of one's SRH rights (Payne, 2011; Fayoyin, 2014). In Malawi, since ICPD 1994, it became apparent that one had to employ the gender mainstreaming strategy in SRH because until recently Malawi was still challenged on key population and health indicators. For example, by 2016 Malawi had an average household size of 4.5, a total fertility rate average of 4.4 and the demand for family planning methods was at 78%. Further, the Maternal Mortality Rate was at 439 deaths for every 100, 000 women and it had an HIV prevalence rate of 8.8% with

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higher prevalence among women (10.8%) than men (6.4%) (NSO and ICF, 2016).

In Malawi, the USAID (2005) report on family planning initiative gives a clear background of the services. It highlights that family planning had been remarkably successful between 1992 and 2000, despite the various factors that would have affected its progress. Some of the factors were high rates of poverty, low rates of literacy and a predominantly rural population. These factors to date still affect Malawi's population and health indicators. The USAID further stated that besides the banning of FP during the one-party dispensation in Malawi [1964-1994] there was recognition of the challenges of lack of family planning services. For example, an integral part of the family planning associated with the SRH component of maternal and child health (MCH) program in the 1980s recognized the health problems that women faced when pregnancies were too early, too many, too late, or too frequent. Some of the problems were: increased deaths of women due to frequent births and high mortality of new born babies due to pre-mature births from young mothers or birth complications arising from too early births. Beside these health-related problems, there was gender or socially related challenges. Some men were engaging in extramarital relationships due to frequent births that affected their sexual life, poor gender relations in decision making spaces, and the marital level violence due to stress associated with large families (Jackson, 2013).

At present, the effects of unplanned pregnancies arise because of low access and utilization of family planning services. Where these services exist, low access and utilization among women happens because either the spouse, to be precise the husband does approve or disapproves the FP. The power of mother in-laws over family planning because of cultural norms and taboos also affect the family planning utilization (Kululanga *et al.*, 2011). Moreover, the myths and beliefs regarding contraceptives also hamper family planning utilization. For example, there are beliefs in Malawi among some rural men that a woman on contraceptives does not feel sexually sweet in bed because contraceptives cause a man to be weak during sexual intercourse and that contraceptives can result in prolonged menstrual periods for women which affects their sex life (Jackson, 2013). These myths have affected the success of family planning interventions in Malawi despite the intensive policy and programmatic activities that have been undertaken over the years from 1994 on these services. To address these myths and improve the relations between couples on matters of decisions related to family planning, a gender sensitive approach or gender

mainstreaming strategy is central in the design and implementation of SRH projects in Malawi.

The Central Argument

The fundamental thesis of this paper was that while the gender mainstreaming strategy remains supported in family planning projects, its accomplishment in terms of social and gender related changes among the beneficiaries is low. The paper therefore explores the salient reasons behind this state of affairs. It is hoped that this understanding will help programme implementers especially in nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) that purport to be gender sensitive to design and implement the SRH projects in a manner that can lead to the realization of the changes expected in family planning projects that are gender mainstreaming strategy focused.

According to the 1994 ICPD Programme of Action (POA), men and women have a right to be informed, have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family planning services. In Malawi, such rights are guaranteed and protected by laws, especially the Gender Equality Act of 2013. The National Health Policy of 2008 also promotes a health system based on principles of human rights and equity, gender sensitivity, efficiency, accountability, community participation and partnership. It can be argued that given such a legal and policy environment, the family planning programmes and projects developed and executed in the context of these laws needed to respect and promote the spirit of the given laws, namely; human rights, equity and gender sensitivity (Jackson, 2013). If this happened, then gender mainstreaming strategy would be executed in the context of these laws, thereby assuring its expected success. This paper, therefore, intends to answer two questions. Firstly, how is gender mainstreaming understood and justified in family planning projects? Secondly, what are the factors that hinder the realization of gender mainstreaming strategy outcomes in family planning projects in selected projects in Malawi?

Study Methods

The data were collected between the months of March and September, 2017 as part of a post graduate PhD student research requirement at the Institute of Development Studies of the University of Dares Salaam. The study area was in three districts; Nsanje and Chikhwawa in the south and Ntcheu district in the central region of Malawi. Nsanje and Chikhwawa districts have interrelated social norms and practices with the majority of the people practicing a patrilineal family regime with aspects of a matrilineal regime in Chikhwawa.

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Ntcheu district is largely a matrilineal district in central Malawi. The study was done in collaboration with three organisations implementing FP projects with gender related component. Each organisation subscribes to the gender mainstreaming strategy and they had implemented the sampled projects in the areas within the districts for at least 2 to 5 years or more involving the targeted community respondents as beneficiaries. This research was largely qualitative in nature and approached purposively using an exploratory design. The primary data for this paper were from interviews with three sets of study populations, namely; (i) 15 organisations staff (5 F and 10 M) and (ii) key informants, who are 16 gender specialists (9 F and 7 M) and (iii) a KAP Survey N=222 (177 F, 55M). The interviews were done by the researcher and three trained research assistants in the project impacts districts and cities of Lilongwe and Blantyre. This paper also uses secondary data collected from literature sources like reports, journals and other published sources which were all duly referenced. Data analysis was based on qualitative content analysis where themes and subthemes were drawn from the qualitative data after processing.

Literature Review

Gender mainstreaming continued to gain currency and support by governments, donor agencies and non-governmental organizations working on family planning and SRH in Malawi (Payne, 2011; Malawi Government, 2014; Mbeko and Chome, 2015). However, its success in development efforts like family planning projects is influenced by many factors such as, institutional preparedness, socio-cultural, affiliations, the law and policies, and conceptual frameworks (Tiessen, 2005; White, 2007 and Woodward, 2008). While these factors have been documented by researchers, a deeper analysis of their effect on gender mainstreaming success or failure in FP and HIV and AIDS projects have not been explored, especially in the context of Malawi's matrilineal and patrilineal areas where the above said projects are being implemented. This was the broader focus of the whole research. However, for this paper, the focus was only on the understanding and justification of gender mainstreaming and its introduction and involvements of men and women in SRH projects.

The Programme of Action of the ICPD of 1994 and the Beijing Declaration of 1995 recognised that gender mainstreaming as part of the development approaches should result in the empowerment of women and men. Furthermore, it ought to result into comprehensive fulfillment of women's reproductive health rights. To ensure women enjoy their rights, the need to engage men and boys to question harmful constructions of masculinity and address gender inequalities in development effort and in SRH is encouraged (Fayoyin, 2014).

The research focused on three organizations mentioned above. Organizations aim to achieve changes in health, social and gender relations in family planning projects that are designed from a gender perspective. Besides health, family planning contributes to non-medical benefits at individual, family, and social well-being. For example, at individual level, there is less worry of unplanned pregnancy, greater self-esteem and decision-making space for women. At family level, it leads to more attention on parental child care and for community it leads to higher productivity and less burdens relating to the child care of the neglected children (Smith, *et al.*, 2009; Kululunga *et al.*, 2011).

Further, Greene *et al.*, 2003 and Fayoyin, 2014 have observed that for the gender and social changes to happen there are attributes that such programmes should exemplify. Firstly, family planning projects should aim to address inequalities in gender socialization through exploring ways to attain equitable, supportive relationships between men and women. Secondly, SRH projects should promote peer to peer support among men and boys, on the one hand, and women and girls, on the other hand. This will lead to shared positive behaviours and support among the beneficiaries of the family planning projects. The last attribute was that SRH projects should mobilize communities to recognize how their understanding of gender roles contribute to family planning challenges and the spread of STIs and HIV and AIDS. This understanding will influence the need to counter socio-cultural practices and norms that inform inequalities on gender roles. The three organizations were selected to observe whether the organisations' staff demonstrated gender mainstreaming strategy understanding and whether they ensured the attributes of programming of SRH interventions.

Presentation and Analysis of Findings

To begin with, the findings on this section was based on the assumption that, the way gender mainstreaming was conceptualised by the organisations' programme staff in the SRH family planning projects influences how it is introduced in such projects in the communities.

Understanding Gender Mainstreaming in Family Planning Projects in Malawi

The targeted respondents gave their views on the perspectives that they hold on how gender mainstreaming was understood in family planning projects. This was central to its internalization and introduction in the SRH projects. The key questions were how gender mainstreaming was understood in SRH and how that may affect its outcomes in terms of social and gender related changes between men and women involved in the family planning projects.

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To ascertain how gender mainstreaming was understood in the SRH projects, the researcher started by finding out the broad knowledge and understanding of gender mainstreaming among the gender specialists and the organisations staff as a basis of comparison with how it was understood in the projects. It was largely found that the respondents' broad knowledge of gender mainstreaming was related to the United Nations ECOSOC conclusions 1997/2 definition as:

The process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality (United Nations, 2002).

Key in the above understanding was the consideration of interests, needs and experiences of both women and men to inform the design, implementation and monitoring of programmes and projects if they could meet the ultimate goals of empowerment and gender equality in the long run. For example, one gender specialist working under the Ministry of Gender summarised gender mainstreaming as being at two levels as summarized below:

Firstly at institutional level; where rules, regulations and policies that an organisation has need to be gender responsive, in the expert's own words- 'garbage in, garbage out' in reference to the existence of gender responsive institutional policies, rules and frameworks will influence the gender responsive recruitments, sex disaggregated planning including having gender responsive work plans and budgets and eventual implementation of projects and results (Interview with male gender specialist in Lilongwe, 2017).

This view was also supported by one organisation's staff that focused on understanding gender mainstreaming from a programme and project cycle perspective as follows:

It is where at programme or projects level, we focus at how gender mainstreaming is done in the project cycle stages from needs assessment, planning, implementation and monitoring. There is need for full consideration of the interests and experiences of women and men hence ensuring they are actively involved in all the stages (Interview with female organisation staff in Ntcheu, 2017).

The two perspectives above agrees with Ravindran and Khambete 2008 cited by Payne (2011) who stressed the need for the re-conceptualization of gender

mainstreaming approach in two forms. Firstly, as operational gender mainstreaming to focus on integration of gender equality perspectives in policies, programs and projects run by the organization and secondly, as institutional gender mainstreaming which refers to the integration of gender equality inside the organization itself.

Besides the above understanding, there was a third perspective which was stated as a contextual pre-requisite for the gender mainstreaming strategy in which the emphasis on laws and policies was highlighted as follows:

The existence of gender sensitive laws and policies are the pre-requisite to creating a gender responsive wider environment where organisations can learn from and adapt if they have to actively be involved in the implementation of projects in a gender responsive manner (Interview with female gender specialist in Lilongwe, 2017).

Evidently, from the findings above, the gender specialists and the organisations' staff do have an adequate broad understanding of gender mainstreaming and the levels it has to first be internalised and operationalised. It was found that, the organisation's staff and the gender specialists agreed on the fact that, to achieve gender mainstreaming strategy, it required a tripartite interplay.

Firstly, there is need to have gender responsive national laws and policies to inform the context of gender mainstreaming strategy. The seconded is the organisations' readiness to internalise gender responsiveness in the form of having institutional policies, adequate gender capacity in staff and the leadership commitment. Thirdly, there is the need for the organisations in all their project cycle stages to mainstream gender after a thorough analysis of the needs, interests and experiences of men and women. Arguably, if these were followed, then the changes arising from the gender mainstreaming strategy in the SRH projects would have been more tangible. The inadequacy in the realization of the outcomes meant that there may have been a divergence in the way the strategy is understood in SRH projects and how it is prioritised and introduced in the projects. In that regard, views were solicited on how the targeted respondents understood gender mainstreaming specifically in the family planning projects.

Gender mainstreaming understanding and justification in family planning projects

As earlier indicated, notwithstanding the consensus on the general understanding of gender mainstreaming strategy in the previous section, it was

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found that there was diversity of views among gender specialists and organisations staff on their understanding of the strategy in family planning. This is as summarised in the Table 1 below.

Table 1: GM in SRH by Organisation Staff and Gender Specialists

Options of views on GM in family planning projects	Frequency of views	
	Staff	Experts
1. It should base on needs assessment in project delivery for the men and women as key groups affected by the SRH interventions, hence it is critical to ensure that there are strategies that respond to these needs and interests in the process of SRH projects delivery.	XX	XXXX
2. GM in SRH should begin by asking specific questions as to the needs of men and boys as well as women and girls on their experiences, vis-à-vis interaction with Family Planning services.	XX	X
3. Need to first appreciate that Family Planning projects touch on sexuality hence social norms on sexuality should guide how we understand and mainstream gender if we have to meet the outcomes. If we consider norms and values of the people in doing GM in these projects, there will be self-consciousness on male involvement in these issues, as we know there is tendency of male control on sexuality matters.	X	XX
4. We have to ensure that in SRH projects, GM should go beyond gender analysis to understand the problems for men and women involved; instead it should also challenge the structural barriers as sexuality issues are socially embedded.	X	X
5. GM in SRH should look at how do men contribute to the success of women SRH rights and benefits and hence men should be at centre stage to ensure equality of involvement in these issues.	XX	XXXX
6. The entry on GM should be individual or couple level where in family planning interventions, targeting should be both men and women on decisions. So much that gender issues should not be taken as a fight; it should be a friendly shared act to achieve more gains.	X	XX
7. Where couples should be jointly involved in Family planning including HIV and AIDS because male involvement helps to demystify lies, myths and misinformation. This would help couples on choice of	XXXX	

even long-term Family Planning methods and the joint access to these services.		
8. GM must be cascaded in local level plans in village committees to be more inclusive when identifying priority activities in the initial planning of various interventions. When it is driven from local leaders' level up to the national plans in all sectors, then its inclusion in SRH activities will become obvious.		X
9. GM in SRH should be considered as a two-tier approach- firstly where there can be a standalone focus to address specific vulnerability of women or teen mothers in family planning efforts and secondly as integration when despite the vulnerable focus, both husband and wife can be targeted for trainings, services and involvement in the projects.	XX	X
Total Respondents	15	16

Source: Field Data (2017)

As can be seen from Table 1, there was diversity of views on how gender mainstreaming was understood and justified in family planning projects. When the organisation's staff view were deliberately focused at since they were directly involved in the SRH and FP projects sampled, it was noted they had diverse views just like the gender specialists. The diversity of views was on how they understood and justified GM and how this had a bearing on how they introduced the approach in the projects. By critically analysing the summarised frequency of responses, four categorisations of the understanding of organisation staff were deduced as follows: starting from needs assessment; deal with socio norms and challenge structural barriers; base on male contribution and role; and base on levels of vulnerability. The four categories are analysed as follows:

Needs assessment: On this, from the responses on options 1 and 2, only 27% (4 out of 15) felt GM in SRH should be based on a thorough needs assessment where one asks specific questions and have clear strategies to respond to the needs during the project's implementation. The UNDP (2016) states that the first step in a mainstreaming strategy is the assessment of how and why gender differences and inequalities are relevant to the subject under discussion in this case SRH projects. Without it, the UNDP stressed that gender mainstreaming is not possible. Needs assessment informs other key stages like introductory awareness, start up and the implementation process. It was therefore surprising that the other 73% of organisation staff had not prioritised the centrality of this

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stage in their understanding of GM in family planning related projects that they were involved in. This had put the expectations on gender related changes as an outcome to question.

Dealing with socio norms and structural barriers: On this second categorisation, for options 3 and 4, only 14% (2 out of 15) felt this should be prioritised in SRH projects where the beneficiaries' cultural values, norms, beliefs and power inequality associated with sexuality are focused and addressed in the process of implementation (MHRC, 2007; Greene *et al.*, 2003). It is viewed that, this should have been part of the aspects to be considered in the needs assessment than to be understood as stand-alone conceptualization of GM in SRH. To an extent that, some organisation's staff had this understanding of GM in SRH, it entailed that FP projects may only focus on addressing socio norms and structural barriers during implementation when it is more than that.

Male Contribution and Central Role: On this third categorisation related to men's role on issues of SRH under options 5 to 7, there were 7 out of 15 respondents (47%) who felt that on issues of SRH, the entry should be couples, the efforts should not be regarded as a fight but, rather, joint involvement should be emphasized. This was justified based on traditionally known male power and control over decisions which cannot be overlooked and the need for shared joint responsibility especially for married couples. This model works to a large extent in the realisation of improved gender relations between men and women as observed by Greene (2001 and Jackson (2013). Nevertheless, this conceptualization of GM in SRH outcomes largely applies to those in marriages suggesting that couples involvement needed to be more robust than was in the SRH projects as discussed later.

Levels of vulnerability: On this last basis, 27% felt that GM in SRH should be at two levels, where priority should be to address the needs of the most vulnerable (especially women) and secondly to address the vulnerability of both men and women (couples) during the implementing the SRH projects. This was justified in the sense that, there are cases where specific affirmative action in programming becomes crucial which should be coupled with equality perspective of bringing couples together. This agrees with UN Women (2016) in a Malawi study in which affirmative action programmes are still being encouraged to ensure women rights are safeguarded. That notwithstanding, to only conceptualise GM in family planning and SRH projects in this way runs a risk of undermining joint involvement of men and women from the start of the

programmes and hence may affect the gender mainstreaming strategy and outcomes.

From the analysis of the findings above, regardless of the diversity of understanding of GM in SRH, one would still be able to note that the key aspects of GM are imbedded within the diversity of views by the respondents. Firstly, one will note the important aspect of asking key questions based on needs and experiences of men and women (Moser, 2003). This will help to understand how to challenge the social norms and values, including sexuality associated structural barriers common in FP projects. This essentially implied the need for a through gender analysis prior to the resumption of the gender mainstreaming strategy in the SRH projects (UNDP, 2015). Evident also was the issue of joint involvement of men and women, which comes with benefits of being able to demystify myths on FP as was earlier noted. It has also been emphasized that there are gains men bring to the issues of SRH in supporting the achievement of women rights and gender equality goals, which was a similar view held by various researchers (Kauffman, 2003; Kululanga and Sundby, 2012; Jackson, 2013).

Lastly, there was a strand stated by the gender specialists on the broad nature of gender mainstreaming, that it applies in all programmes beyond family planning and other SRH components. One respondent observed that gender mainstreaming should begin from the planning of every development effort at village level up to national level. Implicitly, it meant the internalization of gender issues across all the sectors of development as stressed by Moser (2003). This resonates with the definition and understanding of gender mainstreaming under the UN framework as earlier noted. While the actual realization may remain farfetched, it was a justified position for the creation of societies and development programme that fully subscribe to gender mainstreaming strategy.

Entrance and barriers to gender mainstreaming in sexual and reproductive health projects

The gender mainstreaming strategy in family planning, just as other development projects, should contribute to gains such as inclusion, participation and shared decisions between men and women involved (UNEG, 2011). This will add to the strategy enhancement of improved health and more equitable gender relations between couples in the projects. This calls for an introduction of gender mainstreaming strategy in SRH projects that is thoughtful and intentionally focused on addressing the barriers that may affect the realization of these gains in the projects. Through an open-ended questionnaire,

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organisation's staffs were asked on how specifically they included men and women in the sampled FP and SRH projects in the districts. Furthermore, communities using the KAP survey were asked to corroborate on how they were involved in the project cycle stages. The analysis on the introduction of GM in SRH project started with an enquiry on whether as organisations staff, they believed in the need for joint involvement of men and women (as couples). A 100% affirmation was provided by the organisations staff. This belief was also checked through a KAP survey (N=222) as in Figure 1 below.




Chart 1: Views on Spouse Involvement in the Projects (N=222)

Source: Field Data (2017)

In Chart 1 above, it was found that many of the respondents (82%) agreed that their spouses were involved while only 18 % did not agree. Those who did not agree did so because from the 222 KAP respondents, 7 were widowed and 8 respondents were not in marriage at the time of the study. Even though there was confirmation on the involvement of men and women, the nature and scope of involved of the men and women in the SRH projects coupled with the capacity gaps in the organisation's staff gave way to barriers that influenced the outcomes. The expected overall involvement of men and women in the FP and SRH projects was in the whole project cycle stages (needs assessment, design and planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation) (March *et al.*, 2005). The need assessment, design and planning stages were critical for the introduction of gender mainstreaming strategy. Instead, it was found that the organisation staff introduced gender mainstreaming in ways and using

structures that overlooked gender analysis and tackling gender issues. The organisations' staff used four ways.

Volunteers' role in need assessments: Firstly, by the involvement of lower level volunteers to collect data on gender related issues, akin to needs assessment on family planning services. This was at the design stage where volunteers named the Community Reproductive Health Providers (CRHP) went into the community and collected the information. It was found that, this information was useful at the pre- implementation stage of awareness rising on the issues as evident in the voice below:

We went to do assessment on local people's needs in the areas especially related to HIV/AIDS and Family Planning focusing on men and women (Interview with Female staff, BLM, Ntcheu, 2017).

On the same, some respondents observed that as far as they know, organisations like FPAM focuses more on delivering the FP services (thus giving out contraceptive methods) than engage the people (men and women together) on gender issues in the outreach clinics. The awareness raising on the importance of couples being jointly involved in these services was left to their lower level volunteer health staff called the Community Based Distribution Agents (CBDAs) who stay in the same community with the beneficiaries as commented below by one staff:

FPAM is more of service delivery than information sharing to couples to create demand. So while we understand the need for this joint involvement; our nature of services is yet to fully create demand to both men and women. But we have CBDAs who do awareness rising as we provide SRH services in the communities; as such inclusion of men and women together is not a big priority (Interview with Male FPAM staff, Ntcheu, 2017).

Thus, while needs assessment was done as part of the introductory process, the involvement of volunteers who are local people within the community and the CBDAs did not seem enough to entrench joint involvement and gender consideration in the projects. This was so because, these local cadres were not well trained in gender issues. As observed by White (2007), to do proper gender analysis and consideration, staffs need to have adequate gender training. This was not the case for the community based development assistants; hence emphasis was more on SRH service delivery than on ensuring that the projects were implemented in a gender sensitive manner.

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Community leaders' role in beneficiary mobilization: The use of community leadership structures to mobilize people for engagement was a second mechanism used to introduce the need for gender considerations where men and women had to be involved in the projects. The community leaders and the ADC (Area Development Committees), a local cadre of development got involved at the initial stages of the projects. These structures ensured ownership of the intervention and encouraged the people during the project. The involvement of the community leaders as messengers of joint involvement of men and women messages seemed superficial. This was because there was no adequate information and training on them to internalise the rationale for gender consideration in the projects as recommended by White (2007). It should be emphasised that tackling gender issues require efforts to change socio-cultural mindsets, question the socialization of the people and challenge the power inequalities between men and women. One of the ways to achieve this is where a robust approach to the introduction of gender issues as proposed by March *et al.* (2005) is done which focus on addressing key questions related to gender analysis. Relegating this role in the hands of the gender unskilled community leaders was a compromise that necessitated the failure of the SRH projects to deconstruct the deep-rooted gender norms and practices.

Community Campaign and Outreaches: The third way organisations staff introduced gender issues and involved men and women was through specific community campaigns during implementation and using door to door advocacy during outreaches. There was also sensitization in the initial stages of the project where couples were sensitized on the need to be jointly involved in the FP and SRH services. This was a similar approach documented by Fayoyin (2014) on HIV/AIDS projects in Malawi. The following voices shade more light on this approach:

We include messages on men and women working together in our interventions in general and in specific awareness raising activities specifically, to reach men who are included in the campaigns (Interview with UNFPA and its partner's local Staff, Chikhwawa, 2017).

Another staff emphasized on household engagement of the beneficiaries as follows:

We move around in households to encourage men and women as families to work together on issues of FP and SRH during outreach clinics (Interview with Female FPAM Staff, Ntcheu, 2017).

The above approaches seem to be more event-based and sporadic in nature than the expected ongoing involvement in the projects for internalisation and sustainable opportunity to change power inequalities and challenge male dominance on decisions. Fayoyin (2014) proposed the need for more focused community engagement for the success of joint involvement strategies in SRH which was not the case. To an extent that the joint involvement of men and women was event based and sporadic, the likelihood of tangible changes in gender inequalities remained uncertain.

Trained peer educator volunteers: Lastly, the organisation's staff indicated that efforts on joint involvement of men and women are introduced through volunteers who are first trained as peer educators. These could be women, men and youth educators trained on various aspects on FP and SRH services to also train and motivate others in their communities. Some of the Peer educators specific to HIV and AIDS are called *Expert Patients* who are engaged to reach out to men and women (couples) who are on treatment but are known to be Anti- Retroviral Therapy (ART) defaulters. They encourage them to go for HIV clinics to get new medication and receive ongoing counseling and support. The role of peers has always been crucial in SRH as observed by Greene *et.al* (2003) as their role is consolidated by the fact that the peers message appeals to other peers on the basis of their shared experience. Other peer educators among women are called *Amayi a Chinsisi* (Confidant Women Group) who specifically reaches out to fellow women on SRH issues. The peer educators through community mobilization structures like youth action movements, youth forum meetings, referral systems and women forums do carry out community sensitization with youths, families and couples to encourage them on the need for joint involvement of men, women, and youths on SRH services as in the voice below.

Beside awareness, we also train peer educators or volunteers and mobilise them whether men, youth and women peer educators in youth action movements and other community forums to help engage communities on need for jointly working together on SRH issues (Interview with Male FPAM Field officer, Ntcheu, 2017).

From the role that peer educators play, one would deduce that their role was not much far removed from what the organisation's staff do in introducing gender issues through campaigns that were earlier highlighted (Fayoyin, 2014). As much as the Peer educators are trained in some skills to engage couples, they may not be competent enough to be heard in the communities. Their authority and influence was prone to be questioned as they were not being accompanied

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by the organisation's staff. It was therefore uncommon from some respondents who suggested the need for staff to be available when asked what organisations needed to change.

Since this study employed mixed methods, the researcher also endeavoured to triangulate the above findings with the KAP survey respondents' views on the questions as (i) who were the key targets for the projects from initial stage? And, (ii) how were they and their spouses involved? This helped to check if the KAP views would confirm the organisation staff views in the preceding section on involvement and the introduction of the gender mainstreaming approach. These views are as summarised in the Figures 2 and 3 below:




Figure 2: KAP Respondents Views on whom the Projects Targeted (N=222)

Source: Field Data (2017)

As indicated in the previous section, the organisations' staff reached out to the communities as the projects were about to start and part of their initial sensitization was on who the projects targeted. According to Figure 2 above, of the total KAP respondents (N=222), slightly over half 51.8% (115) heard the projects are targeting couples and general community, 11% (25) heard the projects target was men and women (couples only). Further 10% (23) of the respondents indicated they heard the projects target was women only when 9.5% (21) people heard the projects targeted the general community.

From the results, it seemed the messages on the sensitization of the FP and SRH projects was not as clear cut on the couples as it was on the key targets. This may have compromised the emphasis on the joint involvement of men and women in the projects as expected of these projects (Kauffmann, 2003). The lack of clarity on the targets may explain the earlier approaches in the preceding section that largely reached out to the general community than being specific to couples as key targets. This exposes the staff's inadequate capacity and preparedness on gender mainstreaming strategy. The lack of clarity on targeting imply that gender analysis was not done fully since the key questions on gender analysis process could have guided clear targeting of the interventions based on the needs, experiences and interests of the targeted beneficiaries (March *et al.*, 2005).

Researchers have recommended that targeting couples or a male involvement model in SRH activities would be an ideal targeting of participants to realise the outcomes. This has been the preferred model in Malawi and other places (Greene, *et.al* 2003; Jackson, 2013; Kululanga *et al.*, 2011; Fayoyin, 2014). Targeting couples could have also been consistent with the ICPD recommendation on male involvement in SRH as documented in the introductory chapter. To the extent that couples and general community was the preferred target beneficiaries in the projects meant that more focused activities on challenging gender norms and stereotypes among couples may have not been adequately done as the activities involved the wider community.

To further understand the involvement of the beneficiaries, the researcher focused on how the targeted beneficiaries and spouses were involved as summarised in Figure 3 below.

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


Figure 3: Views on SRH Project Stages the Beneficiaries were Involved (N=222)

Source: Field Data (2017)

The above figure on respondent's involvement in the projects show the respondents percentage numbers in project cycle stages of; needs assessment, start-up awareness, implementation, monitoring and closure. As earlier noted, the KAP survey involved 80% (177) female and 20% (55) male. From the chart above, only 5 respondents (2.3%) were involved at needs assessment stage which was a close replica of a gender analysis process. Further, 37 people (16.7%) were involved at start up awareness stage and 26 people (11.7%) involved at implementation stage. This was followed by 2.7% who were involved in the monitoring process of the projects to closure, the same number involved in a combined awareness, implementation and monitoring. A total of 2.3% were in needs assessment and awareness while 1.4% was in combined needs assessment, awareness and monitoring stage. The combined stages of start-up and implementation had more people involved which were slightly close to one third thus 67 people (30.2%) and those involved in all the stages were 66 (29.2%). There was a similar trend on the results of the stages in which the spouses were involved.

From the results, it is apparent that more people involved in the combined start up and implementation (30.2%) were not subjected to a needs assessment process. This is a stage in a gender analysis (GA) on their experiences and needs that should have happened. Further, while a second majority (29.2%) was involved in all the stages, from those involved directly in the needs assessment stage (2.3%), one can conclude that, there was less effort to focus on the gender

analysis of their needs. The projects staff as was hinted at by one FPAM staff in the earlier sections focused more at involving the targeted in the activities as recipients of the FP and SRH projects than starting from a gender analysis of their needs. Since the KAP survey targeted more women than men, the above trends applied to all. Therefore, the process did not ensure a more rights-based participation, engagement and inclusion of both men and women beneficiaries in the projects (UNEG, 2011). The levels of involvement in all the project cycle stages was shallower than expected of projects that were focused on gender mainstreaming strategy. One could then argue that, if the spouse were less involved in the project stages that were avenues for more engaged reflection on socio-cultural issues, norms and stereotypes, then it raises doubt on the attainability of expected changes on gender relations.

The two figures above show a trend on having unclear targeting; fewer respondents involved in all the projects stages and the implied fewer spouses' involvement in all the project stages. Despite that a sizeable number of respondents were involved in the ongoing implementation stage. This was inadequate to sustain the participation that would challenge the gender stereotypes, norms and beliefs related to SRH interventions among the beneficiaries. It was expected of the organisations' staff to have involved as many men and women together as couples from the key introductory stages of the projects throughout the other stages. This could have helped to show their organisation's tangible commitment to gender mainstreaming strategy. As Burton and Pollack (2002) place a lot of emphasis on achieving gender mainstreaming them better to be able to attend to the need for change of the organisations' mentalities in the way programmes are delivered. Furthermore, the active involvement could have allowed shared decisions between men and women. Shared decision making was one component of improved gender relations changes between men and women (Greene *et al.*, 2003). This was limited in the projects because of the manner the organisations staff introduced and involved the beneficiaries. To emphasise on this point, the KAP respondents were asked to relate to the decisions of FP services access. The following were the results of their responses:

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Table 2: Views on how decisions are being made regarding family planning choice

Options	Frequency	Percent
wife decides	23	10.4
man decide	15	6.8
the two agree	110	49.5
wife chooses and then inform husband	62	27.9
the husband chooses and inform the wife	11	5.0
NA	1	0.5
Total	222	100.0

Source: Field Data (2017)

In Table 2 above, it is evident that about half of the respondents (49.5%) agree that decisions were jointly made, while a combined other half (50%) said decisions were made by either wife alone (10%), man decided (7%), women chose, as well as informed husband (28%) or husband chose and informed wife (5%). From this it is evident that, for projects that are gender mainstreaming focused; the support for shared decisions between husband and wife needed to have been more than 50% from the people that had been participating throughout the projects. The evidence of other options on how decisions are made validates the fact that there were inadequate shared decision-making changes because of the compromised participation, inclusion and involvement of beneficiaries.

Implications of these Findings on Gender Outcomes

The findings above have shown diversity on how GM was understood and justified, the diversity on how GM was introduced and the way beneficiaries were involved. It has been discussed that these have implications on the gender related changes hence showing why there was inadequate realization of the gender related outcomes. As earlier indicated, gender mainstreaming focused SRH projects should enhance the inclusion, participation and shared decisions among women and men as it enhances improved health and gender relations between them.

Given that the focus of family planning and SRH projects leans more on health services, the outcome on improved health are often met (Greene, *et al.*, 2003). However, the changes on improved gender relations as was the focus of this paper are sparingly realised. Therefore, it has been found that due to the low involvement of men and women either as individuals and or couples in the main

initial stages of the projects cycle, the gains on inclusion and participation were less met.

In the whole, the type of participation that was anticipated was a community development perspective one which goes beyond token involvement to autonomous decision making (Maluka, 2008). This form of participation is both rights based and capacity building in nature. It often leads to the empowerment of the communities involved. From the analysis on how men and women involvement was pursued by the projects staff in the family planning and SRH efforts, the participation can be said to have been mere tokenism on the basis of the Arnstein (1969) typology of citizen participation than the substantive participation (*ibid*). For instance, there was no adequate capacity building on the volunteers and community leaders who were entrusted to take over the joint involvement of men and women efforts in the projects.

Participation, inclusion and involvement should start from the identification of problem areas to the development, implementation and management of plans (Schafft and Greenwood, 2003 cited in Maluka 2008). This was not the case in the projects according to the results. There were also inadequate improved shared decisions changes between men and women because of the level of participation of men and women in the key stages of the projects as earlier presented. Thus, one can conclude that the combination of inadequate inclusion, participation and shared decisions, essentially explain the inadequate outcomes or changes on improved gender relations between men and women from these projects which was contrary to the expectation of these projects.

Conclusion

In the light of the discussion of the study findings in the preceding section of this article, one conclusion can be made. The main conclusion is that, as much as there is support for gender mainstreaming strategy in family planning and SRH project delivery, the realization of gender related changes depends on a thoughtful gender issues consideration in the project cycle stages. This will be through how the gender mainstreaming process is introduced and beneficiaries involved. The diversity of understanding of gender mainstreaming in family planning was one factor that shows lack of adequate capacity on gender issues in the part of the organisation's staff. This suggests the need for capacity building on gender strategy for the organisations' staff working on SRH projects. The way gender mainstreaming projects are introduced and gender considerations in the couple's involvement does demonstrate the existence the gaps of the needed thorough gender analysis prior to these projects. While the

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respondents have acknowledged staff efforts on joint involvement and the couples' participation in the projects, this has not translated into tangible empowerment in the form of shared decisions. Deliberate efforts are crucial for couples to fully be involved in all the stages of the projects than mere tokenism.

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Political Ecology of Malaria Prevalence in Urban Nigeria

Yemi Adewoyin¹

Abstract

This study investigates the spatial prevalence of malaria in urban Nigeria as a reflection of the population's residential habitat quality and the distributional pattern of healthcare resources in the study area. Both factors are conceptualized as being products of urban governance and corollaries of territorial distributive justice. Secondary data on clinically-diagnosed cases of malaria, population, and the location of healthcare facilities in the study area were subjected to various statistical and descriptive analyses. The results show a bias in the distribution of the facilities against high density residential neighborhoods populated mostly by the less affluent and an inverse relationship between the availability of health facilities and disease prevalence. The relationship was however not statistically significant. Conscious urban planning efforts, rather than politics and economic considerations, are suggested to address the inequalities in environmental quality and the distribution of healthcare facilities as both were found to influence health outcomes in the study area.

Keywords: *Political Ecology, Health Inequality, Residential Neighborhood, Malaria, Urban Planning*

Introduction

The fact that health matters for development has been long recognized (WHO, 2016; UN, 2012; Bloom and Canning, 2008; IMF, 2004; Sachs and Malaney, 2002), yet health is not uniformly present in space, and so is development. The variation in health may present itself as differences in the incidence of diseases in space and in health outcomes among a population. It may also be in the distribution of and access to healthcare facilities in space. While biology and exposure to elements in the natural environment account largely for the former, the latter is consequent on the social interactions in space. Such interactions are underlined by political and economic considerations, are responsible for determining the distribution of resources among the population, and are responsible for the creation of a social environment that influences health (Swyngedouw and Kaika, 2014; King, 2010; McLafferty, 2010; McLaughlin

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and Dietz, 2008; Swyngedouw and Heynen, 2003; Mayer, 1996). When situated within an urban space, these political and economic considerations create power relationships that define who has access to and controls available natural and physical resources within the city, and have implications for the governance and administration of the healthcare system, healthcare resources allocation, health services delivery, and health outcomes (Mackenbach, 2013; 2014; Chen and Cammett, 2012; Beckfield and Krieger, 2009; Navarro *et al.*, 2006). The power relations also foster a differential spatial structure among the residential neighborhoods in a city through the way urban services infrastructures are provided and in the disparity in the quality of the living environment (Swyngedouw and Kaika, 2014; Loftus, 2012; Heynen, Kaika and Swyngedouw, 2005; Keil, 2003; Brechin, 2001; Lipton, 1998; Smith, 1987; Knox, 1978; Harvey, 1973).

In Nigeria urban centers, the social environment has evolved in a residential differentiation that is characterized by neighborhoods with varying population densities and income classes. The high-density neighborhoods are usually at and/or at very close proximity to the city center and are noted for overcrowding, waste disposal issues and sanitation problems, old and decaying infrastructures, and are mostly populated by people of low socioeconomic status. At the other end, the low-density neighborhoods are the reserved and emerging residential areas, with fewer people, usually populated by the rich and elites, and have the best of social infrastructures. Medium density residential localities are in-between in location and features. The spatial inequality in residential habitat conditions in the urban centers has been found to have implications for health (Macyntyre *et al.*, 2002; Kawachi and Kennedy, 1997; Kennedy *et al.*, 1996). Available data on health outcomes in Nigeria are also as grim as they are unequal. There are 2 infected people for every 1,000 HIV-uninfected population aged 15 to 49 in Nigeria; incidence of tuberculosis is 322 cases for every 1,000 population; and under-five child mortality is 109 cases in 1,000 (WHO, 2016). With an all-time-high of 54.5 years, life expectancy at birth in Nigeria is one of the lowest in the world. Life expectancy at birth is 81.8 years in Norway. The probability of dying between ages 15 and 60 is 38.7% in Nigeria but a mere 6.2% in Norway. In 2015, 37% of children under the age of 5 in Nigeria were stunted, 18% were wasted, and 29% were underweight (FMOH, 2016). About 86% of mothers in urban centers received ante-natal care in contrast to 48% of mothers in rural Nigeria, while ante-natal care coverage was 41% in the Northwest geopolitical zone of the country and 91% in the Southeast in 2015 (FMOH, 2016).

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Based on the foregoing, it becomes imperative to investigate the linkages among political ecology, spatial variation in residential environmental conditions, and health outcomes in the urban center. This study argues that the bias in the allocation of urban infrastructures in Nigeria in favor of certain localities and residential neighborhoods is consequent on the power relations in the urban centers, creates health vulnerabilities in the other parts of the city, and reflects in the spatial disparity in health outcomes of the urban population. The study employs the distribution of healthcare facilities as a corollary of urban service infrastructure, and the prevalence of malaria as a measure of health outcomes. Malaria is a public health problem in Nigeria with more than 97% of the population at risk (National Malaria Elimination Programme, 2014). About 11% of maternal mortality, 60% out-patients hospital visits, and 30% hospitalization among children under the age of 5 are attributable to malaria (Nigeria, 2013). Malaria also places an economic burden on the country's development as more than \$1 billion is lost to the disease annually in the form of treatment costs, prevention and loss of man-hour among others (National Malaria Elimination Programme, 2014).

Methods

Population and Sampling

The study employed a multi-stage sampling technique. Ibadan, the capital of Southwest Nigeria, was purposively selected as the study location for several reasons. Firstly, the Southwest region has the highest rate of under-five malaria mortality in Nigeria. The city is also located in the rain forest vegetation belt where there is precipitation for a minimum of 8 months in a year with a mean annual temperature of about 27°C. These climatic conditions provide a perfect environmental condition for the malaria vector, mosquito, to breed all through the year. The city further typifies an average Nigerian urban center with clear neighborhood differentiation along the lines of population density, income and social classes. Ibadan has 11 Local Government Areas (LGAs) and an estimated population of 3.5 million. Five congruent LGAs (Ibadan North, Northeast, Northwest, Southeast and Southwest) constitute the core of the city as metropolitan Ibadan and accounted for 53% of the total population while the remaining 6 LGAs are sub-urban. The metropolitan LGAs were selected for the study purposively in order to eliminate bias and external factors, notably agricultural land uses and open spaces that are known to negatively affect the prevalence of malaria. Agricultural land uses are virtually non-existent in the metropolitan LGA. Using a stratified sampling technique, 3 residential localities typifying the high, medium, and low-density residential neighborhoods in each of the 5 LGAs of study were further selected. These are

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Ikolaba, Basorun and Yemetu in Ibadan North LGA; Idi-Isin, Eleyele and Abebi in Ibadan North-West LGA; and Agodi, Old-Ife Road and Elekuro in Ibadan North-East. Other localities are Felele, Challenge and Idi-Aro in Ibadan South-East; and Oluyole Estate, Molete and Foko in Ibadan South-West LGA. The selection was to assess the spatial disparities across the different residential classes in the city.

Data Types and Sources

Secondary data types were used in the study. The number and distribution of hospitals in the selected localities were extracted from the records of the Oyo State Ministry of Health (OYMOH). Data on clinically-diagnosed cases of malaria were also obtained from the same source. The number of cases for each of the study locality was computed from the records of all health facilities available in each of the study localities as detailed in the District Health Information Software (DHIS) of the Department of Planning, Research and Statistics of the Oyo State Ministry of Health (OYMOH), Nigeria. Both government and privately-owned health facilities in the study area are regulated by public policies. Records from them are made available to the government database through the DHS on weekly and monthly bases or as demanded by the government as a matter of policy. It was recently introduced and that accounts for why a comprehensive and detailed record of clinically diagnosed malaria cases from the facilities available in the database did not date before 2013. Population data employed in the study was sourced from the records of the National Population Commission and projected as appropriate.

Data Analysis

The number of clinically-diagnosed cases of malaria computed for each of the study localities was analyzed for spatial variations using both the ANOVA and Case Comparison methods. Case Comparison identifies disease clusters and describes the extent and pattern of disease occurrence in a geographical space (Kelsey, Thompson and Evans, 1986; Breslow and Day, 1987). Ratio of Access and Coefficient of Advantage were employed to assess the level of equity in the distribution of the healthcare facilities relative to the population served while the Pearson Product Moment Correlation (PPMC) and Spearman Rank Correlation techniques were used to examine the relationship between the distribution of healthcare resources and prevalence of malaria in the localities. A Ratio of Access as employed in this study refers simply to the number of people to a healthcare resource. It measures the level of equity in the distribution using the population criterion. Access is conceptualized within this context to imply the number of facilities available for the population within the

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geographical space where they reside whether they choose to use the facilities or not. The Ratio of Access is variously referred to in the literature as facility to population ratio or facility to patient ratio. The Coefficient of Advantage is simply the percentage share of facilities divided by the percentage share of the population (Smith, 1979; 1987). An equal distribution will give a coefficient of 1 while a coefficient greater than 1 implies that the locality has more facilities than its share of population while a coefficient less than unity indicates the reverse (Smith, 1979).

Results and Discussion

Spatial Prevalence of Malaria

For the period reviewed, there were 82,547 clinically diagnosed cases of malaria in the 15 localities of study. Of these, Agodi had the highest number of cases; 10,644 or almost 13% of the distribution. Yet, its share of health facilities was not the highest as shown in Figure 1 below.




Figure 1: Distribution of Hospitals in the Selected Localities

Source: Oyo State Ministry of Health (2016)

Molete followed closely with 9,330 cases (11.30%) while Challenge, Eleyele, Abebi and Elekuro followed in the magnitude of malaria incidence respectively with 8,978 (10.88%), 8,285 (10.04%), 7,152 (8.66%) and 6,845 (8.29%). Idi-

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Isin with 813 cases or less than 1% of the distribution had the lowest number of malaria cases among the localities. Other locations with relatively lower number of cases were Oluyole Estate with 1,566 cases (1.90%) and Ikolaba with 2,353 cases (2.85%). Other sampled localities in the study area recorded between 3,418 and 5,826 cases as shown in Table 1.

Residential Density	Locality	LGA	Cases	Proportion (%)	Residential Density Total
Low	Ikolaba	Ibd N	2,353	2.85	17,821
	Idi-Isin	Ibd NW	813	0.98	
	Agodi	Ibd NE	10,644	12.89	
	Felele	Ibd SE	2,445	2.96	
	Oluyole	Ibd SW	1,566	1.90	
	Basorun	Ibd N	5,774	6.99	
	Eleyele	Ibd NW	8,285	10.04	
	Old-Ife Road	Ibd NE	3,418	4.14	
	Challenge	Ibd SE	8,978	10.88	
	Medium	Molete	Ibd SW	9,330	
Yemetu		Ibd N	3,635	4.40	
Abebi		Ibd NW	7,152	8.66	
Elekuro		Ibd NE	6,845	8.29	
Idi-Aro		Ibd SE	5,826	7.06	
High		Foko	Ibd SW	5,483	6.64
	Total		82,547	100.00	82,547

Table 1: Distribution of Malaria Cases in Ibadan Localities

Source: OYMOH Records (2016)

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When the distribution is disaggregated along residential density lines, the proportional shares of the incidence of malaria were between 0.98% and 2.96% in four of the five low density residential localities. The only exception was Agodi with 12.89%. The shares also ranged between 4.14% and 11.30% in the medium density neighborhoods while in the high-density neighborhoods, the distribution was between 4.40% and 8.66%. A further analysis of the distribution shows that jointly, the localities from Ibadan North-East LGA accounted for 25.33% of the total distribution. Localities from Ibadan South-East LGA also jointly accounted for 20.90% of the malaria cases while the localities from Ibadan South-West LGA contributed 19.84% of the total number of cases. Localities in Ibadan North-West and Ibadan North accounted for 19.69% and 14.25% of the cases, respectively.

From the comparison of cases, it is evident that the distribution was unequal among the various residential localities with the medium density localities jointly recording the highest number of cases while the low-density neighborhoods jointly accounted for the lowest number of cases. The statistical analysis of variance of the distribution indicated that indeed variations existed in the number of cases among the study localities but the variations were statistically insignificant ($F = 0.935$, $P = 0.548$). This implies that although the distribution of prevalence among the localities differed from one locality to another in value, the variations were not statistically significant to conclude that certain localities had significantly higher prevalence of malaria than the others. The correlation analysis also showed that there was a positive correlation between residential density and the incidence of malaria ($r = 0.400$, $P = 0.140$). The correlation was however not statistically significant.

The lowest number of cases of malaria was recorded largely in the low-density residential neighborhoods while the highest number of cases was recorded in the medium density localities contrary to the assumption that the high density localities would record the highest prevalence owing to the ecological characteristics of such neighborhoods. This might not be unconnected with the mismatch between places of residence/work and places of treatment in the study area. For instance, Agodi is a low-density residential neighborhood within which can be found the government houses and places of residence of several of the city's elites and political office holders. It is also home to many of the notable private hospitals in the city of Ibadan and a Primary Health Center (PHC). The PHC is located at Idi-Ogungun, which, jurisdictionally falls under Agodi, but much closer to the food and automobile spare-parts markets along the Agodi-Gate-Yidi corridor. Owing to the general perception that private

hospitals are more expensive, the bulk of the traders and patrons at the markets patronize the PHC at Agodi and this explains why over 85% of the nearly 11,000 cases of malaria in Agodi were recorded at the PHC. Most of the traders do not reside anywhere close to the markets or Agodi. This portends that a critical factor to consider in the employment of hospital records in the mapping of the number of cases (of diseases) to places is the distinction between places of residence/work and treatment places.

Healthcare Facilities and Population Distribution

There are 75 hospitals in the 15 localities as illustrated in Figure 1. This number comprised 49 private hospitals and 26 government hospitals. While the quality of service, number of personnel, and availability of equipment may differ between the private and public hospitals in Nigeria, there is uniformity in standard procedures, including the diagnosis of malaria, across the facilities as all healthcare facilities are regulated by national health policies and guidelines irrespective of the ownership status. The medium density residential areas had 41% of all the hospitals as well as 42% of the public hospitals. The high-density neighborhoods had 30% of the total distribution and 31% of the public facilities. The total number of public hospitals was least in the low-density neighborhoods. The level of equity in the distribution was further analyzed using the population as the equity stratifier. Population is a distributive factor in Nigeria (Okafor, 1989; Nigeria, 1999). Table 2 shows the population of the localities. The distribution of the health facilities relative to the population sizes of the localities showed that access to hospitals was best in Basorun where there was at least a hospital to about 700 people. Basorun was followed closely by Oluyole Estate with about 1,000 people being served by a hospital. Other localities where the number of the population to a hospital was less than 2,000 were Agodi (1,280), Old-Ife Road (1,700), Idi-Isin (1,199), Eleyele (1,895) and Molete (1,323). In the other localities, there were more than 2,000 people to a hospital as depicted in Table 2. Access was lowest, however, in Foko, with one hospital to 6,277 people.

When the analysis of access was aggregated along residential density lines, the medium density neighborhoods had the highest access rate of one hospital to 1,656 people. In the high-density areas, the ratio was one hospital to 3,604 people. The equity analysis also showed that four of the five medium density neighborhoods had more than their fair share of the distribution as evident by a Coefficient of Advantage greater than 1.00 while only two of the low-density localities had less than their fair share. All the high-density localities had less than their fair share of the distribution as shown in Table 2 below.

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Table 2: Access and Equity in the Distribution of Health Facilities

Locality	Residential Density	Population Proportion (%)	Ratio of Access	Coefficient of Advantage
Ikolaba	Low	3.79	1 : 3,288	0.70
Agodi		5.16	1 : 1,280	1.81
Idi-Isin		1.38	1 : 1,199	1.93
Felele		12.76	1 : 3,162	0.73
Oluyole		2.94	1 : 1,019	2.27
Basorun	Medium	2.40	1 : 693	3.34
Old-Ife Road		6.86	1 : 1,700	1.36
Eleyele		10.92	1 : 1,895	1.22
Challenge		6.15	1 : 2,669	0.87
Molete		3.05	1 : 1,323	1.75
Yemetu	High	6.78	1 : 2,353	0.98
Elekuro		7.09	1 : 3,075	0.75
Abebi		6.84	1 : 2,968	0.78
Idi-Aro		5.79	1 : 3,349	0.69
Foko		18.09	1 : 6,277	0.37
Total		100.00		

Source: Author's Computation, 2016

In effect, the bias in the location of healthcare facilities in the study area was mostly against the high-density residential neighborhoods. Apart from having about 30% of the total numbers of hospitals, which implied that both private and government provision did not favor these localities, the hospital to population ratio in the high-density areas was also the poorest at 1 to nearly 4,000 people.

Distributional Pattern of Healthcare Facilities and Malaria Prevalence

The absolute numbers of the facilities in the localities and a ranking of the performance of the localities on the access and equity measures were employed as the independent variables in a correlation analysis with the number of malaria cases in the localities. The analysis was to determine the relationship between the distributional pattern of the facilities and the spatial prevalence of malaria in the study localities. With the absolute number of hospitals, the result of the correlation analysis ($r = -0.405$, $P = 0.134$) indicated an inverse relationship between the incidence of malaria and the distribution of health

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facilities in the study area. The relationship was however not statistically significant. The introduction of the population factor to the analysis by employing both the ratios of access and coefficients of advantage of each locality in the distribution of hospitals for the correlation analysis indicated that there was no relationship between malaria and the distribution of hospitals in the study localities ($r = -0.049$, $P = 0.861$ and $r = 0.17$, $P = 0.951$ respectively). The correlation coefficients in both instances were very low and closer to 0.

In the general analysis, the fact that there were more hospitals relative to population distribution in some areas of the city while other areas were in want is an indication that treatment seeking in the latter areas would be largely constrained. This situation may have unwittingly created a culture of self-treatment with its attendant consequences, particularly drug resistance, in the affected locations and may equally be responsible for the high prevalence of malaria in those locations. Also, such lopsidedness in the distribution of healthcare facilities has been found to have consequences for health education, treatment seeking and disease awareness in the affected locations (Lowasa *et al.*, 2012). As seen from the results, the fact that the bias in the distribution of the health facilities, both publicly and privately provided, was mostly against locations where the bulk of the population is less affluent and where the quality of the living environment is poorest, further places the residents of such places at a greater disadvantage with respect to their health. On the one hand, the quality of the living environment in the locations exposes the population to diseases and ill-health while inadequacy of health facilities constrains access for treatment seeking, thus exacerbating the already poor health status of the largely impoverished population of the high-density localities. Both circumstances are fallouts of the interplay of political economy in the management of urban resources and environment.

The results of the study, discussed in this article, regarding the relationship between health facilities and disease prevalence are in line with previous studies on the subject. Lowasa *et al.* (2012), Chirebvu *et al.*, (2014) and Yadav *et al.*, (2014) have all shown that the location of hospitals has a positive influence in reducing the prevalence of diseases, just as this study has shown that there is an inverse relationship between the distribution of health facilities and the prevalence of malaria, such that places with more facilities recorded lower number of malaria cases and locations with fewer number of facilities had more malaria cases. However, considering the level of statistical significance of the relationship established in this work, and the fact that there are other environmental and social determinants of health not investigated in the study,

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an outright generalization on the role of the health systems, particularly the location of hospitals, on malaria prevalence in the study area cannot be attempted with the study findings.

Conclusion

The study showed that within the city, the number of reported cases of malaria varied among the residential localities with the highbrow, low density neighborhoods of the affluent recording the least number of cases. The study also showed that the distribution of healthcare facilities relative to population distribution placed the residents of the less affluent and ecologically low-quality high density residential localities at a greater disadvantage when compared with their counterparts elsewhere within the study area. It was also established from the study that the distribution of the healthcare facilities impacted on the spatial prevalence of malaria among the study localities. From the foregoing, there is a clear bias in the location and allocation of healthcare facilities among different residential neighborhoods; the neighborhoods themselves having been differentiated along socioeconomic and environmental quality lines wittingly or unwittingly by urban planning activities. All these factors have been shown to affect malaria prevalence among the different neighborhoods within the urban center. First, the study therefore permits a recommendation to the effect that there is need for a conscious urban planning effort to reduce spatial inequality among residential neighborhoods irrespective of who lives where. Second, the study also provides justification for recommending that in the distribution of healthcare facilities in the study area, urban planning authorities ought to take cognizance of the locations of existing facilities and population distribution when granting approvals for new investment in health infrastructure. Third, because of their impacts on diseases prevalence, it is also suggested that the distribution of these facilities should be regulated and not be left to market forces and narrow interest driven political considerations.

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**Root Causes of Intra-Ethnic Conflicts among Agro-Pastoralists
Kuria of Tarime, Tanzania**

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Abstract

The study whose findings are discussed in this article was conducted to unveil the socio-cultural related root causes of Intra-Ethnic conflicts among the Agro-Pastoralist Kuria of Tarime district in Tanzania with the aim of creating understanding on how socio-cultural dynamics have paved the way for the existing intra-ethnic conflicts among Kuria. Ethnographic research design guided by qualitative research approach was deployed to collect information. The collected data were subjected to content analysis to form themes and sub-themes of the study. The study findings revealed that, the Kuria historical legacy and strong upholding of cultural values propagated and transmitted from one generation to another through various cultural ritual practices have shaped the attitudes and thinking among Kuria towards the clan's collective resource ownership and paving the way for the rise of the clan's nationalism. This phenomenon has further strengthened segregations among clans, hatred, mistrust, violence, fighting, and revenge and therefore serving as the historical roots of intra-ethnic conflicts among Kuria clans. The study recommends inclusion of initiatives targeting the addressing of historical and cultural dynamics in the Tarime peacemaking process.

Key words: Intra-ethnic conflict, historical manifestations, socio-cultural dynamics

Introduction

While many parts of Tanzania are characterised by peace and stability to the extent of being considered as an island of peace in Africa (Mmuya and Maundi, 2002:3), there are some parts of the country which experience unique cases of intra-ethnic conflicts. Some of those unique cases include Tarime district in Mara region, whereby for quite a while has been immersed in persistent intra-ethnic conflicts which involve mistrust and fights between clans. This

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phenomenon has been viewed as threatening the image of Tanzania in the international community as an “Oasis of Peace” on the troubled African continent (Hirschler, 2007).

Conflicts among the Kuria clans have been a normal custom of the people in the Tarime district and have caused an enormous impact on individuals, the district and the nation as a whole (The African Team, 2006; Iddy, 2007 & Masakija, 2011). For instance, from 1992 to 2006, intra-ethnic conflicts between Wakira and Waanchari forced more than 300 households of the Waanchari to abandon their area (Mahende, 2012). During the same period, intra-ethnic conflicts caused the death of 17 people, 77 people were injured, 130 houses were burnt and 81 acres of various crops were destroyed (Iddy, 2007). It has also been observed that almost six people lose a life each year due to intra – ethnic conflicts between Wakira, Waanchari and Warechoka clans (Mahende, 2012). Several initiatives have taken to resolve the conflicts but the conflicts still persist.

Despite effects caused by the existence of intra-ethnic conflicts in Tanzania and worldwide, intra-ethnic conflict is considered to be a less studied problem in peace and conflicts studies (Stavenhagen, 1998; Miedema, 2010; Joshua, 2013; Warren and Troy, 2015). As a result, there has been a greater scarcity of literature concerning studies of intra-ethnic conflicts in both developed and developing countries (Joshua, 2013 and Miedema, 2010). Arguing in support of this observation, (Jerman, 1997, Ryan, 1988 and Ssereo, 2003), point out that, although much has been written on ethno politics, clan politics has not been the focus of conflict research and scholarly debate on conflict resolution and as a result research concerning ethnicity and ethnic conflicts were rarely conducted or neglected as they were perceived by political elites as being detrimental to National Unity. It is due to this research deficit that studies on intra-ethnic conflict has been receiving little attention, neglected by writers, ignored by the standard textbooks on international relations, receiving slow recognition in the discipline of international relations and unheard in the scholarly fields in many parts of the world (Ryan,1988). Therefore, the study that informs the writing of this article was conducted to unveil the socio-cultural related root causes of Intra-Ethnic conflicts among the Agro-Pastoralist Kuria of Tarime district, Tanzania. It is a study whose significance lay in contributing to the broadening of the literature on intra-ethnic conflicts dynamics. The article is divided into four (4) sections: the first is an introduction, the second presents conceptual and contextual issues, the third section discuss the methodology that the study

adopted, the fourth section presents the study results and the discussion thereof, and the fifth section presents the conclusion.

Conceptual and Contextual Issues

Conceptualization of Intra-Ethnic Conflict

The intra-ethnic conflict which is the central focus of this article is also known as the inter-clan conflict (Psiwa, *et al.*, 2014). The expression “intra-ethnic conflicts” is used here to refer to conflicts that arise from interactions between groups within an ethnic group. The term intra – ethnic conflicts is also used to explain conflicts which take place between clans belonging to the same ethnic group or tribe. Conflicts may appear as a dispute on an important social, political, economic, cultural, religious, territorial, or lingual issue (Psiwa, *et.al.*, 2014). Therefore, the concept of intra-ethnic conflicts is used interchangeably with the term inter-clan conflicts denoting a type of conflicts taking place between clans belonging to the same ethnic group (Mahende, 2012 & Masakija, 2011).

Intra-ethnic conflicts have been attributed more to internal phenomena like dispute over ownership of land and population explosion (Babajimi, 2003; Idowu, 2001; Obono, 1999 & Oladoyin, 2001), elite competition for economic and political resources (Albert, 1999; Oladoyin, 2001), tussles over chieftaincy titles (Akinteye, 1999 & Babajimi, 2003) and use of derogatory words and terms to refer to a group (Babajimi, 2003). According to Onwuzuruigbo (2010), intra-ethnic conflicts can be generated by externally induced factors and policies emanating from outside the ethnic group. Rupensinghe and Tishkov (1996) make the point clearer when they argue that any move to solve inter-ethnic clashes through reservation of political offices on an ethnic basis can foster intra-ethnic conflicts. In other words, intra-ethnic conflicts can arise when sub-groups of an ethnic group compete for political and economic resources allocated to the ethnic group at the national, regional or local level. Given the arguments articulated by scholars in the definition and elaboration of the existence of intra-ethnic conflicts, the researchers of this study do take the views that, apart from internal and external factors pointed out as triggers of intra-ethnic conflicts, scholars missed out to include the role and contribution of historical factors and cultural dynamics (attitudes, myth and belief systems), as the root causes of intra-ethnic conflicts. This situation forms a very important gap in the articulated arguments concerning the existence of intra-ethnic conflicts. Despite these diversities in the scholar’s aforestated arguments, these different scholars share a common view that intra-ethnic conflicts is a phenomenon which evolves around both internal and externally complex

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interrelated factors. Therefore, for the operational purpose of this study, intra-ethnic conflicts refer to types of conflicts that arise from interactions between groups (sub-ethnic groups or clans) within an ethnic group.

Intra-ethnic conflicts have been attributed more to internal phenomena like dispute over ownership of land and population explosion (Obono, 1999; Idowu, 2001; Oladoyin, 2001; Babajimi, 2003), elite competition for economic and political resources (Albert, 1999; Oladoyin, 2001), tussles over chieftaincy titles (Akinteye, 1999; Babajimi, 2003) and use of derogatory words and terms to refer to a group (Babajimi, 2003). According to Onwuzuruigbo (2010:3), intra-ethnic conflicts can be generated by externally-induced factors and policies emanating from outside the ethnic group. Intra-ethnic conflicts can arise when sub-groups of an ethnic group compete for political and economic resources allocated to the ethnic group at the national, regional or local level. Intra-ethnic conflict is an important phenomenon in its own right, generating thousands of deaths and displacements throughout the world (Warren and Troy, 2015).

Intra ethnic conflicts have been experienced in different parts of the world although they differ in terms of nature, causes, magnitude, and impact. Between 1990 and 1996 about 5 million people were displaced due to inter-group (intra-ethnic) conflicts in the world (Yang, 2000). The causes and consequences of conflicts are often a complex mix of inter-linked economic, environmental, political, cultural and religious factors (Teodosijevic, 2003). Intra-ethnic conflicts in Pakistan within the Orakzai ethnic group (tribe) which is comprised of eighteen (18) clans, has been experienced since 1977, whereby three clans of A'Khel on one side and the Rabia and Daradar on the other have been involved in conflicts (Ahmed,1980). The main cause of the conflict which resulted in fighting was competition for plots of land popularly known as *Mullah's field* (Ahmed, 1980). Sindh province in Pakistan for a long time has been also severely affected by conflicts between two clans of Mehars and Jatoi existing at Shikarpur district) caused by the widespread extremism and differences in sectarian affiliations (Yusuf and Hasan, 2015). Mehars belong to Sunni whereas Jatoi are of Shia sect and thus, this tribal rivalry has been exploited by sectarian militant organizations to perpetuate their ideology (Yusuf and Hasan, 2015).

With regards to intra-ethnic conflicts, Africa has not been spared. Generally, Africa has been leading in the world in terms of conflicts and thus conflict is one of the great threats to Africa's development (Govender and Ngandu, 2010). It has also experienced intra-ethnic conflicts across different countries. However, the magnitude, intensity, and effects have been different from one

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country to another. Conflicts linked to ethnicity have led to significant loss of life and injuries in many countries, and become major elements in impoverishment, undermining human security and sustainable development (Chikumi, 2013:13). Cases of intra-ethnic conflicts in Africa have been reported in several countries such as Nigeria, Kenya, the Republic of South Africa, Somalia and South Sudan. However, for the purpose of this article cases of Somalia and South Sudan, were picked for discussion.

One among the most cited battlefields of intra-ethnic conflict in Africa is the Somali conflict which involves a number of clans fighting against each other (Mpangala, 2004). Somalia, with a population of more than 10 million people, is made up of six major clan families: the Darod, the Isaaq, the Dir and the Hawiye, the Rahanwein, and the Digil (Ssereo, 2003). According to Ssereo (2003:25), the clan families have common ancestral origins and they are interrelated through complex networks of social relationships, which extend over clan territories marked with fluid borders, within the national territory. Despite having similarities in identity, language, common citizenship, culture, religion (Moslems in the majority) and common ancestral descendants, intra-ethnic conflicts in Somalia are a normal phenomenon. Several attempts were made to halt the hostilities but conflict still persists (IRIN, 2006). Clan conflicts in Somalia have become entrenched in the social-political fabrics of Somalia to the extent that Somalia is an example in Africa where the social category 'ethnic' has been replaced by the category 'clan' whereby the political systems of Somalia operate on a clan basis (Ssereo, 2003). Intra- Ethnic conflicts in Somalia have played a big role in the mass exodus of Somali from their country to Kenya since 1991 (Mkutu, 2008).

South Sudan is another African country which has experienced deadly intra-ethnic conflict for much of the last five decades (Gray and Roos, 2012). The conflict exists at Wanglei in Jonglei state which is one of the most conflict-prone and least developed states in the new republic of South Sudan (International Crisis Group 2009). The conflict is between two clans of the Dinka tribe, the Ayual, and Dachuek along with a third clan not involved in the conflict, the Awulian. The three clans have lived largely in peaceful co-existence for generations and they share the same history, language and culture, and under normal circumstances have collaborative relationships (Gray and Roos, 2012). The main source of the conflict at Wanglei in Jonglei state was the 1970s disagreement over who was the rightful owner of Wanglei village. Both clans (the Ayual and Dachuek) have historical claims to the area. Other sources of conflict identified in the area include competition for natural resources such

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as watering holes and grazing land, competition for church congregants between the Episcopal and Anglican churches, and competition over positions of political power in the social hierarchy (Gray and Roos, 2012). Several initiatives were taken to resolve the conflict ranging from political intervention to traditional conflict resolution mechanisms but tensions had remained high in the communities (Gray and Roos, 2012).

In order to analyse social-cultural dynamics responsible for the existence of intra-ethnic conflicts in Tarime, this study was guided by Systems Thinking Theory (STT) which was considered to be a powerful tool for analyzing most difficult types of problems to solve, especially those involving complex issues, recurring problems and identifying high leverage interventions that create fundamental changes (Aronson, 1996). Systems thinking theory provided an analytical tool in understanding the relationship between elements which promote, sustain, or influence conflicts, recognize patterns that lead into conflicts or reveal the underlying forces that give rise to conflict (Gallo, 2012). In the field of political science and peace studies, in particular, systems thinking theory has been used to make analysis of conflicts by examining complex interacting factors or transformers which shape the course of conflicts, components of conflicts or stakeholders (individuals, groups and institutions affected or affecting its course, as well as identifying the structural forces which shape the socio-politico-economical transitions within war-torn societies (Dudouet, 2006).

From the systems thinking perspectives, ethnic conflict and intra-ethnic conflict, in particular, is never mono-causal, but multi-causal. Conflicts exist as a result of the interaction of multi-causal factors and thus this implies that any analysis of conflicts should take into consideration that the causes of conflict are many, complex, interconnected and interrelated. Therefore, the causes of conflicts can range from historical factors, traditions and belief systems to governance issues or governance malpractices. Other factors can be the rise of a clan or ethnic nationalism whereby ethnic groups organize along clan basis for pride or for assurance of clan's security. Thus, in the analysis of intra-ethnic conflicts, one can note that conflict is a result of interconnected multicausal factors. The use of systems thinking theory in the study on which this article is based it was deemed useful in identifying the interconnected causal factors for the persistence of intra-ethnic conflicts among Kuria clans, such as historical manifestations, identity creation, insecurity of clans and motivating factors for community mobilization along ethnic lines or along the basis of clans.

Materials and Methods

Description of the Study Area

Tarime district is located in the North Eastern part of Tanzania forming one of the six districts of Mara region. The other districts are; Bunda, Musoma Urban, Butiama, Rorya, and Serengeti. The district is situated in the North-East of Tanzania and lies between latitudes 1°00' - 1°45' South and longitudes 33°30' - 35° 00' East, with a total area of 1,636.9 km². The district is boarded by Kenya (Trans-Mara and Kurya District) to the North, Serengeti district to the East, Rorya district to the west and Musoma district to the south (TDC, 2015). The study focused on Inchugu division in which three (3) wards (Mwema, Susuni, and Regicheri (formerly Nyamalaga) were selected. The choice of this division, wards and four (4) villages (Kubiterere, Korotambe, Ng'ereng'ere, and Nyamhunda) was determined by the fact that these areas in Tarime district have witnessed numerous conflicts since the 1960s among clans belonging to the Kuria ethnic group, which have caused death, mistrust as well as loss of properties.

Data Collection and Analysis

The study was ethnographic in nature and thus, qualitative methods were used to collect data. Thus, data collection methods or tools used in this study included: in-depth-interviews focus group discussion (FGD), documentary reviews and observations. Furthermore, reflexive field notes, tape recording, and some photographs were concurrently taken as other important data sources. The researcher recorded and noted reflexively what he heard, saw, experienced and thought was worth noting during the data collection process as encouraged in ethnographic and qualitative studies (Groenewald, 2004). For the accomplishment of this study, purposive sampling and more specifically snowball sampling was used to identify key informants. The goal of using purposive sampling was to select individuals or informants who were likely to be information-rich or who have special knowledge or perspectives that make them especially important in obtaining the emic perspective according to the purpose of the study (Coolican, 2004; Gall, *et al.*, 2005 & Patton, 1990). On the other hand, snowball sampling was used to identify community members knowledgeable on a particular issue under investigation whereby under the assistant of the key informants interviewed, they kept on revealing other people considered to have rich information on the subject matter under investigation till the point of saturation.

Data from interviews, focus group discussion, documentary analysis and observation were summarized and subjected to content analysis to extract

important information that formed main themes and sub-themes. Content analysis is concerned with working with data from written, visual or heard information for the purpose of identifying and summarizing specific information based on the themes and objectives of the study (Began and Bilked, 2003 & Creswell, 2008). Data from the field were thematically categorized and matched with research objectives and their respective research questions which formed the main themes and sub-themes. Validity was attained through use of tool triangulation, the use of rich and thick verbatim descriptions of participants' accounts to support findings as well as the use of back translation. The reliability of data was attained through making logical inferences from data and being precise in describing phenomena.

Findings and Discussion

Tales on the Origin of Kuria Inherited from One Generation to Another

The study found that traditionally there has been an elaborate history of Kuria ethnic group which was transmitted from one generation to another for a long time. Historical evidence relating to the origin of the Kuria people suggests that they are not the original inhabitants of their present-day territory (Sutton, 1968; Chacha, 1963 and Cory, 1945). Findings from various interviews show that there are old tales and several stories inherited from one generation to another which try to explain the origin of Kuria and their migration routes from Egypt. Such migration is associated with the culture of violence as exemplified below:

We are from the Wakira clan; in our history we have been also told by our grandfathers on different occasions that our history is inseparable from fighting. We have been migrating from one place to another due to fights (war) with other clans or other ethnic groups that we came across or that we came into contact with in search for land and pasture. For example, in these areas which are traditionally inhabited by Wakira (Abhakhira) in the present day, (the Sirari hills), these are the "conquered land". Our ancestors, when they arrived here they fought and defeated the Maasai who left for the Masai-Mara, Serengeti and Ngorongoro and a Kuria clan known as Wasweta, who left for Serengeti and Nyamongo [Interview, 25th August 2016 at Ng'ereng'ere].

The study findings show that the history of the Kuria ethnic group describes the Kuria as migrants who moved from one place to another in search for the establishment of territories, enough farming land, and pasture. Hence, in the course of migration, they have been experiencing fighting with original inhabitants of various localities. This phenomenon has been narrated by an informant who said:

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In the pre-colonial period, social relations among clans were dominated by the war of conquest and occupation. Each clan was an enemy of another clan as they were frequently at war, each clan seeking to evict another from the land it occupied in order to expand its territory. Such were the conflicts that occurred between the Wakira and Wasweta. Wasweta were forced out of the area they were inhabiting around Sirari hills and went to establish their settlement at a place now called Gamasara. Wakira also fought and evicted Wanyamongo who went to live at what is now known as Nyamongo village [Interview, 10th October 2016 at Ng'ereng'ere].

The findings of the study have also shown that youths in the Kuria communities were receiving information about their historical origin, historical factors behind the conflicts, stories about their rival clans and attitudes towards rival clans and how they should treat the rival clans. Youth used to receive information through storytelling that their ancestors were migrants and conquerors of land for territorial establishment and land for pasture and agriculture. This type of narration transmitted from one generation to another especially among youth helped to indoctrinate youth with feelings of being descendants from ancestors who were warriors and thus the creation of a brave attitude among youth. This phenomenon can partly help to explain the violent nature of Kuria communities and thus the culture of violence and aggressiveness among Kuria can be explained as a cultural inherited phenomenon.

Social–Cultural and Historical Dynamics of Kuria

Generally, culture may be defined as socially inherited, shared, and learned ways of living possessed by persons by virtue of their membership in social groups (Avruch, 1998:4). The findings from focus groups discussions and interviews have proved that the Kuria's clans had their traditional and cultural practices which have been inherited and transmitted from one generation to another with the aim of maintaining individual or group identity, solidarity, and history. Although these cultural practices are considered by the Kuria ethnic group as an important landmark for their cultural identity, analysis of evidence from interviewees shows that they have partly been associated with the occurrences of intra-ethnic conflicts in the following ways.

Oral traditions about clan's enmities and segregation: Research findings showed that although the Kuria ethnic group has been subdivided into clans, but the truth from history will remain that clans within this ethnic group speak the same language (*Kikuria*); and share similar cultural practices like traditional dances (*ritungu* dances) and they all practice circumcision (*ichisaro*) for both

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male and female but they have different tales or oral traditions describing their history, identity and a sense of belonging to a clan. The following tales describes the traditional enmities between Waanchari versus Warenchoka:

Tale 1: Hostilities between between Waanchari versus Warenchoka clans

We had stories from our grandfathers which have been passed over from one generation to another over a long period of time that conflicts between Waanchari and Warenchoka began a very long time ago. Stories from these clans show that once upon a time Warenchoka and Waanchari were all living in some parts of Kenya in a hilly area called Renchoka about more than 150 or 200 years ago. One day two boys one from Warenchoka and another from Waanchari went to graze their cattle in a salty swamp called Kitingiti. Kitingiti is in Kenya. Each boy was struggling to be the first to let his animal drink water in the pond. In the cause of this struggle, the Mrenchoka boy killed a bull belonging to Munchari boy by using his traditional spear. As a result, the boy from Warenchoka was killed by a boy from Waanchari. Consequently, there was an outbreak of war against Waanchari trying to avenge their boy. This war lasted for a number of days and many people lost their lives. The war was later on resolved but the Waanchari decided to leave and establish their settlement at Susuni hills which are now part of Tanzania at present-day Nyabirongo village in Susuni Ward (Inchugu division)” (Interview, 16th September 2016 at Kubiterere)

Source: Field Data (2016).

Tale II: Kuria Tales

Some years before the creation of the Tanganyika and Kenya border, a certain group of Warenchoka who lived in Renchoka hill in Kenya decided to shift from Kenya to Tanganyika and established their settlement in Tanganyika at a place which is currently known as Nyamhunda and Kubiterere village. As the population of Warenchoka (who were considered to be immigrants) increased, they decided to invade their traditional enemies (Waanchari) who had already established themselves at Susuni hills, to chase them and extend their territorial boundaries. We are told that in this war a lot of Warenchoka died in the water of Nyambacha River swamp (near Sirari) and Waanchari won the war (Interview, 16th, September at Kubiterere).

Source: Field Data (2016).

The study also found stories concerning segregations among clans as narrated in the Tale below:

Tale III: The Story of Wambura

I remember one story that I have heard some years ago from my elders. One girl belonging to the Wakira clan got married to a Mnyabasi boy, and they lived in the village inhabited by Wanyabasi. As time went on, they managed to have a boy child who was named Wambura (born during the rainy season). However, the husband died when the boy child was still at the very young age. The woman was thus widowed. As a result of the life hardships faced the widow, she decided to go back with her young child to her family of birth around Sirari town (her home village) inhabited by the Wakira. The boy child was raised in these families of the Wakira where his mother belongs till the time, he became a mature person. For a quite long Wambura identified himself as a boy belonging to Wakira and he was Mkira for his understanding as he went through circumcision (Saro) with his age mates belonging to Wakira. He went to school with his friends belonging to Wakira clan.

One day a herd of cattle was stolen from the village and youths were called upon through an alert popularly known as “yowe” from community members. As usual from our Kuria traditions, youth were assigned to make follow-ups to trace those cattle, rescue them and bring them back. Wambura was among those youth and began their assignment and left to nearby villages inhabited by Wanyabasi with their traditional weapons. However, after a certain distance as they left their home village, youths stopped and one among them raised the question, “Are we all one or there is one who is not among us? Are we all Wakira? In the course of this discussion, one boy in the group shouted!!..... Wambura!! Wambura is not among us! Wambura is Mnyabasi! As a result, a group leader ordered Wambura to stop being part of the assignment and go back to the village immediately before they could harm him living the assignment to be done by youth belonging to Wakira. Wambura was puzzled because he used to know that he belonged to Wakira but this was contrary to reality (Interview, 08th September 2016, Ng’ereng’ere).

Source: Field Data (2016).

A follow up of the narration concerning Wambura as to why he was segregated was revealed by one of the elderly informants who observed that in most cases when youths make a follow up in rescuing herds of cattle or when they go into war, they are supplied with traditional medicine by traditional leaders and before they leave, they praise their traditional Gods to assist them in their mission. Thus, it was difficult for these youths from Wakira to be accompanied by a person who is not Mkira and who cannot be accepted by their gods. The Kuria spiritually believes that their gods give them medicine, protect them from evils and courage to defeat rivals. This was substantiated by an elderly informant during an interview who said:

When you are going to the war or to accomplish the mission of rescuing stolen cattle, it is prohibited to be accompanied by a person who is not in your clan. The reason here is that you have different Gods or spiritual beliefs. Being accompanied by a person who is not your clansman can cause a curse to the whole group and you can end up dying on the battlefield. Therefore, it is prohibited and that is what our youth did in the story of Wambura (Informant, 15th September 2016 at Ng’ereng’ere).

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The study has also found the existence of a lot of segregation and mistrust among Kuria clans to the extent that it becomes difficult for a person of a different clan to settle, be accepted and be trusted by another clan. Substantiating this narration, one informant argued:

In our clan, it is very difficult for a person from another Kuria clan to come and establish a settlement in our area which is an area of another clan. If it happens that he has been accepted to establish his settlement and family, and even if her daughters and boys have got married to the clan members of his new settlement, it will reach a time when the host clan will begin to ask themselves.....what is the origin of these people (the guest), from which clan do they belong? Are we from the same clan or different.....? You know in our village we live with people who belong to the same clan. And in most cases, we don't trust people belonging to a different clan. I don't even understand if in our country (Tanzania) we have an ethnic group which has behaviour like what we are practising. I think it is only in Tarime district and especially we Kuria who have this segregation behaviour..... For sure people from other regions in Tanzania would definitely perceive us (Kuria) as culprits and uncivilised people (Interview, 20th October 2016 at Kiongera).

Strong Upholding of Clan's Identity and Clan Solidarity: A clan's collective identity, sometimes referred to as ethnicity, is generally understood as a sense of common identity derived from sharing a language and culture and having ties with a certain area (Iddy, 2007). It was found that despite various changes which have taken place in Tanzania since the establishment of colonialism to the post-independence era, Kuria ethnic group has managed to maintain its identity. The Kuria ethnic group identifies itself through the use of clan totems (totemic symbols), age group or circumcision groups (ichisaro) and the village they come from. Identification of the Kuria ethnic group on the basis of clans, place of origin, and Isaro is a normal phenomenon which has been culturally entrenched in their traditions. The study has confirmed that the mere mention of a place of origin to which one belongs in the land of the Kuria enables them to know each other about their clans. Narrating on the significance of this tradition one informant argued:

In our greetings whenever we meet as Kuria and when we are meeting for the first time and when we have the interest to know each other in details, we have a component which requires to identify each other on the aspects of given traditional names and a place of origin especially the village that one originates from. This is very important for us especially for the creation of intimate friendship or for security purposes because you can end up sitting with a person who is your traditional enemy. Basically,

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these greetings are aimed for us to know each other if we are the same or different. For example, if we share the same age group (Isaro), this can be a sense of friendship and especially if we are coming from the same clan. You know it is a taboo and strictly prohibited to marry a daughter of a colleague whom you went through the same circumcision rituals (Saro). That is why there is a need to know each other (Interview, 10th October 2016 at Kubiterere).

To the Kuria, a clan is, according to Corry (1947), Ruel (1958), Chacha (1963), and Rwezaura (1982), the largest single social organization which unites the majority of the families of Kuria people, and thus, each clan is a separate unit in a number of respects, as it conducts its own circumcision ceremonies, has its own territorial boundaries, and shares a common totem and spiritually they have different gods. A totem is an object, species of animal or plant or a natural phenomenon used as a symbol or emblem of a clan often having ritual associations (The American Heritage, 2005). According to Freud (1961), a totem is important in binding a community together as one people – a clan, and even bigger units such as a sub-tribe. A totem is important in that it explains in a mythical way the origins of the people observing it.

As Kuria were organized into clans made up of people of related families, they used totems to distinguish between the various clans and sub-tribes of the Kuria (Adada, 2016). According to Adada (2016), all of Kuria totems are wild animals including the Leopard, Zebra, Elephant, Baboon, Hippopotamus, and Hyena. In Abakuria society a totem embraces not only one clan but a whole sub-tribe, or in other cases two or more sub-tribes together. All clans within that sub-tribe automatically belong to that totem. The totems helped to cement all the hitherto heterogeneous sections of Kuria communities into a unified group (Adada, 2016). The significance of a totem among Kuria clans as a symbol of solidarity was well articulated by one informant during an interview at Ng'ereng'ere village who had this to say:

We from Wakira clan have our own totem which is an elephant. As Wakira, we are very strong as an elephant. We respect elephants and we are not allowed to eat the elephant's meat. It is strictly prohibited. When one eats elephant's meat he/ she will definitely face trouble or sickness which will lead to death. It is a taboo that we do not eat elephant's meat. The elephant is a symbol of our superiority and patriotism for our clan. When it comes to fighting with other clans, we unite as one and become very brave and we cannot accept to be defeated by any clan. During fights, we call elephants spiritually and elephants energize us giving us

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power and strength to fight with anybody (Interview, 16th August 2016 at Ng'ereng'ere).

Findings from the study also suggest that given the nature of solidarity which has been created, it is a normal phenomenon for a person involved in a conflict with a person from another clan to invite assistance from fellow clan members where he or she belongs. In most cases, this happens when two individuals from different clans have been aggrieved due to farm's boundary disputes, cattle theft or any other misunderstanding. The aggrieved persons would shout (*yowe*) to invite assistance from other clan members.

When this phenomenon happens each side of a clan would gather and lead an invasion towards a village where the suspect belongs, and this becomes a source of clans to enter into open fights as it was unanimously reported during the focus group discussion:

*Our clan identity and solidarity sometimes are a source of fighting between our clans. In most cases, our fights between clans start as a conflict between two individuals from different clans competing for farm boundaries or one individual suspecting that another individual has stolen his cattle or one grazing his cattle to the farm belonging to a member of another clan resulting into crop destruction. If these people cannot resolve their misunderstanding, then they will begin to fight and later shout (*yowe*) seeking assistance from their clan members by describing that they have been invaded by Waanchari, or Warechoka or Wakira. Thus, youth from those clans without scrutinizing as to what really caused the incidence, they will start mobilizing themselves to assist their clan member and ultimately becomes a source of conflicts and fighting between clans* (Anonymous Focus Group Discussion, 12th September 2016 at Kubiterere).

The existence of clan solidarity was further substantiated during an interview by an informant, who asserted:

If someone did wrong to our clan or if our cattle have been stolen by anybody, we always used to assemble and when a whistle is blown and our totem elephant is mentioned, we become very furious, highly committed, united as one, angry and strong to the extent that we can tear into pieces anybody who would have done wrong to our clan or to a member of our clan (Interview on 16th August 2016 at Korotambe).

Rites of Passage: Circumcision Rites among Kuria: The study found that circumcision is a central institution in the lives of the Kuria ethnic group and it is highly embraced. As a rite of passage, it constitutes the transition from

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childhood to adulthood, marking the changed status of an individual and his or her family, with the concomitant changes in roles, responsibilities, control, and power. The Kuria practices circumcision for both males and females. Normally, the Kuria circumcises their children at the age of 20-30 years. In the contemporary times, children are circumcised at the age of 15-20 years and even below the age of 15 and the interval from one age group to another range from 3 to 5 years (Iddy, 2007). All youths who are circumcised in one season form one age group (Isaro). Each age group (ichisaro-plural) is assigned its own name based on a certain event at a local, national or International level as one anonymous informer narrates during an interview:

Every circumcised group of youth (Isaro) is assigned its own distinctive name which serves as an identity that one has gone through this important ritual. Those who were circumcised during the 1940s when the United States of America bombed Japan with atomic bomb were named "Abamerika" meaning 'America'. Likewise, those who went through circumcision during German rule when the modern education system was introduced in Tanganyika when people were taught writing and reading skills were named Abakaramu-(meaning those who used a pen to write (Interview, 20th August 2016 at Korotambe).

Initiation ceremonies among youths create a culture of braveness or a quality of spirit that enables one to face danger or pain without showing fear. Findings from an observation made in the area where circumcisions were conducted as well as evidence from narration during study fieldwork interviews indicated that youths are circumcised without any kind of medication which reduces pains (anesthesia). Initiates are usually circumcised before sunrise, they stand in a queue while naked and thus a male circumciser with a knife or blade attends the youths by cutting the fore part of the penis. In order not to be a disgrace to their families, they are expected to act stoically and tolerate the pain of this anesthesia-free procedure without flinching, crying or dirtying the traditional circumciser. Youths being circumcised are required to tolerate pains without crying until the end of the whole process. Narrating on the significance of this tradition, the informant said:

Circumcision among youths is our tradition. The person undergoing circumcision is accompanied in running across the villages, and at the end of process he must be strong and he is not expected to make noise (scream) during circumcision, as otherwise, the family will be too embarrassed. It is of great importance for the candidate to "quietly" stand strong during the circumcision to show that he is capable and ready to become a man. This enables youth to be very brave and without fear of any challenge, and that is why a youth from Kuria is not afraid of

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anything. Since youth from Kuria has been accustomed to experiencing pain and blood from his body during circumcision; it is no wonder that they are not afraid of seeing the blood of any human being. That is why when Kuria men tell you that..... I am going to cut you "Mura" with a knife he really means it and within no time he can cause injuries or harm to you (Interview, 17th October 2016 at Kubiterere).

It was also found that when misfortunes happened and one circumcised warrior died, then it was considered a bad omen and the dead body is not buried in the clan's land rather it is taken during the night and thrown over to the land of a rival clan. This phenomenon sometimes acts as a source of conflict between clans. Narrating on the existence of this tradition one informant argued:

It is a bad luck and a bad omen for circumcised youths to die during initiation rituals. It is considered to be misfortune because the whole process of initiation rituals had blessings from ancestors. Normally traditional leaders through dreamers receive blessings from ancestors before initiation. They are also told what medication should be used to protect warriors. When a misfortune happens, such as when a boy dies during an initiation ritual, such a boy is not buried on the clan land, rather, he must be thrown over to nearby land belonging to another clan. However, sometimes this has been a source of misunderstanding between clans especially when the rival clans realise the source of the dead body (Interview, 05th August 2016 at Kiongera).

Circumcision rituals are not a new practice in Tanzania. Pastoral communities like the Maasai had the same practice. What differs for the case of the Kuria is that youth are oriented towards the identification of their enemies, and how they can protect their territories against enemies (neighbouring clans). Learning from the finding of the study, circumcision among youths in Kuria communities instill a culture of violence, and that is why it is a normal phenomenon to see people who have been injured with knives even in very small antagonisms or misunderstandings among youths. Initiation ceremonies or ritual practices are among those traditional practices which inculcated a culture of violence. Findings from the study showed that, according to local traditions, youths among Kuria's are raised to be warriors from their very young age. Youths during circumcision, are taught to be self-reliant; they are directed to take care of family properties and safeguarding clan's properties (land), as well as clan's territorial boundaries.

Findings show that traditional leaders and healers also play a significant role in the whole process of initiation rituals. It was found that dreamers prepare

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medicine before circumcision aimed at protecting their youths against misfortune or calamities which they may encounter caused by witchcraft from other clans. It was also found that, in the preparation of initiation rituals, traditional healers and dreamers must inform traditional leaders in advance where and when circumcision should be conducted and what type of traditional medicine should be applied to protect their youths (warriors) from dangers of being affected by witchcraft from rival clans as one informant narrated during the study fieldwork interview:

In Kuria communities, each clan organizes their own circumcision for their youths. These youths are protected from the harm of other clans by applying for different traditional medicine. Also, during circumcision, members from other clans are not allowed to come and watch our youth. This is due to the fact that, sometimes other clans use witchcraft to frighten our youth and sometimes the witchcraft can lead to excessive bleeding from the wound for the circumcised youth and ultimately death. Apart from causing harm, witchcraft from other clans can also make our youth fearful and cowards during their assignment of protecting our clans (Interview, 9th October 2016 at Kiongera).

Traditionally Kuria communities in their lifetime have been living in perceiving the existence of threat from rival clans and other unforeseeable threats like cattle rustlers and land invaders. As a result, youths were used to receiving orientation at their tender age encouraging them to view themselves as men and how they were not supposed to behave as women. Men must be brave and ready to fight. Given this situation, any attempt to make jokes with Kuria youths amounting to telling a Kuria young man to a woman will always end up in an open fight. Youths were oriented towards the identification of their enemies and safeguarding of resources belonging to their clans during circumcision rituals.

Being protected from the harm of witchcraft attacks from other clans is a kind of orientation that makes Kuria people to always think of the existence enmities with other clans which threaten their own clans' wellbeing. This kind of indoctrination inculcated among youth creates a sense of fear of attacks from other clans and mistrust among communities and thus encouraging them to always seek to be prepared to defend their clan's interest. This situation implies that any government intervention to manage conflicts among Kuria communities must take into consideration the existence of such a powerful security system consciousness among Kuria communities which has been entrenched in the social fabric and inherited from one generation to another.

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Cattle Ownership as a Symbol of Wealth and Bride Price: Culturally (traditionally) and historically, cattle's rustling was considered to be a means of accumulating wealth and thus possession of many herds of cattle is used as a symbol of wealth and status quo. In this theft, the warrior – youths (*abamura*) organised themselves and were blessed by the elders before they left for cattle raiding outside their country (Iddy, 2007). Cattle were used for payment of bride price. This was a period when communities did not consider cattle rustling as a crime. It was rather taken as a symbol of community strength and heroism. In most cases, youths were the ones involved in the process of smuggling cattle from other clans. Those who went to smuggle cattle were considered as heroes and received community protection. Those who made a follow-up to restore the stolen cattle in most cases faced resistances from members of the clan who protected the cattle rustlers. Traditional leaders also offered protection to these heroes (cattle rustlers). This phenomenon was better explained by the informant during an interview when arguing:

In the past, many conflicts and fighting among clans were facilitated by cattle rustling, which were used as a primary source of wealth accumulation among community members within Kuria's clans. Cattle rustlers were protected by members of the clan. It was prohibited for any community member to reveal or identify anyone who participated in cattle rustling. Sometimes traditional leaders or traditional healers provided traditional medicine based on the magic craft to conceal those who participated in cattle rustling. Rustlers were considered as community heroes and not criminals at all. Therefore, community members in which cattle rustlers belong were not ready to cooperate with members from other clans who lost their cattle. This attitude of lack of cooperation and resistance in favour of cattle rustlers for many years has been a cause of conflicts between clans especially Wakira versus Waanchari and Waanchari versus Warechoka. However, this situation is no longer a big problem due to various interventions taken by the Government and traditional leaders (Interview, 20th, October 2016 at Ng'ereng'ere).

Traditional Dance (Ritungu and Ikhuibaka): Kuria traditional dance (*ritungu*) was also pointed out as one among the cultural practices which inculcates hostilities, mistrust, and enmity among clans. This type of traditional dance has been practised in the Kuria communities for a very long time. Ritungu dance is mostly used during weddings, harvesting seasons and mostly during the circumcision ceremonies. Traditional dancing among Kuria has been used for years to transmit the history of the clan from one generation to another and inculcating a sense of belongingness to a certain clan. It is normally performed in the public arena and it is a normal phenomenon for dancers to hold traditional

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weapons while dancing, such as sticks, knives, and a panga. The study found that dancing while holding traditional weapons is a sign of heroism symbolising that the youth are ready to cooperate in doing different work, ready to encounter any challenges and thus ready to defend their clan's land and properties.

During ritungu performance, it is a normal phenomenon for DJs to invite any dancer to recite or perform an "art of pride" or "individual praises" also known as in Kuria as "*Ikhuibhaka*". Sometimes during this artistic performance while other people who attend the dance are listening to him, the praise-singer can explain about his family achievements, give similar narrations about friends, about his physical strength and, sometimes about his participation in criminal acts such as fighting with people from other clans, participation in rescuing cattle and involvement in cattle raids and killing rustlers. When this performance is going on those who are attending the dance shout to congratulate him and sometimes give him various prizes. Sometimes this artistic performance can be a source of conflicts especially when the praise-singer provides some information about his involvement in criminal activities and when it happens that the victims are present at the dance. When narrating the danger of this artistic performance, one anonymous informant argued:

Kuibhaka is a good practice in Ritungu dancing and we really enjoy to see a person praising himself and his achievements. If you are a good praise-singer you will also receive many gifts, and you will be famous to the whole village, but it is also a place where people could learn how other people have been successful in life and thus acting as an inspiration to youth. The negative side of this practice is that sometimes the praise-singers are over-excited to the extent of revealing their acts of involvement in criminal acts. This can be alright if those who happen to be attending the dance are from one clan, but if the attendees include members of another clan, this can create a sense of mistrust and sometimes trigger revenge relating to what would have just been disclosed by the praise-singer against his criminal act towards another rival clan (Interview, 10th, September 2016 at Ng'ereng'ere).

Findings from the study have shown that despite the significance of Ritungu dances in the entertainment industry and in the transmission of cultural values from one generation to another, sometimes they bring about unintended negative effects to Kuria communities. Likewise, participation in the Ritungu dance while holding traditional war weapons is the indication that members of the Kuria ethnic group have martial or militant characteristics. Kuria traditional militant behavior and feeling of being ready to fight with enemies is what had been used by the British colonial rulers in East Africa to label the Kuria as one among the

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most martial tribe and which paved the way for approximately 25% of military recruitment into the then colonial British Army (Kings Africa Rifles (KAR)) in 1959 (Parsons, 2003 and Iddy, 2007) being drawn from the Kuria. Hence, intra-ethnic conflicts among Kuria clans can, therefore, be associated with the martial behaviour enshrined in their cultural orientations. There is a need for grassroots government's officers' in-charge of cultural affairs in Tarime district council to register Ritungu traditional dancing groups and provide them with special training on how traditional dancing groups can be used to sustain peace instead of being a catalyst for instigating conflicts.

Conclusion

Throughout this paper, it has been learned that Kuria communities still adhere strongly to their traditional values and belief systems. Their attachments to traditional values and belief systems emanate from their strong ties or attachment with clan ethos and thus Kuria clans have different traditional belief systems (ancestral beliefs) and these contribute to the widening of social distances between them. Likewise, it is clear that informal education transmitted from one generation to another through oral traditions and through initiation rituals among Kuria have resulted into militant behaviour among youth, a sense of hatred and mistrust among communities. This phenomenon implies that initiatives to reduce social distance between clans and ultimately managing and resolving conflicts between Kuria communities must be multi-dimensional in nature ranging from changing the communities' belief systems as well as political and traditional interventions. On the other hand, the peacemaking process among Kuria communities must take into consideration the militant behaviour of the community members and thus diplomatic initiatives can be more appropriate than coercive approaches.

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The Myth of Local Content in Uganda's Oil Sector: An Eclipse of Economic Liberalism?

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Abstract

This paper interrogates local content with specific reference to the oil and gas sector in Uganda. Three theoretical perspectives are reviewed – the local-content-as-national-content theory; local-content-as-good-corporate-governance; and local content as 'smart' industrial policy. It is this third perspective that guides our scrutiny of the local content credentials of Uganda's oil policies and laws. To what degree is Uganda's local content rhetoric reflected in the difficult but necessary task of *skilling* the nation (that is, the 'citizens'); empowering local businesses, and, in short, creating a virtuous cycle of local ownership, job creation and inclusive development? The methodology adopted herein includes critical desktop reviews; scrutiny of the oil policies and laws; and key informant interviews. The emerging conclusion is that the demand for measurable local content dividends – defined in terms of job creation for nationals; use of national suppliers; utilization of local inputs; and, in short, the inclusion of nationals in the upstream, midstream and downstream of the petroleum value chain – is undoubtedly real. The supply, however, we contend, is disappointingly poor, leading to what we term the myth of local content. This is largely, but by no means *exclusively*, attributed to the eclipse of economic liberalism.

Key words: local content, oil and gas, economic liberalism, Uganda

Introduction

The last few decades have witnessed the death and resurrection of local content as a guide to economic governance, industrial promotion, and job creation in Africa. The death phase is associated with the proverbial *laissez-faire* policies of economic liberalism, which populated, or even monopolized, Africa's development policy space in the 1980s and 1990s (Mensah, 2006; Kiiza, 2006; 2016). At a dogmatic level, economic liberalism called for blind faith being placed in what was persuasively argued to be the allocative efficiency of the market, unfettered by state 'interference'. The claim was that government has no business in business, and that state interference in the economy invariably creates disincentives for market-based entrepreneurs to make 'prudent'

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vestment decisions, coordinate investments, or even promote wealth creation (IMF Mission, 2015).

Empirical research on the development dividends of neoliberal policies presents a mixed picture (Carter and Barrett, 2012). Some liberalizing economies (such as Uganda and Mozambique) have registered rapid, and often sustained, growth rates of over 6 percent (Museveni, 2016). This has fueled the powerful but erroneous *Africa-is-Rising* hypothesis (The Economist, 2013; Olamosu and Wynne, 2015).

This claim is erroneous considering the concrete economic and political conditions prevailing in Africa countries that have registered impressive economic growth rates. Overall, it is acknowledged that Africa's fastest growing economies - a significant total of twenty in 2015 – are undoubtedly important (in the light of Africa's negative growth rates of the pre-liberalization era of the 1970s). However, the 'super-performers' are predominantly primary commodity producers, not industrial manufacturers. Virtually all of them practice extractive economic activities (such as mining). Top on the league of Africa's 20 'spectacular-performers' are oil exporters (such as Angola) or rain-fed (not irrigated) agricultural economies (such as Rwanda or Uganda). The oil exporters and the agrarian economies are united by one common denominator. All are literally stuck in the proverbial Garden of Eden (Kiiza, 2006). To make matters worse, some neo-liberal economies (such as post-Apartheid South Africa) have had unimpressive growth rates, pointing to the un-kept 'growth-propelling' promises of economic liberalism.

The outcome of the foregoing has been twofold. First, is the discomfort with the quality of market-led growth, characterized, as it has been, by rapid but non-transformative change, jobless growth, and high-income inequality (signifying a high degree of social exclusion). Second, there are rising if suppressed demands for alternative approaches to wealth creation and industrial development. It is in this context that the resurrection of local content policies, which suffered systemic death in the heydays of economic liberalism, makes sense.

Theoretical Significance of Local Content Debates

Today's discourse on local content is important from three major theoretical perspectives. The first is the local-content-as-national-content theory. This theoretical viewpoint is credited for resurrecting debates over the *national* interest in today's globalization discourse. Rooted in Friedrich List's (1841/1885) *The National System of Political Economy* and Hamilton's (1791)

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On the Subject of Manufactures, the national interest had suffered death in the era of neoliberal globalization (Kiiza, 2008). Today's nationalistic local content debates make one fundamental claim, namely, that oil-led development is good if, and only if, citizens of the host country play an integral part in the upstream, midstream and down-stream phases of the petroleum value-chains. From a local content perspective, the pro-citizen argument is a matter of urgency where the value-chains are controlled by *foreign* oil companies.

The re-invention of the citizenry (long trivialized and forgotten under the austere policies of economic liberalism) is seen to be a key element of inclusive development. It is seen to be the panacea for extractive investment regimes that hardly integrate locals in their political economy calculus, save as suppliers of prostitution, manual labour and other low value-added goods and services in the value-chains.

The problem with the local-content-as-national-content perspective is that it conflates national content with *local content*. For example, Uganda's Oil and Gas Policy (Uganda Government, 2008) provides for 'national' content. However, it is devoid of *local* content provisions that affirmatively favor local citizens who ordinarily reside in the oil-rich lands of the Albertine Graben, that is, Uganda's western Rift Valley (where commercial quantities of oil have been discovered). This is an important omission precisely because it prioritizes the interests of politically-connected national elites over the *wananchi* (local citizens). This omission, it appears, is associated with the neoliberal hegemonic order which prioritizes the generic macro-political economy over the 'tedious' context-specific details (such as the inclusion or exclusion of locals in oil-led development). The neoliberal order also rejects as useless strategic state 'interference' in promoting pro-people (read 'equitable') investment decisions.

The second major theoretical perspective is the local-content-as-good-corporate-governance. Admittedly, the oil companies are in business to do business, not charity. They are driven by the logic of profit maximization and share-holder equity expansion, not almsgiving. However, today's development discourse suggests that companies must be seen to practice corporate social responsibility. This spring from the fashionable claim that oil companies (like other socially responsible businesses) can, and should be, responsible corporate citizens, defined as being proactively responsive to citizens' demands.

The local-content-as-good-corporate-governance viewpoint is nevertheless buttressed by a regime of contracts in the extractive industries. The contractual

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arrangements have evolved from concessions (associated with the era of direct colonialism) through the joint ventures of the last few decades to the contemporary production sharing agreements (PSAs). Today's oil PSAs are traceable to Indonesia's 1966 production sharing agreement (Bindemann, 1999). Like the concessions, today's PSAs are essentially contracting between the host state and (foreign) mining companies. However, a substantial difference exists. Where the concessionary agreements involved 'surrender' by the host government of its sovereign rights over mineral wealth, today's PSAs retain government as the sovereign owner.

Indeed, PSAs are different from other varieties of contracts in three distinctive ways. First, as Bindemann (1999) indicates, the foreign (oil) company carries the entire exploration risk. If no oil is found the company receives no compensation. Second, the companies signing PSAs invest their own capital, technology and managerial skills but as *contractors* of the host country (Bindemann, 1999). Third, and as already hinted, government does not renounce its sovereign right to continue owning the oil resource.

That is not all. The foreign company 'pays a royalty on gross production to the government' (Bindemann, 1999:1). Once the royalty is deducted, the oil company is entitled to a pre-negotiated share of the oil output of say 30 percent (for purposes of production cost recovery). The remainder of the output, popularly known as profit oil, is shared between government and the oil company at pre-determined percentages - for example, 75 percent for the government and 25 percent for the oil company. Depending on the taxation regime of the host country, the oil company is obliged to pay income tax on its share of profit oil (at the corporate tax rate of 30 percent in Uganda).

But that is not the point. The point at issue is that the contractual PSA dispensation pursues local content by getting the host government to retain sovereign ownership of the oil (on behalf of the citizenry), and by forging a taxation regime that obliges the oil companies to pay tax on their profits. Shrewd oil companies can still hire dubious lawyers and accountants to deny a host country tax revenue via tax avoidance – as the recently leaked Panama Papers show (ICIJ, 2016). The point, however, is that, PSAs create an institutional framework for a win/win outcome for foreign oil companies and the host government. The quality of bureaucrats who negotiate for the host country - whether they are nationalistic and meritocratic officials; laissez-faire-cum-neoliberal officials; or corruption-ridden cronies of the top political elites - becomes a key element of local content.

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The major third theoretical perspective views local content as 'smart' industrial policy. This view springs from the understanding that globalization has resulted in the changing but not ending significance of industrial policy (Kiiza, 2006; Chang, 2015). 'Smart' industrial policy is smart in two distinctive ways. First, 'smart' industrial policy emphasizes continuous innovation – or what Joseph Schumpeter (1942/1994) and other gurus of innovation call creative destruction (defined, in simple terms, as the reconfiguration of existing institutions, norms and values with a view to replacing them with new ones).

Second, smart industrial policy appreciates the significant changes triggered by globalization, resulting in what the political economy lexicon now calls the global knowledge economy. This signifies two things. High-tech (read innovative) manufacturing activities continue to be important in the current era of globalization. Second, competition has shifted from resource endowments (and low value-added industrial products) to knowledge-based activities. To the extent that this is true, then quality education and the skilling of the nation become central ingredients of local content policy.

It is this new thinking that guides our interpretation of the local content discourse in Uganda. To what degree is Uganda's local content rhetoric reflected in the difficult but necessary task of *skilling* the nation (that is, the 'citizens'); empowering local businesses, and, in short, creating a virtuous cycle of local ownership, job creation and inclusive development? Furthermore, as a corollary, to what extent has economic liberalism (the official ideology of Uganda's state elites) been replaced with economic nationalism, which is consistent with developmentalist local content theory?

To answer this two-pronged question, this paper examines the local content credentials of Uganda's oil policies and laws. Our central argument is simple but not simplistic. The demand for measurable local content dividends – defined in terms of job creation for nationals; use of national suppliers; utilization of local inputs; and, in short, the inclusion of nationals in the upstream, midstream and downstream of the petroleum value chain – is undoubtedly real. The supply, we contend, is disappointingly poor. Rather than meeting the popular demands for local content, Uganda's state elites have adopted the language of local content even as they operationalize the norms of free-market capitalism. Rather than tooling and retooling the country's businesses, the elites have designed a *Skilling Uganda* program which remains unimplemented. Rather than operationalizing economic nationalism, Uganda has institutionalized economic liberalism as the official ideology of the ruling

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elites. Thus, what is gaining traction is the myth of local content, not economic nationalism, thanks to the eclipse of economic liberalism.

Information for this paper was collected via critical desktop review of published literature on local content and the dominant neoliberal ideology in contemporary Uganda. We then carried out content analysis by subjecting to scrutiny the relevant petroleum sector policies, laws and regulations. Elite interviews were also conducted with members of parliament (on the natural resources committee), and the technocrats of the Petroleum Unit in the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development. Additionally, interviews were carried out with the local government officials in Hoima District (near the Albertine Graben where oil has been discovered); as well as selected officials of Bunyoro-Kitara Kingdom (which historically and culturally has a claim over the oil-rich lands in the Albertine Grabeng).

Organization of the Paper

What follows this section of the paper, Section 2, briefly conceptualizes and contextualizes today's local content policies. Section 3 outlines the global context of local content policies, with particular reference to Norway (today's world-class epitome of local content implementation). The rationale for referring to Norway is simple. Norway is among a very small numbers of countries that are endowed with rich oil natural resources for which the possession of the natural resources endowment has not turned out to be a curse and which has achieved impressive local content dividends in the oil production sector. Neither Uganda nor any other developing country can credibly aspire for Norway-like local content dividends without attempting to learn Norway's lessons of good practice. Section 4 highlights the African context of local content with reference to oil-rich Angola. The object here is to outline what could go wrong with local content, and what should, ipso facto, be avoided by local content aspirants such as Uganda. Section 5 presents the climax of the paper - local content in neoliberal Uganda (with an eye on the legislative regime of the petroleum sector). Section 6 is a critique of Uganda's local content claims. Finally, Section 7 summarizes Uganda's spurious or even mythical claim to local content readiness, before drawing the relevant policy implications.

Conceptualizing Local Content

The term local content refers to a wide range of nationalistic policies and programs that are designed to upscale the participation of citizens or nationals in the domestic economy (Ovadia, 2013:5). The object of local content policies

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is to deliver inclusive growth via the active, not passive, participation of citizens in the wealth-creation process. The aim is to ensure that the growth and development dividends accruing from natural resource development are shared by a broad spectrum of citizens. Shared growth (Campos and Root, 1996) is seen as an antidote to the Nigeria-like conflicts over natural resources. Local content is also seen as a strategy for immunizing the national economy against the natural resource curse characterized by the exclusion of the *wananchi* (Swahili word for 'ordinary citizens') from oil-led development.

It follows, therefore, that 'citizen participation' and 'local content' are two sides of the same coin; the *coin* in this case being the political economy. Citizen participation conventionally operates at the level of the polity; local content, at the level of the economy. One concept is a norm of political democracy; the other, of *economic* democracy. Citizen participation seeks to create spaces for people's voices. The aim is to create a polity of the people, by the people and for the people. By contrast, local content seeks to establish local ownership of the national economy. The object is to deliver what is now termed shared or even *inclusive* growth (Campos and Root, 1996; Naqvi, 2012).

Inclusive growth, as Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue, flows from a synergy of economic and political institutions, which seek to distribute political *and* economic power broadly, democratically and equitably. Inclusive political and economic institutions beget widespread prosperity which, in turn, triggers a virtuous cycle of local ownership, durable socio-economic transformation, and other multiplier effects (such as conflict avoidance).

Contemporary debates on local content are characterized by one distinctive falsehood. That falsehood is the claim, stated explicitly or implicitly, that local content is 'new'. This is utterly erroneous. The term local content may be new. But what it refers to - the control of the economy by citizens rather than foreigners - is central to the age-old demands for import substitution industrialization and inclusive development. At the macro-political economy level, local content is a mere resuscitation of what Friedrich List (1841/1885), the German guru of late industrialization, termed the *national* political economy as opposed to the 'cosmo' (or global) political economy.

Two variants of local content exist – the maximalist and the minimalist. While the maximalist variant emphasizes indigenization; the minimalist version stands for mere domiciliation. Indigenization is inspired by the 'import substitution' philosophy; domiciliation, by the new acceptance of foreign investors as

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'partners' in national development. Indigenization prioritizes the use of the national labour force, using national goods and services, supplied by national companies (MoEMD, 2011:5). Domiciliation de-emphasizes national ownership and, instead, prioritizes value-added activities in the national economy – whether by local or foreign companies (Ovadia, 2013: 5). One variant of local content appears idealistic; the other, pragmatic.

In summary, local content in the oil and gas industry involves developing domestic industries whether they are directly involved in the petroleum industry (for example as oil refineries) or as auxiliary service providers (such as health and safety providers). Local content development involves promoting a skilled workforce, building developmental infrastructure (such as roads and railways), and creating a competitive supplier base. The aim is “to ensure that citizens participate as critical stakeholders, not spectators, in the upstream, mid-stream and/or down-stream phases of the petroleum value-chain” (Hoima District Interviews, May 2016). The ultimate goal is to deepen local ownership and citizen participation in the political economy.

Evidence suggests that local content policies have borrowed heavily from the policies of economic nationalism (Kiiza, 2008). According to Dan Rodrik (2001), the East Asian tigers used foreign market exposure backed by ‘unorthodox [or nationalistic] policies – export subsidies, domestic content requirements, import–export linkages, patent and copyrights infringements, restrictions on capital flows (including direct foreign investments), directed credit, and so on..’ (ibid: 28). The key question today is whether policies of economic nationalism (such as local content requirements) can still be used to strengthen the national economy. To answer this, we locate today's local content policies in the global context before zeroing down to the African/Ugandan context.

Global Context of Local Content

Overall Global Lessons

It is worth emphasizing that local content resurrects, albeit with renewed vigor, the age-old infant industry argument which was propounded by Alexander Hamilton (1791) and others after him (List, 1885; Chang, 2002; 2012). The central claim of the infant industry thesis is that the state must baby sit its embryonic industries into competitive adulthood. The aim is to transform an agrarian national economy (such as USA at the time of independence in 1776) into a vibrant industrial economy (such as 21st Century USA).

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In the early phases of industrialization, infant industry promotion involves preferential allocation of government contracts to domestic firms. It involves concessional lending to domestic industries - for example, at interest rates of 5 percent or less as opposed to Uganda's obscenely high commercial bank lending rates of over 25 percent. Infant industry promotion also involves judicious use of protective tariffs, subsidies, and training programs for the national labour force. Like the local content policies, infant industry policies seek to increase the participation of citizens in the national economy. The rationale is simple but not obvious. Foreign investors come and go; citizens stay – hence the importance of indigenization as opposed to mere domiciliation.

Local Content Policies in Norway

The local content story of Norway is a story of indigenization, not mere domiciliation. It is a story of effective institution-building, coupled with the use of exhaustible natural resources to build inexhaustible developmental capabilities. Norway, today's world-class prototype of local content policy development, initiated its local content policies in the wake of its oil discovery in the 1960s. By the 1970s, the country had already embarked on meticulous local content policy implementation. The three-pronged aim of Norway's local content policies was to protect national companies, empower local communities, and develop a distinctly Norwegian national economy (Oil & Gas iQ, 2012).

Accordingly, Norway preferentially awarded oil contracts to Norwegian bidders. However, Norwegian firms had to be competitive in terms of price, quality, and delivery time (Oil and Gas iQ, 2012). To its credit, government in Norway massively invested in education at all levels – basic, post-primary, technical and university. The aim was to deepen the level, quality and significance of Norwegian citizen participation in the petroleum industry (and other sectors of the economy).

But this was not all. Norway, forced foreign oil companies to forge partnerships with local companies. To deepen Norway's level of innovation, knowledge creation, and global competitiveness, the country forced international companies to invest in research and development (R&D) joint ventures with Norwegian companies. The oil companies and large engineering companies were incentivized by Norway's virtually corruption-free government, and were “more than eager to contribute throughout the 1970s and early 1980s when the build-up of domestic capacity took place...” (Oil and Gas iQ, 2012). This point

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is also emphasized the study by Nordas, Vatne and Heun (2003) on upstream petroleum industry and local industrial development.

Norway's ability to avoid the resource-curse is attributed, first, to the country's initial conditions' and the inclusive institutions – socially, politically and economically – that were put in place (Larsen, 2006). By the time the extraction of oil started in the early 1970s, Norway was not just a developed economy with per capita GDP of over US\$10,000 (PPP); it was (and continues to be) “a highly egalitarian society that prides itself on being that” (Larsen, 2006: 628). In other words, egalitarianism (signifying high levels of social inclusion and citizen participation) was socially embedded.

Second, Norway was a mature democracy with a deep-seated culture of accountability. Norwegian politicians hardly posed any risk of looting public resources. Nor was illegal rent-seeking entertained. This left open only the possibility of accessing resource-revenues through legal channels (such as lobbying Parliament for tax relief).

Third, Norway forged a tripartite social contract between capital, labour and state elites. This social contract, which is central to Scandinavian welfare capitalism, resulted in the institutionalization of equitable distribution of wealth as a societal norm. Norway's distributive justice was in turn made possible by the national norm known as de-commodification (Esping-Andersen, 1990), that is, “the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation” (Kiiza, 2006:271). This system enabled Norway to avoid huge income disparities, and violent conflicts over distribution. As Larsen (2006: 269) states: “The perception was that resource revenues were used to the benefit of all, in investments, technological advancement, and education.”

Fourth, Norway institutionalized the rule of law and developed a swift judicial system to detect, determine and deter theft of official resources. As a consequence, illegalities such as grabbing of collective wealth via corruption, theft or misreporting are rare. These initiatives enabled effective oil governance to gain traction in Norway.

Following the Norwegian example (and with support from the Norwegian Oil Development Initiative) countries such as Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, Timor-Leste, Nigeria, and Uganda have adopted variants of the Norwegian local content policies. Yet, Norway's success story is not really observable in

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most of these countries. This begs the question: Why? Why are some countries more able than others to develop *and* implement nationalistic local content and citizen participation policies? We answer this question with reference to local content policies in Nigeria, Angola and, later, Uganda.

African Context of Local Content: From Nigeria to Angola

The case of local content in Africa underscores the contention between normative standards and pragmatic approaches. For example, Nigeria officially accepts mere domiciliation in its petroleum policies. In practice, however, the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Local Content Development Act of 2010 firmly provides for substantial *Nigerian* content. Nigerian content is defined as “the quantum of composite value added to or created in the Nigerian economy by a systematic development of capacity and capabilities through deliberate utilization of Nigerian human, material resources and services in the Nigerian oil and gas industry” (quoted in KPMG, 2010:1).

In the same spirit of Nigerianization, the Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board manifestly promotes Nigerian ownership in its review of oil companies' local content plans (including the jobs to be created, and the substitution of imported goods and services) (Ovadia, 2013: 5). Nigeria demands for 100 percent compliance with the targets set in the Local Content Act before a company is permitted to operate in Nigeria (even though many local content targets are “well beyond the capacity of Nigerian companies” (Ovadia, 2013: 5).

In the case of Angola, again one sees a substantial deviation from the local content ideals vis-a-vis the real practice. This begs an explanation. The country's local content policies started right at the time of independence from Portugal (in 1975). Angola's indigenization program, baptized Angolanization, was designed to close the chapter of colonialism and usher in a new era of nationalistic developmental policies. The Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA) party, which captured power, adopted a patriotic political ideology with Marxist overtones. As a matter of priority, the colonial oil company, Angol, was appropriated, and a national/Angolan oil company, Sonangol, created in 1976. Sonangol was granted sole concessionaire rights over petroleum resources, and was mandated to conduct regulatory and operational activities (CRES, 2008). With time, Sonangol expanded its role to include identification of exploration areas; negotiation and management of production contracts; and the collection, validation, monitoring, and archiving of all petroleum activity data in Angola (CRES, 2008; Tordo and Anauti, 2013).

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Two issues are worth noting. First, the Angola content policies, that is, Angolanization, called for a maximalist indigenization agenda. This involved calls for technology transfer; the Angolanization of the petroleum workforce; domestic sourcing of goods and services (which was extended beyond the petroleum sector); and the use of national companies – such as Sonangol – to govern the Angolan oil and gas industry in the national interest.

However, while Angola adopted a Marxist ideology (partly due to Cuba's involvement in its liberation struggle), Angola's Angolanization agenda (inspired by Marxian nationalism) is, in practice, watered down to accommodate certain interests of oil companies. Sonangol, for example, has never strictly followed a socialist agenda. The company partnered with international oil companies to pursue oil development in Angola. This suggests that while the country's official rhetoric was rife with far-reaching Angolanization, the practice was a more pragmatic, hybridization of indigenization with domiciliation (Oliviera, 2007).

Second, citizen participation in the Angolan polity (and the economy) does not feature prominently. MPLA party and its leader, who until recently was Jose Eduardo dos Santos, has since 1979 to-date continued to exert a strong grip on the oil sector through the Ministry of Petroleum, and Sonangol, by proxy (Cinlar, 2010; Morais, 2012).

Third, in terms of developmental impacts, Angolanization leaves a lot to be desired. The World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report of 2011 ranked Angola 139th out of the 142 countries covered (WEF, 2011). Angola is almost at the bottom of the UN Human Development Index. The oil-rich country also has a disturbingly high inequality in income distribution. In 2010, Angola's GINI index (which measures inequality) was 58.6% and 54.3% of the population lived below the \$1.25 a day poverty line (UNDP, 2010).

Moreover, the country has a growing, under-educated labour force; poor infrastructure; and a huge problem of government ineffectiveness largely due to endemic corruption. Angola is rated one of the world's most corrupt countries (CRES, 2008; Tordo and Anauti, 2013). Thus, while Angola has one of the world's highest corporate tax rates (35%), compared with Brazil (34%), Uganda (30%), South Africa (28%), and Norway (28%), and while Angola's tax revenue as a percentage of GDP is 43% (2009 figures) compared to Norway (27%), South Africa (26%) and Uganda (12%), a lot of this money is swindled.

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In short, Angola's indigenization policies have neither gained traction nor delivered lasting developmental impacts. This is largely attributed to corruption, a lesson that Uganda needs to learn. The negative effects of corruption in Angola have been worsened by the 27-year civil war which shattered Angola's economy, human capital, and infrastructure. The MPLA government revived the Angolanization policies after the civil war but still lacks demonstrable capacity to disable corruption.

Local Content in Uganda

As already hinted, the 'initial conditions' of oil-rich Uganda are substantially different from those of Norway, the epitome of local content, at the time she discovered oil. This contrast is succinctly summarized hereunder.

Where Norway was an advanced economy with per capita GDP of over \$10,000 in 1970, Uganda currently has a GDP of \$ 1,000 (PPP). Where Norway was a stable democracy at the time of its oil discovery, Uganda is a fragile democracy that only reintroduced competitive party politics in 2006 after 20 years of 'no-party democracy.' Where Norway forged a social contract between the rival claimants to the political economy, Uganda has not. Norway had institutionalized a system of welfare capitalism that guaranteed peoples' right to equitable growth, and to the basic necessities of life. By contrast, Uganda has institutionalized neoliberal economics characterized by rapid growth (estimated at 7.3 percent in 1992-2009). However, the rapid growth is highly inequitable signifying the exclusion of a substantial proportion of the people from the fruits of growth (Kiiza *et al.*, 2011: 192)).

The Uganda-Norway contrast extends to the arena of institution-building. Norway immunized its economy and society against corruption by institutionalizing the rule of law. By contrast, Uganda suffers deep-seated official corruption (with the World Bank estimating that Uganda loses to corruption an estimated Ushs 500 billion a year). Uganda's corruption scandals (such as the recent Office of Prime Minister scandal which led to donors' withdraw of foreign aid) suggest that a lot needs to be done to prevent the grabbing of oil revenues via corrupt practices.

However, not everything is negative. The Ugandan President has firmly stated that Uganda will not export oil in raw form. Ministry of Energy officials concur. Their view is that government will use the exhaustible petroleum resources to build *inexhaustible* developmental capabilities (Interviews, January 2016). Indeed, by 2013, the development of an oil refinery had already started

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in Kabaale Parish, Hoima District. The aim was to domesticate oil refinery technology, add value to crude oil, create jobs, and sell value-added petroleum products in the local, regional and global markets. The spirit of Uganda's local content policies is evident in Uganda's upstream and midstream petroleum laws.

Local Content in Uganda's Oil and Gas Policy

The case of local content in Uganda is interesting. The country demands for the maximalist variant of local content and citizen participation. According to the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, national content in Uganda is defined in terms of “value addition in Uganda, by Ugandans in the oil industry, by the use of Ugandan materials, services produced by Ugandans and Ugandan firms, and the use of facilities in Uganda ...” (MoEMD, 2011:5; Interviews, August 2016). Ownership, though important, should arguably “not be a precondition for national content especially in the short term” (ibid: 5).

In practice, however, the oil companies import a substantial proportion of the labour force, as well as other supplies such as sausages and mineral water (Hoima Interviews, 2013) from other countries. This is attributed to the absence of a “competitive supplier base” (Interviews, MEMD, and May 2016). This kind of problem points to “the need for Uganda to address the limited capacity of local firms to meet supply quarters sustainably and predictably”. (Bunyoro Kingdom Interviews, May 2016).

Local Content in the Upstream and Midstream Laws (2013)

Uganda passed the Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Act in 2013. This law (herein after called the Upstream Act, 2013) has explicit provisions for local content and state participation in the petroleum industry. Section 124(1) provides for government participation in petroleum activities through a participating interest of a license or contract, and via joint ventures. Government participation reinforces Section 4(2) of the Upstream Act, which stipulates that “...the Government of Uganda shall hold petroleum rights on behalf of and for the benefit of the people of Uganda”.

Additionally, Section 125 legislates in favor of provision of goods and services by Ugandan entrepreneurs. Succinctly stated, “The licensee, its contractors and subcontractors shall give preference to goods which are produced *or available* in Uganda and services which are rendered by Ugandan citizens and companies” [Section 125(1) – *italics added*]. In the event of non-availability of the appropriate goods and services in Uganda, “they shall be provided by a

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company which has entered into a joint venture with a Ugandan company provided that the Ugandan company has a share capital of at least forty eight percent in the joint venture” (Section 125(2). Section 126 provides for the training and employment of Ugandans; while Section 127 commits oil companies to “maximize knowledge transfer to Ugandans [via scholarships and other programs], and to establish in Uganda, management and technical capabilities and any necessary facilities for technical work, including the interpretation of data.”

In the same spirit, the Petroleum (Refining, Conversion, Transmission and Midstream Storage) Act of 2013 has substantial provisions for local content enhancement. This law (herein after called the Midstream Act, 2013) provides in Section 52(1) for government participation in midstream activities, through the National Oil Company established under Section 42 of the Upstream Act, 2013. Like the Upstream Act, the Midstream Act commits the licensee, its contractors and subcontractors to “give priority to citizens of Uganda and registered entities owned by Ugandans in the provision of goods and services” (Section 53(1)).

Additionally, Section 54 of the Midstream Act provides for the training and employment of Ugandans in midstream activities. Section 55 mandates licensees in the midstream activities to maximize knowledge and skills transfer to Ugandans from the perspective of oil governance readiness; Uganda appears to have crafted the relevant laws. The devil is in the implementation capacity, as will be indicated hereunder (in the sections on Uganda’s local institutional context and its micro and SMEs)

Critique of the Ugandan Scenario

Enabling Laws, Disabling Institutional Framework

A major problem that is likely to neutralize Uganda’s local content legislation is the disabling institutional framework. For example, no national content development and monitoring agency has been established. This contrasts with Nigeria which, in 2010, established the Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board as an autonomous agency. The Board is mandated to receive, review and approve (or reject) the local content development plans of oil companies. The Board also sets policies and guidelines for an ambitious program of local content improvement via capacity building initiatives, job creation and substitution of imported goods/services with Nigerian products. No such agency exists in Uganda. Nor has the Nigeria-like ambitious spirit of local content development gained traction in Uganda – at least not yet – even though

Section 9 of the Upstream Law establishes a Petroleum Authority to inter alia “administer petroleum agreements” in Uganda (Section 9(2j)).

Corrosive Effect of Corruption on Local Content Regulations

The most paramount problem of governance in Uganda is not the absence of laws. It is the corrosive effect of corruption on the quality of governance. Take the case of signature bonuses. Because of weak readiness to govern the oil economy, Uganda got laughable bonuses of \$200,000 and \$300,000 for Block 2 and Block 3 respectively. DRC, which is widely faulted for its cancer of state failure, ironically caused the oil companies to pay \$3.5 million in bonuses upon signing a PSA for its Block 1 in 2008. According to Lay *et al.*, (2010: 6-7), Uganda’s Ministry for Finance denies knowledge of where the laughable signature bonuses went. This has fueled suspicion that the money was stolen. It raises questions over the government’s readiness to govern the oil sector in the national interest, and use the larger oil revenues for national, as opposed to predatory, purposes.

Oil in Uganda (OiU) (OiU, 2013:8) raises similar concerns. Uganda, it argued, has already earned roughly US\$1billion (in form of fees, signature bonuses and most importantly, capital gains tax on Tullow and other oil companies). The problem is that government – which, according to the Constitution, holds oil resources ‘in trust’ for the nation – is not willing to disclose to the citizens how much money it is receiving (OiU, 2013:8). While enabling disclosure laws exist - for example, under the Access to Information Act of 2015, secrecy predominates as a culture of doing business. This is likely to compromise citizen agency – for example, to hold government to account.

Local Business Readiness Lacks: Problem of Micro and SMEs

An important problem that oil governance has to grapple with is Uganda’s predominantly micro, small and medium enterprise (MSME) sector, which is ill-prepared to compete in the oil and gas value chain. In Uganda, a small enterprise is defined as firm “employing a minimum of 5 people and a maximum of 50 people; and/or has an annual sales/revenue turnover of a maximum of Ugandan Shillings 360 million and total assets of a maximum of Ugandan Shillings 360 Million” (Earnest and Young, 2011: 5). A medium enterprise is a firm “employing between 50 and 100 people; and/or has an annual sales/revenue turnover of more than Ugandan Shillings 360 million and total assets of more than Ugandan Shillings 360 million” (Earnest and Young, 2011: 5). This definition of SMEs suggests that firms with less than 5

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employees are 'micro' – hence, the notion of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs).

According to the National Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) Policy and Strategy report of 2007, the MSME sector contributes 20 percent to GDP and provides employment to about 1.5 million people. This is roughly 90 percent of total non-farming private sector employment. Additionally, employment growth in the MSME sector is 20 percent per annum (Earnest and Young, 2011: 5). This is clearly the sector that should be targeted by government and the oil companies to enhance local content and citizen participation in oil-led development.

A key problem for Uganda is that the MSMEs suffer endemic problems. They predominantly operate as *jua kali* (hot sun) firms in the open spaces, with no proper business premises. Uganda's MSMEs are constrained in terms of accessing credit. They lack managerial capabilities (and are often run as family businesses using kin and kith ties, not professionalism, to do business). Moreover, most of these firms live in a science and technology museum, lacking, as they do, the empowering technologies needed for business record keeping, trend analysis, forecasting, and competitive business practices. Because of this litany of problems, Uganda's MSMEs are characterized by high birthrates, and high death rates. Over 65 percent of MSMEs die before they celebrate their 5th birthday (Earnest and Young, 2011).

Thus, in terms of business readiness to exploit opportunities in the oil and gas sector, Uganda is simply NOT ready. Yet, the BTVET institutions, which should empower Uganda's business firms for oil-related business, are manifestly incapacitated. With the possible exception of Nakawa Vocational Training Institute in Kampala (Tulloch Interviews, Kampala, 2013), Uganda's BTVET institutions are dysfunctional. This clearly arises from the government's neglect of the BTVET sector. For example, over 65 percent of the Ministry of Education and Sports Budget is spent on basic/primary education. Yet, less than 5 percent is spent on BTVETs, notwithstanding the official pro-BTVET rhetoric of the *Skilling Uganda* program.

Zero Ideological Readiness: Economic Liberalism Reigns

The philosophy of local content is premised on the ideology of economic nationalism (Kiiza, 2007). It is premised on the use of state power and domestic institutions to govern the national economy *in the national interest*. The aim is to deliver inclusive growth characterized by active citizen participation in the

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political economy. The problem in the case of Uganda is the limited supply of economic nationalism. Economic liberalism is the dominant or even official economic ideology of the ruling elites (in the economy and the polity).

Moreover, economic liberalism has been institutionalized. The most influential institutions for governing the national economy – that is, the Central Bank of Uganda and the powerful Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development are predominantly staffed with donor-driven, baby-faced economic bureaucrats (some may claim that this would include the current powerful Governor Tumusiime-Mutebile). These bureaucrats religiously owe their allegiance, their economic wisdom, and political clout to the IMF/World Bank fraternity. Insulated from local political demands for concrete developmental outcomes, the Central Bank and the Ministry have a two-pronged character. They are simultaneously autonomous of local political pressures, and captured by the Washington-based forces of global capitalism.

The IMF, for example, retains an office in the Bank of Uganda building. The aim is to conduct surveillance on Uganda and enforce compliance with conservative economic policies – Made in Washington, DC. Neither local content nor citizen participation in the polity and economy can gain traction unless economic liberalism is replaced with economic nationalism.

Summary and Policy Implications

This paper has scrutinized the local content credentials of Uganda's petroleum policies as well as the upstream and midstream laws. We have highlighted the corrosive effect of economic liberalism (the dominant ideology in Uganda) on local content policies; the nature of local businesses (which are predominantly micro and SMEs), and the fragile BTVET institutions which are manifestly unready to transform Uganda's firms into competitive actors in oil-led development.

The main conclusion is, firstly, that Uganda has, without a doubt, crafted enabling local content policies and laws. The enactment of local content legislation in Uganda is, without a doubt, an important milestone; *important* because local content development is a journey, not a destination. In a rating of zero (0) to ten (10), Uganda's local content legislation has been rated 7/10 (MEMD Interviews, January 2016). However, the country has substantial deficits in terms of its institutional capacity. No specialized agency for local content enhancement exists. Moreover, the country has a weak policy implementation capacity. Good policies (such as the anti-plastic bags policy or

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the more nationalistic 'Buy Uganda, Build Uganda' policy) have so far proved difficult to enforce. For reasons of path-dependency, there is little evidence to suggest that Uganda's local content policies, laws and regulations will be the first to navigate past the country's weak implementation capacity.

Secondly, however, the situation described above is a mere tip of the iceberg because Uganda has a cancerous problem of corruption. Ineffective control of corruption spells doom for oil governance in general and local content development in particular. In fact, the disastrous level of official corruption is a recipe for oil-curses, not blessings.

Thirdly, it is fair to characterize Uganda's problem as more a structural one than anything else. Uganda's predominantly micro and SMEs are not just embryonic. They are uncompetitive. This is likely to compromise local business participation in the oil and gas value-chain. Closely related to this is the challenge of Fragile BTVET institutions. As indicated herein above, Uganda's BTVET institutions are underfunded, trivialized and neglected under the current administration (1986 - to-date). While a *Skilling Uganda* program has been designed, actual implementation leaves a lot to be desired.

Important as they are, the afore-stated problems pale in comparison with Uganda's mega-problem, that is, ideological capture. That economic liberalism (the ideology of advanced high-tech economies) was prematurely adopted in pre-industrial Uganda is no longer debatable. That economic liberalism is the dominant ideology of the state elites, in politics and in the economy, is not debatable either. What is underemphasized is one key challenge. Economic nationalism, the ideology of late developers, is still under-supplied in Uganda, thanks to the eclipse of neo-liberalism.

The elites in Uganda must be caused to appreciate one key point. Local content implementation can hardly gain traction unless economic liberalism is replaced with economic nationalism. The experiences of Norway and Angola show that having nationalistic local content policies is one thing. Actualizing them is another. Norway succeeded while Angola failed to actualize local content in the national political economy. Thus, Uganda needs to learn from Norway, not Angola.

It follows, therefore, that Uganda needs to embark on local content enhancement via concrete programs for local skills development; technology transfer; inclusion of local businesses in the different phases of the petroleum

value chain; participation of local communities; and the creation of industries to promote local manufacturing value-addition (Asamoah, Joe, 1013). Such capabilities are not God-given, as Norway's case shows. They are historically created. None of the Norway-like credentials will gain traction unless Uganda the complex problem of ideological capture (by foreign conservative elites headquartered in the Bretton Woods institutions) is resolved. The problem of non-developmental elites also needs to be addressed. Uganda's elites, who have been faithful servants of foreign interests, should be retired or reformed to serve Uganda. Without these reforms, Uganda's local content dispensation will remain mythical. If Uganda's elites are not retired or reformed, mythical local content will degenerate into local discontent, with serious implications for peace, stability and national development.

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Review Essay

Paul Bjerk. **Building a Peaceful Nation: Julius Nyerere and the Establishment of Sovereignty in Tanzania 1960-1964**. New York: University of Rochester Press, 2015. 374pp. ISBN-13:978-1-58046-505-2. Price \$75 Hardcover.

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Building a Peaceful Nation in Tanzania is a significant contribution to the growing literature on state-and nation-building in Africa. Cast in the analytic framework of sovereignty and discursive agency, the book examines the historical context within which, Julius Nyerere, the founding President of Tanzania, navigated the challenges and policy processes of reconstructing a colonial state apparatus and re-fashioning into a new sovereign state with an enduring national identity and a collective consciousness. Based on the interpretation and analysis of extensive archival materials and interviews, the author demonstrates how the colonial history, experiences and expectations of subject citizens provided critical conjunctures that informed and defined policy options for nationalist leaders. The book further argues that the social, political and economic policies and institutions that were subsequently designed and implemented formed a robust anchor for the resulting passive political culture that was largely responsible for Tanzania's apparent unique peace and stability in the subsequent decades. In the midst of an army mutiny, bitter Cold War-engineered conflicts and international political intrigues, the contested Union Treaty between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, pervasive poverty, heterogeneous ethnic, racial and religious social groups as well as regional political instabilities – otherwise veritable indicators of instability for any young nation – Tanzania, unlike her immediate African neighbors, remained largely unscathed during the entire period under discussion.

The book is divided into three main parts constituting a total of ten chapters. Part One is sub-titled Searching for a Sovereign Discourse and has two chapters, the first sub-titled the Education of Julius Nyerere and the second sub-titled contemplating the Political Economy. Part Two discusses Internal Sovereignty and has five chapters, namely: Independence and the Fear of

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Divisions, Invention of Ujamaa, Origins of Villagization, the Army Munity and the National Youth Service. Part Three discusses External Sovereignty and has three chapters namely: A Realist Foreign Policy, the Cold War and the Union Treaty, and Contending with International Intrigues.

The book goes to great lengths and details in discussing what is presented as Nyerere's profound and deep-seated fears and anxieties about the possible negative role of identity politics in undermining the establishment and resilience of a peaceful and prosperous nation. Right from the early independence days, the Tanzanian state set itself the task of undertaking a vigorous process of nation-building with the aim of welding its multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-cultural and multi-religious country into one nation. It is argued that the First President deliberately embarked on developing discursive strategies of uniting a historically divided post-colonial nation by craftily declaring an all-out war on what was characterized as three common national enemies, namely ignorance, disease and poverty. The very choice of the war imagery served as a unifying factor against the real and imagined national enemies, calling on all citizens to unquestioningly support all the development policies, projects and programs identified and promoted by the Government, not least, the nation-building experiment. The project was therefore, state-driven from the outset, relying on a top-down approach that carried far-reaching centralizing implications. The only shared experience of Tanzanians was that of German and British colonial administrations.

President Nyerere came to enjoy the unparalleled adulation across the world and was variously described as 'Africa's "philosopher king", or the 'greatest thinker president' by various writers. Issa Shivji (2011:1) describes him aptly as "the most articulate, intense and militant of the first generation of African nationalists...he stood head and shoulder above many of his political contemporaries. He was a radical nationalist, progressive, pan-Africanist and broadly anti-imperialist. Goran Hyden and Donald William (1993) shared similar sentiments. They assert that Nyerere's presidency was the most symbolic in all of Africa, carefully framing the nation-building project with the goal of remaking the entire nation into a super community. They add further that "Nyerere's own rationale for communitarian, one-party democracy became a source of inspiration for many other political leaders in the region...Tanzania had much greater influence in African than its otherwise modest accomplishments might suggest" (1993:92-93). In addition, Ali Mazrui (1967:22) writes that "Of all the top political figures in English-Speaking Africa as a whole, Nyerere is perhaps the most original thinker of them all".

Research conducted among representative adult samples in twelve countries provides further evidence that popular notions of ethnic and national identity in Tanzania are in fact radically different from those found in other African countries. When asked the open question ‘which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost? Only 3 percent of Tanzanians responded in terms of ethnic, language or tribal affiliation, the lowest of the 12 countries in the sample with the exception of small and relatively homogeneous Lesotho at 2 percent. This is in contrast to 76 percent of the respondents who answered the relevant question in terms of occupational affiliations. Moreover, about 90 percent of the respondents claimed they were proud to be called Tanzanians. This low rate of attachment to ethnic identity stands in sharp contrast to Nigeria (48 percent), Namibia (46 percent), Mali (39 percent), Malawi (38 percent), and Zimbabwe (36percent) (Afro-Barometer, 2002). To be sure, Julius Nyerere’s nation-building experiment would seem to have left an indelible mark on Tanzania’s political culture!

After his resignation from the premiership position only six weeks after independence, Nyerere embarked on creating a sustained common narrative and a shared political culture for Tanzanians through a series of well-calculated nation-building strategies. These strategies were firmly grounded in his profound belief in the intrinsic equality of all mankind and his unwavering commitment to the building of social, economic and political institutions that would reflect and ensure such equality. He began earnestly by re-invigorating TANU (the Tanganyika African National Union), the nationalist political party, transforming it from a mere nationalist movement into a robust and powerful political organization, with massive popular support at all levels of society. Its membership was not structurally linked to any particular group - religious, ethnic, racial class or regional. The mass political party represented many divergent interests and was held together by electoral rules that helped to strengthen its national dominance. By revitalizing the party, the political leadership sought to counterbalance the power of the new political and bureaucratic elites by establishing a political mechanism meant to promote the effective mobilization of the popular masses thus creating grass-root-based political power.

The book further discusses how the state swiftly enacted and rigorously enforced several contentious stiff laws that were designed to promote national unity and discourage societal divisiveness. The struggle to concentrate power, authority and influence gradually led to the abolition of fissiparous tendencies in the body politic. Politically restrictive legislations include the Preventive

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Detention Laws targeting supposedly rancorous trade unions and opposition political parties as well as the introduction of a one-party state system. Civil society organizations such as trade unions and the youth, women's and students' organizations that had supported nationalist struggles were either banned or turned into affiliates of the ruling political party. It was claimed that fully open competition between rival political parties might have generated poisonous ethnic, class and/or religious factionalism in a fragile political environment. Other politically restrictive laws abolished the post of traditional chief in 1962 while strengthening the role of elected village councils. The book notes that the abolition of traditional chiefs played a pivotal role in further diminishing ethnicity in Tanzania's public life relative to other politically turbulent African countries where such authorities remained firmly anchored in the local governance organizational structures.

Moreover, through the virtual monopoly and control of the mass media, schools, public service and civil society organizations, the state-party oligarchy successfully inculcated citizens with "desirable" political ideas and opinions including, often, a strong attachment to the nation, over and above ethnic, religious or even regional identities. During the immediate post-independence years, the state created an environment in which the freedom of the mass media was severely curtailed and the dissemination of news and information was monopolized by its own agencies. The state-controlled media was geared largely to inform, educate and propagate national policies and values.

The private press was forced to exercise self-censorship by constraining its coverage of certain controversial issues. The book argues that the state's ultimate virtual hegemony over citizens was further enhanced by the control and monopolization of public messages on nation-building to the extent that it has been difficult to dislodge its impact even after over three decades of political and economic liberalization. Secondly, the book further addresses the role of political mobilization and training of the youths as yet another core nation-building strategy in Tanzania. It comprised, among other aspects, a compulsory national service for all secondary school graduates. The newly established military camps received and trained youths from different regions which, arguably, helped them to create age-based social networks rather than ethnic or religious-based networks. While in military camps, youths received a heavy dose of military training and civic education. Both programs were considered important in getting the youth committed to the nation as they grew up and were expected to unquestionably support rather than oppose the government's development policies and programs. More importantly, civic

education was geared to the molding of the youth into good and responsible citizens as well as being politically competent members of society.

Thirdly, the book discusses the role of the education curriculum in the molding of a national identity in Tanzania. It is noted that schools which belonged to different sections of society – missionary, Asian, European, cooperative and private – were nationalized and turned into public schools. This policy intervention created equal education opportunities and accessibility for all. Moreover, the allocation of secondary school admissions was based on a quota system which tended to favor localities which had lagged behind educationally. In addition, schools became arenas for promoting a national culture. Better still, sports, traditional dances, stories, songs and other cultural practices were taught to all students. Finally, public school curricula in independent Tanzania were aggressively employed as a strategic nation-building tool. The curricula stressed a common Tanzania history, culture, loyalty and values. In this way, the education system inculcated the youth with a strong sense of national and pan-African identity. Bringing and mixing together students from different ethnic, racial and religious backgrounds helped to create networks among educated elites across social divisions.

Fourthly, the book analyzes the role played by the promotion of the Kiswahili language as yet another political factor that most obviously distinguishes Tanzania from all other African nations. The Kiswahili language became a source of shared identity among Tanzanians of all ethnic and racial social groups. As other experts on Tanzania have insightfully observed, the political leadership quickly pushed for total “Swahilization” of the government administration and established the National Kiswahili Council to promote its use in all spheres of public life. Using the Kiswahili language as a medium of instruction at the primary school level was very central to Nyerere’s nation-building project. The language spread throughout the country as primary school children could teach it to their own parents at home. The book strongly notes that the spread of Kiswahili increased friendships, business partnerships and marriages across ethnic, racial and religious groups that shared a common national language. In short, the role of the Kiswahili language in the nation-building project in Tanzania could hardly be overstated. The book concludes that the above self-perpetuating norms, values and institutions fostered widespread acceptance of the preferred national identity and a rejection of political violence as being un-Tanzanian. They were said to have weakened identity consciousness and ties, secularized the society and promoted the new

Severine M. Rugumamu

sense of nationhood just as the experience of industrialization had supposedly done in Europe!

However, **Building a Peaceful Nation** is a provocative and interesting book but falls short of persuading. As the agency in the discursive condition, the book tends to over-play the ideas, interests and perceptions of the First President at the expense of other equally critical policy actors such as his very close nationalist leaders, opposition political parties and leaders, to say nothing of the broad masses of Tanzanian citizens. It provides massive evidence to demonstrate the immense power and ability of the President in supposedly always making the right policy choices and always building unflinching political coalitions around certain discourses while controlling and often marginalizing counter narratives. The book is equally pre-occupied with a thinly-veiled but largely lop-sided discussion about the immense personal skills, intelligence, rhetorical capabilities of the President, while paying lip services to the capabilities of other principle actors and their respective counter discourses and strategies employed to challenge the establishment. In short, it grossly inflates his role! A more useful and better nuanced analysis of political developments in Tanzania would have required a balanced recognition of the complexity of Julius Nyerere, as a person, the complexity of the development process and the challenges of leading a country that was underdeveloped, coupled with the complexity of the international system that the country found itself interacting with immediately after independence in 1961.

Equally disappointing, is the fact that the book fails to capture and analytically designate the Arusha Declaration and its policy strategy of Socialism and Self-Reliance as the critical historical juncture in the analysis of the nation- and state-building project in Tanzania. To be sure, the Declaration came to provide a sweeping but detailed political, social and economic compass for Tanzania for decades along the road. Viewed retrospectively, the immediate post-independence nation-building measures detailed by the book would not have gone far and deep enough in building the coherent and peaceful nation, state and society that we have come to know and celebrate if the momentous Arusha Declaration interventions had not taken place. The whole book project required being anchored in some all-encompassing ideology and policy strategy such as was provided by the Arusha Declaration. This is the policy blue-print that promised a non-racial, non-tribal, and non-religious development strategy in order to arrest and even reverse the already creeping processes of class formation and regional economic disparities through the national distribution of central government resources – for education, health and infrastructure.

Surprisingly, the author fails to conceptualize this nuanced peculiarity of Tanzania's development intervention. Admittedly, it could be argued, the deliberate equitable resource distribution policies promoted by the Arusha Declaration would seem to have hugely served to depoliticize ethnicity and potential religious conflicts to a far greater extent in Tanzania than in other comparable African countries.

Moreover, although nation-building can bind people together and reduce the likelihood of domestic civil strife, it may equally provide nationalist impulses that may lead to war with neighboring countries. This would happen if the people's national identity and pride was perceived to be under potential external threat. The history of the world is replete with examples of such tendencies including the experiences of Adolf Hitler's Germany, Benito Mussolini's Italy and Emperor Hirohito's Japan. However, this hypothesized fear has not materialized in Tanzania. In fact, the proud Tanzania state has been an excellent neighbor, accepting millions of refugees fleeing armed conflicts in the region and facilitating peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa's troubled neighborhoods thanks to the pan-Africanist ideals that are at the very heart of Nyerere's enduring political philosophy. The analysis in this otherwise well-written and thought-provoking book fails to go this far.

Finally, the author also fails to examine the down side of extensive nation-building interventions on the economic development trajectory of a poor and dependent African country, like Tanzania. A single-minded pursuit of the nation-building project would arguably tend to compromise other equally important national interests, including a focused approach to a balanced economic growth and development. A poorly calibrated public ownership stance with respect to the major means of production and distribution, preference for cooperative over private ownership, the uncompromised policy of self-reliance with a diminishing reliance on foreign direct investment – all these forces could dynamically conspire to generate negative incentives for entrepreneurship, productivity, technology transfer and innovation, leaving the dependent and struggling national economy highly uncompetitive, ineffective and vulnerable to externally generated shocks. This is another way in which Julius Nyerere's nation-building project could also be assessed. Nonetheless, **Building a Peaceful Nation** is an important contribution to a growing literature on state-and nation-building in Africa. It ably explains how and why Tanzania's apparent national identity was created and propagated.

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